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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Concern for nuclear power plant safety has been steadily increasing since the 
beginning of the nuclear power era. This increase in public concern has been accom­
panied by advances made by the nuclear power industry in the design and operation 
of nuclear power plants. Presently, plant safety systems monitor various instrumen­
tation readings to check if the plant conforms to preset safety limits. If any of the 
instrumentation readings exceeds the preset limits, the information is relayed to the 
plant operators through alarms and warnings. The response of the operators to the 
abnormal situation is procedural in nature. These procedures are based on the symp­
toms of the plant, and are developed through prior extensive analysis of the plant. 
The operator response is based on the symptoms of the plant behavior, and not on 
the cause of the symptoms. 
An automated real-time fault diagnostic system would provide information to the 
operators about the cause of the abnormality. The operators can use this additional 
information to validate the appropriateness of their procedural actions. .A.n early 
diagnosis of an impending safety trip can provide the operators adequate lead time to 
bring the plant to a safe shutdown, which has a lesser impact on the plant components 
than a safety trip. Such a fault diagnostic system can also be used at the technical 
support center to monitor the health of the plant. The information from the system 
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can be used during a post-event analysis to prevent a future recurrence. 
The work presented in this dissertation explores the design and development 
of a nuclear power plant fault diagnostic system based on artificial neural networks 
(ANNs), a form of artificial intelligence (.AI). .ANNs have been chosen over other 
forms of .41 due to the advantages they provide. The .ANNs learn from example data 
and thus do not need to be provided with explicit rules regarding the system that is 
being modeled. Moreover, the fault and noise tolerant capabilities make the ANNs 
well suited to the task of fault diagnosis in a system as comple.x as a nuclear power 
plant. 
One of the problems commonly encountered by .ANN users is the selection of 
an -ANN architecture. Currently, the user guesses at the input variables required 
to model a system. This guess is based on the user's expertise of the system being 
modeled. .A.lso, the size of the hidden layer is often guessed at using rules of thumb. 
The common practice is to train different .ANNs with different inputs and hidden 
nodes, and use the model that displays the best post - training characteristics. This 
approach is computation intensive, and is not guaranteed to provide the best possible 
model. 
One of the objective of this research is to develop a scheme that allows an .ANN 
to automatically select the input variables that it deems necessary during the training 
process. This scheme should also allow the .A.NN to vary the number of hidden nodes 
during training to arrive at a viable model. Such a scheme would significantly improve 
the usability of .ANNs. This scheme will be used to develop a fault diagnostic adviser 
for a nuclear power plant. Using these techniques, the adviser will be assembled 
out o individual .ANNs. each of which will act as a module. This modular design 
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will allow for future expansion of the existing adviser. The ability to develop ANN 
models without guesswork will lead to significant reduction in developmental time 
for the adviser. The multiple ANN based design of the adviser would require such a 
capability for practical development of the adviser. 
Dissertation Organization 
The main body of this dissertation comprises of three self-contained papers that 
represent three distinct phases of this research. They have been presented in chrono­
logical order. Anujit Basu is the principal investigator and the first author of the 
papers presented here; Dr. E.B. Bartlett appears as the second author. 
The first paper has been published in Nuclear Science and Engineering. This 
paper describes a dynamic node architecture (DNA) scheme applied to developing 
an ANN-based fault diagnostic adviser for a nuclear power plant. The DNA scheme 
allows the dynamic growth and contraction of the hidden layer to arrive at the opti­
mum hidden layer size without recourse to guesswork. The adviser described in the 
first paper is capable to detecting and classifying 27 distinct transients. 
The second paper has been submitted to IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks. 
This paper describes a dynamic input selection (DIS) scheme that allows an ANN 
to dynamically select inputs and hidden layers during training to arrive at a viable 
model. DIS is an extension and modification of the DNA scheme. Examples are 
provided to explain the workings of DIS. and demonstrate its advantages. The figures 
and tables for this paper have been collected at the end of the paper. 
The third paper has been submitted to Neural Computing and Applications. 
This paper presents the development of a nuclear power plant fault diagnostic adviser 
-i 
based on a modular design. This design allows the adviser to be built up of several 
different ANNs, each performing a part of the diagnostic task. This modular design 
also allows the expansion of the adviser to include new transients. The ANNs in this 
adviser are trained using DIS. The figures and tables of this paper are collected at 
the end of the paper. 
The three papers are followed by a general summary that summarizes the entire 
work. It also addresses some of the issues arising from this work, and future avenues 
for investigation. A list of additional references cited in the general summary are 
also included. The transient scenarios used to develop the advisers in this work are 
described in the appendix. 
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CHAPTER 1. DETECTING FAULTS IN A NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANT USING DYNAMIC NODE ARCHITECTURE ARTIFICIAL 
NEURAL NETWORKS 
A paper published in Nuclear Science and Engineering 
Anujit Basu and Eric B. Bartlett 
ABSTRACT 
This paper describes an artificial neural network- (ANN-) based diagnostic ad­
viser capable of identifying the operating status of a nuclear power plant. A dynamic 
node architecture (DNA) scheme is used to optimize the architectures of the two 
backpropagation ANNs which embody the adviser. The first or root network is used 
to determine whether the plant is in a normal operating condition or not. If the plant 
is not in a normal condition, the second, or classifier network is used to recognize the 
particular ofF-normal condition or transient taking place. These networks are devel­
oped using simulated plant behavior during both normal and abnormal conditions. 
Data from the nuclear generating station training simulator at Iowa Electric Light 
and Power Company's Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) is used in this work. 
The adviser is effective at diagnosing 27 distinct transients based on 43 scenarios 
simulated at various severities which contain up to Z% noise. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The safe operation of nuclear power reactors is very important to the nuclear 
engineering community and vital to creating a more positive attitude towards nu­
clear energy. This paper explains how artificial neural networks (ANNs) can be used 
to increase the operational safety of nuclear reactors by being the basis of a fault 
diagnostic system for a nuclear power plant. Faults in the various systems and com­
ponents of nuclear power plants cause distinct behavioral transients. These transients 
can be identified and the particular faults that cause them detected. It is hoped that 
neurocomputing, as the science of neural networks is sometimes called, will provide 
an important contribution towards the recognition and classification of operational 
transients at nuclear power plants and thereby improve their safety. 
The feasibility of using .^NNs for a fault diagnostic adviser has been demon­
strated in earlier work [3;. The present work describes the evolution of this earlier 
research and develops and enhances the previously used approaches for boiling water 
reactors (BWRs) as opposed to pressurized water reactors (PVVRs). The present 
work also demonstrates the usefulness of ANN techniques for diagnosing many more 
transients over a wider range of severities. The diagnostic task investigated here re­
quires the detection of 27 transients at a BVVR using 97 plant variables as inputs as 
opposed to 7 transients and 27 variables in the earlier investigation. Not only does the 
increase in the number of variables and transients make the adviser more applicable 
but it also significantly increases the difficulty of obtaining a solution. This is due to 
the non-polynomial-time completeness of neural network learning :16:. Therefore, as 
the number of variables n in the problem increases, the complexity increases faster 
than a polynomial of order n [17]. This makes larger problems very difficult to solve 
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using ANNs. In this work the training complexity is reduced by using a modular 
hierarchy of two ANNs which distributes the burden of the diagnosis. This hierar­
chical approach has many advantages as the number of transients and variables and 
therefore ANNs is increased. For example, the individual component networks in this 
hierarchy are trained independently and simultaneously. Moreover, all the ANNs in 
the hierarchy do not need to use the same input variables. The system developer is 
then free to use only those variables needed for each ANN in the hierarchy to com­
plete its particular task. This work demonstrates the feasibility of the hierarchical 
approach. 
The ANNs used in this work utilize the backpropagation learning algorithm in 
contrast to the stochastic learning algorithm used in the previous work !3j. Backprop­
agation is a much more widely understood and accepted paradigm. A dynamic node 
architecture (DN.A.) scheme was developed for backpropagation networks that elimi­
nates the need for preset architectures, thus eliminating another difficulty associated 
with .ANN applications :14j. The successful implementation of the DNA scheme in 
a backpropagation network enables the development of the relatively large networks 
without recourse to guesswork inherent with the usual architecture preselection. 
Power plants currently employ automatic safety systems that allow the plant to 
operate within a predefined operating range. These systems verify that plant vari­
ables conform to preassigned safety limits. If a plant variable exits from its safety 
range, safety systems either trigger an automatic reactor shutdown (safety trip) or 
notify the operators of the violation through alarms or indicators. Corrective actions 
performed by the operators following such events are based on procedures, which 
address symptoms. The operators are trained to react to each symptom by follow­
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ing specific procedures. Developed by extensive ofFsite analysis, these procedures are 
designed to put the plant in a safe condition with minimal risk or damage to the 
environment. The root cause of a transient however does not effect the procedural 
response. After the plant is in a safe condition, the sequence of events leading to a 
plant shutdown or alarm are analyzed by technical review teams comprising of oper­
ators and shift and plant engineers [51. The puropse of such reviews is to determine 
root cause and methods to avoid similar transients. 
The operators in a nuclear power plant are expected to monitor a large number 
and variety of plant parameters. These parameters, or variables are relayed to the 
operator in the control room by instrumentation located in the various systems that 
comprise the plant. It is conceivable that the operators can misread or misinterpret 
instrumentation readings during the stressful situation following an abnormal event. 
The responsibility on the operator can be overwhelming. In such situations, a diag­
nosis by the ANN-based plant diagnostic adviser could reassure the operators about 
the adequacy of their procedural actions. The adviser's diagnosis could also provide 
clues to the operator about certain symptoms that might have been overlooked or 
are likely to develop in the near future. The adviser would be able to diagnose many 
transients in enough time to warn the operators of an impending automatic safety 
trip. The operators can then, in accordance with procedures, carry out a manual 
reactor trip that would be safer and easier on the plant components as compared to 
a fast automatic shutdown. Later during a technical review, a time record of the 
instantaneous response of the .ANN adviser could be a valuable tool in understand­
ing the evolution of the abnormal event. The quick diagnosis of a transient by the 
ANN adviser could help the reviewers evaluate the appropriateness of the emergency 
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operating procedures. The adequacy of operator actions can also be evaluated in this 
light. 
Nuclear power plant diagnostics can also be performed by expert systems. Such 
diagnostic systems usually rely on elaborate decision trees to evaluate the current 
plant status [6. 7, 8]. The most, notable effort in this regard is the Reactor Safety 
Assessment System (RS.A.S) developed jointly by the Idaho National Engineering Lab­
oratory, the University of Maryland, and the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
[6. 9j. Expert systems such as RSAS require knowledge to be specifically enumer­
ated and incorporated into their knowledge base about every aspect of the system 
that is analyzed. This knowledge can be stored as numerous if-then logic statements 
that assist the expert system in performing a fault-tree type analysis ;10, llj. For 
nuclear power plants, this enumeration process for an exhaustive root cause analysis 
can require large amounts of personnel time. Every conceivable scenario should be 
analyzed to assure that as many transients as possible can be differentiated. The 
temporal behavior of all important variables is also required. All of this information 
must be manually incorporated into the expert system in a precise and methodical 
way. On the other hand. .A.NNs do not need an explicit knowledge base of this kind. 
The designer need only have a working model of the plant and a knowledge that cer­
tain sensors are important indicators of the health of the plant. Most nuclear power 
plants have such a working model in the form of a training simulator. .ANNs learn 
their responses from sets of training data and then generalize this information to the 
actual operating plant. A training data set is a collection of input-output patterns 
that are used by the network to infer the functional relationship between their inputs 
and outputs. Generalization in this context is the ability to quantitatively estimate 
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certain characteristics or features of a phenomenon never before encountered on the 
basis of similarities with things previously known [14]. 
Most of the possible transients at nuclear power plants have never actually oc­
curred and data for such scenarios are obtained through computer simulation. The 
noise and fault tolerant capabilities of neural networks are advantageous in developing 
an adviser based on such simulated data. These data are generated on a computer 
and do not contain any noise. But the adviser is expected to perform under real 
plant conditions where the input data can be expected to be corrupted by noise. The 
generalization capability of ANNs enables them to correctly classify patterns contain­
ing such noise. Fault tolerance of the neural networks is advantageous when there 
is failure of plant instrumentation. In such situations, an e.xpert system might fail 
catastrophically if certain decisions in its analysis are based on such failed inputs. On 
the other hand, the ANN adviser could perform relatively accurately, disregarding 
the particular sensor fault. This fault tolerance capability of ANNs is due to their 
distributed memory. As the number of failed sensors increase, the performance of the 
ANN adviser will gradually deteriorate. Moreover, a neural network-based adviser 
system can provide better clues during event evaluations because it can produce its 
output in real time. 
The following section gives a brief introduction to ANNs. This section also intro­
duces the difficulty of determining network architectures and the solution using our 
DN.A scheme. Section 3 gives a description of the design and development of the nu­
clear power plant fault diagnostic adviser. Section 4 presents the performance results 
of the adviser with both pure simulator data and data corrupted by 3% Gaussian 
noise. Section 5 contains concluding remarks. 
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2. NEURAL NETWORKS 
Neural networks are a fast-emerging branch of the science of artificial intelli­
gence. Hecht-Nielsen [3oj defines a neural network as a "parallel, distributed infor­
mation processing structure consisting of processing elements interconnected together 
with unidirectional signal channels called connections." The dense interconnection of 
these simple processing elements or nodes provides the .A.NN models with their char­
acteristic properties. Lippmann [1.3] describes the ANN process as a simultaneous 
exploration of competing hypotheses utilizing massively parallel networks composed 
of individual processing elements connected by variable weights. This is opposed to 
a von Neumann computer that performs a program of sequential instructions. The 
layered feed-forward ANN. as shown in Figure 1.1. was used in this work. This model 
consists of nodes arranged in layers, with the nodes of any layer being connected to 
the nodes in an adjacent layer through variable weights. A node takes its input from 
every node of the layer below it. and feeds its output to every node of the layer above 
it. There are no connections between nodes of the same layer. In such networks, the 
first layer is the input layer where the nodes are inactive, their outputs being equal 
to their inputs. The last layer is the output layer. The layers in between consist of 
"hidden" nodes, so called because they are isolated from the outside environment. 
The design of a network architecture is rather arbitrary: only the number of nodes 
in the input and output layers are fixed by the problem at hand. The simplest node, 
shown in Figure 1.2, sums weighted inputs and passes the result through a squashing 
function, sometimes also called the transfer function. The output signal of a node 
can be of any mathematical type desired [14] but is usually nonlinier and analog and 
is governed by the transfer function. In this work, the transfer function was a sigmoid 
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X(3,l) X(3,2) 
X(l,l) X(l,2) X(l,3) 
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OUTPUT NODES 
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INPUT PATTERN 
Figure 1.1: A three-layered feed-forward backpropagation neural network. 
of the form 
f i x )  =  Y 1 
+ e^ 
(1) 
where x is the weighted sum of the outputs of the nodes in the previous layer, and 
f{x) is the output. The behavior of this function can be seen in Figure 1.3. 
The publication of the backpropagation technique by Rumelhart et al. [36] has 
been the most influential development in the field of neural networks in the past 
decade. This learning scheme involved the presentation of a set of input-output 
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Figure 1.2: A simple node detailed. 
patterns. The ANN uses the input vector to produce an output vector which is then 
compared with the expected or desired output vector to calculate the error for all 
the active nodes. The weights are changed using the delta and the generalized delta 
rules [35, 36, 20] such that the errors decrease during the next iteration. The error in 
the output nodes is easily calculated as the difference between the actual output and 
the desired output. The delta rule calculates the change in weights for the output 
layer. It is not possible to calculate the error in the hidden nodes in this way as their 
14 
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Figure 1.3: The sigmoid transfer function. 
correct or expected outputs are not known. An error is assigned to each hidden node 
by backpropagating the error of the output nodes to the hidden nodes using the very 
same weights that were used to propagate the error to the output nodes in the first 
place [20]. The generalized delta rule, which is the delta rule modified for the hidden 
nodes, is used to change the weights in the hidden layers. 
Most backpropagation networks, including those used in this work, are layered 
and feed-forward; they always consist of at least three layers of nodes. The number of 
inputs and outputs are fixed by the problem at hand. The only choice of network ar­
chitecture is the number of hidden nodes. This choice needs to be exercised carefully. 
If the hidden layer is too large, it will encourage the network to memorize the input 
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patterns rather than generalize the input into features [35, 20j. The large number of 
nodes and weights give the network more ways to distinguish features allowing the 
specifics to be learned rather than the generalities. This reduces the network's ability 
to correctly classify novel patterns after training is complete. On the other hand, a 
hidden layer that is too small will drastically increase the number of iterations and 
thus the computer time required to train the network. In the extreme case, the net­
work might be untrainable [20]. There are no hard and fast rules for determining the 
optimum architecture: most rules in use at this time are empirical in nature and are 
derived by heuristic methods [17, .37, 11]. 
The present work dev^elops an ANN based diagnostic adviser for a nuclear power 
plant. This adviser uses 97 plant variables as inputs. The ANN has five binary out­
puts allowing for 2'^ possible output classes. As the design of the adviser progresses, 
the network needs to be trained a number of times with different numbers of patterns 
in the training set. If a search for the appropriate architecture is attempted before 
each training phase, the problem would assume mammoth proportions involving sig­
nificant amounts of guesswork. It is therefore imperative to develop a systematic 
method that will derive optimum, or near optimum, architectures for a given prob­
lem. The DN.4 scheme described below is one such method. 
2.1 Dynamic Node Architectures 
Other researchers have attempted to develop various dynamic architecture sche­
mes but have left some facets of the problem unanswered. For e^niple, one approach 
prunes unnecessary weights from a fully connected and trained network [3. 21. 7;. 
This results in a sparsely connected network devoid of redundant weights. This 
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approach wastes computer time by training unnecessary nodes and weights in large 
networks. Moreover, some amount of guesswork is still involved in deciding the 
initial network size which needs to be more than the optimum architecture. Another 
approach [8, 24, 2b\ starts with small networks and builds them up until the network 
can successfully learn the training set. Most of these algorithms stop when the 
training set is first learned. But it is known that learning a functional relationship 
requires more nodes than recalling the same function [.36, 27]. Work by Hirose et al. 
[24] addresses this issue by eliminating the last added node after the network can 
successfully learn the training set. The process of deleting nodes continues until the 
smallest network is found that can learn the problem. This process assumes that the 
last added node should be eliminated first. But Hirose et al. have no definite way to 
verify this assertion. 
The derivative DNA scheme developed by Bartlett and Basu jl4; progresses 
in a systematic method ,to arrive at the appropriate architecture for any particular 
problem by adding and deleting nodes as required and using a quantitative measure of 
the importance of each hidden node. Training is initiated with one hidden node. This 
architecture is obviously unable to arrive at a good solution unless the training task 
is exceedingly simple. As training progresses, the network soon reaches a learning 
plateau where it cannot reduce it's error below a certain value during a number 
of successive iterations. A node is then added to the hidden layer. The weights 
connecting this new node are assigned very small random values so that the addition 
of this node does not disrupt the network performance much. Training is resumed and 
the network soon reaches another plateau when another node is added. This process is 
continued until the network reaches a satisfactory level of performance. .At this stage, 
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not all of the hidden nodes may be necessary to perform the mapping. Therefore, the 
hidden node with the least importance is removed from the network. The resultant 
network might require further training, depending on the deleted node's importance 
to the .\NN function. Upon continued training, the smaller network might be able 
to learn the mapping. Then the next node with the least importance is deleted. This 
process is continued until the network is too small to learn the problem. Now nodes 
are added until the problem is relearned. The process of deleting and adding nodes 
is continued until the algorithm oscillates about some relative minimum architecture. 
Note that the final minimum arcitecture arrived at by the DN.A. scheme is influenced 
by the selection of various training parameters such as the learning rate, the initial 
random starting weights used in the initial architecture and the number of iterations 
spent on a learning plateau before a node is added. 
2.2 Importance of a Node 
The importance of a node to the ANN function can be defined in many ways. 
The skeletonization method [4. 5; measures the change in the error of the network 
output with the deletion of each node and assigns a greater importance to the node 
whose deletion causes a greater change. But if a hidden node is biasing the output 
of the network, i.e.. it has a near constant output over the training set, this method 
will assign a very high importance to this node even though it is unimportant to the 
dynamics of the network. Another importance measure [.30] is based on the values of 
the weights leading to and from the node and is binary in nature. Our importance 
measure, on the other hand, assumes that if changes in the output of a hidden node 
are more influential in deciding the output of.the network than a similar change in 
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the output of another hidden node, then the former node is more important to the 
dynamic functioning of the network than the latter node. In this case, the importance 
of the jth hidden node with respect to the A-th output node is defined as [14} 
where £*[...] is the expectation over the entire training set and is the maximum 
change in the output of the jth hidden layer node over the entire training set. The 
above equation gives the partial importance of the jth hidden node with respect to 
the A.'th output node. If the network consists of more than one hidden layer, the 
partial importance of any of these hidden nodes with respect to any output node can 
be found by using the chain rule. The total importance of the jth hidden node is 
the sum of the partial importances of that node with respect to all the output nodes. 
Mathematically, 
k m a x  
where k m a x  in the number of output layer nodes. The importance of a layer can be 
similarly defined as the sum of the importances of the nodes in that layer. 
2.3 DNA Training: An Example 
A very simple network learning task is the exclusive-nor problem. The training 
data for this example is shown in Table I.l. The .A.NN training is initiated with a 
starting architecture of 2 x 1 x 1. i.e., two input, one hidden, and one output nodes. 
The training target was an RMS error of 0.01. Table 1.2 shows the training history 
for this problem. It is known from previous results [14] that while one hidden node is 
too small to solve this problem, two are sufficient. The DNA scheme adds a second 
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Table 1.1: Exclusive-nor training data 
Pattern Input1 Input2 Output 
1 0.0 0.0 1.0 
2 0.0 1.0 0.0 
3 1.0 0.0 0.0 
4 1.0 1.0 1.0 
node when the network is unable to reduce its error during many iterations. This 
architecture reaches a plateau above the target RMS error, and a third node is added. 
This 2x3x1 architecture also is unable to learn the problem before a plateau is 
reached, and a fourth node is added. The 2x4x1 architecture is successful in 
learning the problem. Now. the node with the least importance is deleted. This 
leaves the network with three hidden nodes and is now able to reach the target RMS 
error. Another node is deleted and upon further training, the 2 x 2 x 1 network is also 
able to learn the problem to the desired level of accuracy. The further elimination 
of a node renders the network with only one hidden node. This is not sufficient to 
learn the problem and a node is added. This process is continued and the algorithm 
oscillates around the optimum architecture of 2 x 2 x 1 as can be seen in Table 1.2. 
Computer simulations were carried out to compare the performance of DNA-
generated networks and networks trained by conventional fixed node architecture 
(FNA) schemes. For the exclusive-nor problem, the DNA algorithm gave a minimum 
network of size 2x2x1. Two more networks with 5 and 10 hidden nodes are trained 
to the same level of accuracy on the exclusive-nor problem by using an FN.\ scheme. 
Then all three networks were used to recall on data corrupted by 5% uniform noise. 
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Table 1.2: DNA training history for the exclusive-nor problem 
Archi­
tecture 
RMS 
Error 
Archi­
tecture 
RMS 
Error 
Archi­
tecture 
RMS 
Error 
2 x 1 x 1  0.50122 2 X 3 X 1 0.01793 2 x 4 x 1  0.02828 
2 x 1 x 1  0..3S725 2 x 4 x 1  0.01929 2 x 4 x 1  0.00997 
2 x 2 x 1  0..39071 2 x 4 x 1  0.00993 2 x 3 x 1  0.02877 
2 x 2 x 1  0.11059 2 X 3 X 1 0.02243 2 X 3 X 1 0.00982 
2 X 3 X 1 0.11902 2 X 3 X 1 0.00972 2 x 2 x 1  0.06837 
2 x 3 x 1  0.03376 2 X 2 X 1 0.04227 2 x 2 x 1  0.00999 
2 X 4 X 1 j 0.04133 2 X 2 X 1 0.00999 2 X 1 X 1 0.49962 
2 X 4 X 1 i 0.00997 2 x 1 x 1  0.49979 2 x 1 x 1  0.49224 
2 x 3 x 1 1 0.02521 2 x 1 x 1  0.49286 2 x 2 x 1  0.42182 
2 X 3 X 1 i 0.00981 2 x 2 x 1  0.32188 2 X 2 X 1 0.14522 
2 x 2 x 1  0.06242 2 X 2 X 1 0.06229 2 x 3 x 1 1 0.18256 
2 x 2 X 1 i 0.02109 2 X 3 X 1 0.06681 2 X 3 X 1 i 0.01644 
2 X 3 X 1 I 0.03027 2 x 3 x 1  0.01483 2 X 4 X 1 0.02.388 
Table 1..3: Recall performance of ANNs derived by 
DNA and FNA schemes 
Archi­ Scheme Training Recall 
tecture 1 RMS error RMS error 
2x 2x1 DNA i 9.9956E-03 0.00999 
2x 5x1 FNA i 9.9278E-03 0.01831 
2x10x1 FNA i 9.7582E-03 0.01983 
The results in Table 1.3 show that the DNA architecture network outperformed the 
larger networks in the noisy situation. This indicates better generalization due to 
lesser number of nodes and weights. 
3. DESIGNING THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ADVISER 
This section describes the development of the ANN-based nuclear power plant 
fault diagnostic adviser. This adviser is capable of detecting and classifying a large 
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variety of transients and therefore needs to draw information from many plant vari­
ables. The choice of transients and variables is therefore very important. Two docu­
ments were consulted for the purpose; the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 137; 
and the Malfunction Cause and Effects Report [38], both pertaining to the Duane 
Arnold Energy Center (DAEC)- These documents describe many power plant tran­
sients. Discussions between personnel at DAEC and fellow researchers at Iowa State 
University (ISU) [391 resulted in a preliminary list of transients to be simulated on 
the operator training simulator and plant variables to be monitored [26j. Twenty 
seven of these transients, some of which can occur at varying severities, were selected 
for this work. The simulation of some transients at different severities enabled the 
adviser to detect a transient irrespective of its intensity. The training data therefore 
consisted of 43 scenarios representing the 27 distinct transients, 
3.1 Data Collection and Processing 
The raw data were obtained from the DAEC operators' training simulator. This 
data consisted of the numerical values of 97 plant variables at intervals of one second. 
The data also included a Yes/No binary switch that indicated the onset of the tran­
sient. The variables were selected from the complete list of 2,369 variables available 
on the simulator. These 97 variables were judged to be sufficient for an operator 
to diagnose the transients being investigated [39] and were therefore selected as the 
inputs for the proposed adviser. These variables covered a wide variety of plant in­
strumentation such as pressures and temperatures in the various systems of the plant, 
radiation monitors, and flow meters. Table 1.4 contains a complete list of variable 
used in this work. Raw data obtained from DAEC were reformatted and normalized 
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in the range zero to one. Normalization was based on the maximum and minimum 
possible values of the variables. 
3.2 The Structure of the Adviser 
In earlier approaches f.3, 4, 36] one network was trained to output a particular 
binary code for the normal operating conditions and each transient investigated. The 
adviser presented here is a collection of two networks. The root network determines 
if the plant is in a normal condition or not, and the classifier network identifies the 
particular transient in progress. The values of the 97 chosen variables at any single 
instant of time are assumed to contain enough information to diagnose the plant 
status. This information proved to be adequate to solve the problem. Therefore, 
both networks have 97 input nodes. The root network has only one output node 
which gives an output of 0 if the plant is in a normal condition and 1 otherwise. 
The classifier network needs to be able to distinguish between 27 different transients. 
The .A.NN therefore has five output nodes. listing of the transients investigated is 
shown in Table 1.5. 
3.3 Training the Adviser 
The training data for both the networks were chosen in an iterative manner. 
For the first trial of the root network, one pattern at the beginning and end of each 
of the 43 simulations were taken to form the training set. The initial training set 
therefore contained 86 patterns. Training was initiated with one hidden node. The 
target RMS error was 0.10. .As the training progressed, the DNA scheme added more 
nodes and gave a final architecture with five hidde nodes. The network was used 
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Table 1.4; Plant variables used to train the ANN adviser. 
Var. 
Num. 
Variable 
Desig. Description 
Min. 
Value 
Max. 
Value 
Var. 
Unit 
1 A041 Local power range monitor 
16-25 flux level B 
0.0 125.0 % power 
2 A091 Source range monitor channel B 0.0 100.0 % 
3 BOOO Average power range monitor A 
Flux level 
0.0 125.0 % power 
4 B0r2 Reactor total core flow 0.0 60.0 Mlb/hr 
5 B013 Reactor core pressure-diff"erential 0.0 30,0 j psid 1 
6 BOH Control rod drive system flow 0.0 0.025 i Mlb/hr | 
7 B015 Reactor feedwater loop A flow 0.0 4.0 [ Mlb/hr | 
8 B016 Reactor feedwater loop B flow 0.0 4.0 1 Mlb/hr 1 
9 B017 Cleanup system flow 0.0 1 0.07691 ! Mlb/hr | 
10 B022 Total steam flow 0.0 1 8.0 1 Mlb/hr i 
11 i B023 Cleanup system inlet temperature 0.0 1 755.0 1 "F i 
12 B024 Cleanup system outlet temperature 0.0 1 600.0 i -F i 
13 B026 Recirculation loop Al drive flow j 0.0 | 15.1 i Mlb/hr 
14 B028 Recirculation loop Bl drive flow | 0.0 15.1 Mlb/hr J 
15 B030 Reactor feedwater channel .41 
temperature 
280.0 430.0 1 'F 1 
i 1 
16 B032 Reactor feedwater channel Bl 
temperature 
280.0 430.0 ; 'F i 
i i 
17 B034 Recirculation loop .A.1 inlet 
temperature 
260.0 580.0 Of 
18 B036 Recirculation loop Bl inlet 
temperature 
260.0 I 580.0 
i i  
° F  
19 B0.38 Recirculation A wide range 
temperature 
50.4 ! 789.6 1 ^F 
i i i 
20 B039 Recirculation B wide range 
temperature 
50.4 789.6 OF 
21 B061 Reactor coolant total jet pumps 
1-8 flow B 
0.0 36.7 Mlb/hr 
1 0 0  
\ ! 
B062 Reactor coolant total jet pumps 
9 - 1 6  f l o w  A  
0.0 36.7 i Mlb/hr 
i 23 
1 
i  
B063 Reactor coolant total outlet 
steam flow A 
0.0 2.0 1 Mlb/hr 
1 1 
Table 1.4 (Continued) 
V'ar. Variable Min. Max. Var. 
Num. Desig. Description Value Value ! Unit 1 
24 B064 Reactor coolant total outlet 
steam flow B 
0.0 2.0 1 
i 
Mlb/hr 1 
2.5 B065 Reactor coolant total outlet 
steam flow C 
0.0 2.0 1 Mlb/hr : 
i  
26 B066 Reactor coolant total outlet steam 
flow D 
0.0 2.0 1 
i 
Mlb/hr ; 
27 B079 Reactor recirculation pump A 
motor vibration 
0.0 10.0 i j MILS ! 
28 B080 Reactor recirculation pump B 
motor vibration 
0.0 10.0 1 MILS 1 
29 B083 Control rod drive cooling-water 
differential pressure 
0.0 •500.0 dpsi 
i  
.30 B084 Control rod drive cooling-water 
differential pressure 
0.0 60.0 : dpsi 
j  
31 B085 Torus air temperature #1 0.0 500.0 i op 
32 B086 Torus air temperature ^2 0.0 500.0 i 
33 B087 Torus air temperature 4rZ 0.0 500.0 1 
34 B088 Torus air temperature ^4 0.0 •500.0 i ^F 
35 B089 Drywell temperature azmuth 0 
elevation 750 
0.0 •500.0 ; -F 
36 B090 Drywell temperature azmuth 245 
elevation 750 
0.0 •500.0 ; °F ' 
37 B091 Drywell temperature azmuth 90 
elevation 765 
0.0 500.0 1 
i 
cp 1 
38 B092 Drywell temperature azmuth 270 
elevation 765 
0.0 •500.0 ! 
j  
op i  
39 B093 Drywell temperature azmuth 270 
elevation 765 
0.0 
i 
500.0 1 op 1 
40 B094 Drywell temperature azmuth 180 
elevation 780 
1 0.0 
i  
i 
I 500.0 i 
i  :  
i 
'-F 
41 B095 Drywell temperature azmuth 270 
elevation 830 
1 0.0 
i 
1 500.0 j 
1 1 
-F , 
42 B096 Drywell temperature center 
elevation 750 
j 0.0 
1 
1  
j 500.0 
i  i  
I 
43 B098 Torus water temperature 1 0.0 ! 7.52.0 i -p ! 
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Table 1.4 (Continued) 
Var. Variable Min. Max. Var. { 
Num. Desig. Description Value Value Unit 
44 B099 Torus water temperature 0.0 7.52.0 '^F ; 
45 B103 Drywell pressure 0.0 100.0 psia 1 
46 B104 Torus pressure 0.0 100.0 psia 1 
47 B105 Torus water level -10.0 10.0 in. 
48 B120 Torus radiation monitor .A. -1.0 100.0 % 1 
49 B121 Torus radiation monitor B -1.0 100.0 % 
50 B122 Reactor water level 158.0 218.0 in. 1 
51 B124 Reactor water level 158.0 218.0 in. i 
52 B1257 Fuel zone level indication -153.0 218.0 in. 1 
5.3 B126 Reactor water level 158.0 4.58.0 in. 1 
54 B127 Reactor vessel pressure 0.0 1200.0 psig 1 
55 B128 Reactor vessel pressure 0.0 1200.0 psig ; 
56 B129 Reactor vessel pressure 0.0 1.500.0 psig i 
57 B130 Reactor vessel pressure 0.0 1.500.0 psig . 
58 B137 Torus water level 1.5 16.0 L ft ^ 
59 BI38 Torus water level 1.5 16.0 ft : 
60 B1.50 Core spray A flow -1767.8 5000.0 gpni ! 
61 Biol Core spray B flow -1767.8 5000.0 gpin i 
62 B160 Reactor core isolation cooling flow -62.5 .500.0 gpm 1 
63 B161 High-pressure core injection flow -437.5 .3500.0 gpm i 
64 B162 Residual heat removal A flow -75.0 15000.0 gpni ! 
65 B163 Residual heat removal B flow -75.0 150.0 gpm I 
66 B164 Drywell radiation monitor A -1.0 100.0 % ! 
67 B165 Drywell radiation monitor B 0.0 100.0 % ; 
68 B166 Post-treat activity 0.0 100.0 % 1 
1 69 B168 Pretreat activity 0.0 100.0 % 
i "0 B171 Analyzer A — Oo concentration -1.25 10.0 % 
i n B172 Analyzer A — H2 concentration -1.25 10.0 % • 
72 B173 Analyzer B — O2 concentration -1.25 10.0 % i 
73 B174 Analyzer B — H2 concentration -1.25 10.0 % 
i 74 j B180 Clean-up system flow 0.0 200.0 gpm 
75 i B196 Reactor water level-fuel zone A -1.53.0 218.0 in. 
1 76 i B197 Reactor water level-fuel zone B 1 -1.53.0 218.0 in. 
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Table 1.4 (Continued) 
Var. 
Num. 
Variable 
Desig. Description 
Min. 1  Max. 
Value j Value 
Var. i  
U n i t  1  
77 B247 Turbine steam bypass 0.0 I 500.0 op 1  
78 B248 Turbine steam bypass 0.0 i  .500.0 OF 1  
79 EOOO 4160 V switch gear bus lAl .A.-B 0.0 j  5.25 KV 1  O
 
OO 
I 
F004 Condensate pump AfcB discharge i  0.0 1  600.0 
!  i  pressure j | 
psig I  
I  
81 F005 Low-pressure condenser circulating 
water inlet temperature A 
0.0 200.0 ^F 1  
82 FOlO High-pressure condenser circulating 
water outlet temperature A 
0.0 200.0 op 
8.3 Foil Low-pressure condenser circulating 
water pressure differential A 
0.0 i  lO.O 
j  
dpsi 1  
j  
84 FOlo Circulating water pump .\(fcB 
discharge pressure 
0.0 i  100.0 
j  
psig 
85 F018 Cooling tower A discharge water 
temperature 
0.0 I 7.52.0 ^'F ^ 
i 1 ' 
86 F019 Cooling tower B discharge water { 0.0 
temperature ; 
7.52.0 ^F i 1 
1 
87 
: 
F040 j  1P-1.\ reactor feed pump suction j  0.0 
j  p r e s s u r e  j  
600.0 1  psig i  
i  
00
 
00
 
F041 IP-IB reactor feed pump suction j 0.0 j 600.0 | psig 
pressure 1 i i 
89 
; 
F042 IP-IA reactor feed pump discharge j 0.0 j 2000.0 { psig 
pressure 1 | i ; 
' 90 F043 IP-IB reactor feed pump discharge 0.0 2000.0 j psig 
i 91 F044 Condensate total flow 1 0.0 8.0 i iMlb/hr ! 
! 92 F045 Condensate makeup flow -10.0 I 100.0 i Klb/H ' 
1 93 F046 Condensate rejection flow 0.0 i 50.0 | Klb/H 
i 94 F094 Feedwater final pressure i 0.0 2000.0 | psig 
! 95 i GOOl Generator gross watts 0.0 1 720.0 1 MWE 
i  96 i T039 Low-pressure condenser pressure j 0.0 | .30.0 j in.-Hg 
I 97 i T040 High-pressure condenser pressure j 0.0 j 30.0 in.-Hg 
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Table 1.5; The twenty-seven transients, and the fourty-three scenarios used to de­
sign the adviser. 
No. Scenario Description 
1 culO j Reactor water clean-up coolant leakage 
2 cul0gp5 Reactor water clean-up coolant leakage with failure of Group 5 
isolation valves. 
3 fw04a Condensate filter demineralizer resin injection 
4 fw09a 1 Reactor feedwater pump trip 
5 fwl2c0 I Feedwater regulator valve controller stuck closed 
6 fwl2cl j Feedwater regulator valve controller stuck open 
7 fwl7a ! Main feedwater line break inside primary containment 
8 ! Main feedwater line break outside primary containment 
fwl8a - 100% severity 
fwl8a.2 1 - 60% severity 
fwl8a_3 ! - 30%. severity 
9 
1 
j 
1 
hp05 
hp05-2 
hp05-3 
High-pressure core injection (HPCI) steam supply line 
break in HPCI room 
- 100%c severity 
- 60% severity 
- 30% severity 
! 10 
hp08 
hp08-2 
hp08-3 
High-pressure core injection steam supply line break 
in torus room 
- 1-30% severity 
- 60%' severity 
- 30% severity 
11 ic20scr2 Spurious scram with effective operator action to avoid feedwater 
pump trip. Initial condition IC20 : 100% power. End of Cycle 
1 12 ic20scrm Spurious scram with no operator action. Initial condition IC20 : 
100% power, End of Cycle. 
13 ic22scra Spurious scram. Initial condition IC22: 25% power, 
Beginning of C'ycle 
14 ic23scrm Spurious scram. Initial condition IC23 : 75% power, 
Beginning of Cycle 
15 j ic24scrm Spurious scram. Initial condition IC24 : 100% power, 
! ! Middle of Cvcle ( 1 w 
Table 1.5 (Continued) 
No. Scenario Description | 
i 
I 
16 
ms02 
nis02-2 
ms02.3 
Steam leak inside primary containment ' 
- 100% severity 
- 60% severity 
- 30%. severity-
IT 
ms03a 
ms03a.2 
ms03a.3 
Main steam line rupture inside primary containment ; 
- 100% severity 
- 60% severity 1 
- 30%! severity-
18 
ms04a 
nis04a_2 
ms04aJ3 
Main steam line rupture outside primary containment 
- 100% severity ; 
- 60%i severity 
- 30% severity ' 
19 msl9ab | Spurious group 1 isolation 
20 ms32 Spurious group 7 isolation 
21 rp05tc01 Reactor protection system SCRAM circuit failure (ATWS) with ! 
alternate rod injection 
22 1 rpoactcl 1 Reactor protection system SCRAM circuit failure (.ATWS) with 
1 j failure of alternate rod injection 
23 I rrlO I Recirculation pump speed feedback signal failure : 
24 
rrloa 
rrl5a.2 
rrl5a.3 
Recirculation loop rupture (design basis Loss of Coolant 
Accident) 
- 100%. severity 
- 60%i severity 
- 30%' severity 
25 
rr30 
rr30-2 
rr30.3 
Coolant leakage inside primary containment 
- 100% severity 
- 60% severity 
- 30% severity 
26 1 rxOl Fuel cladding (5%) failure 
27 j tc02 
j 1 
Electrical hydraulic control (EHC) system hydraulic pump 
1 failure 
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to recall all the patterns over the entire length of the 43 simulations. The network, 
as expected, did not do a very good job of classifying ail the patterns. The patterns 
with the worst recall errors were added to the training set and the network from the 
previous trial was trained further. This process of adding patterns to the training set 
was continued until the network could detect the onset of all the transients within 
a reasonable amount of time. A similar approach was used to train the classifier 
network. In this case, the normal operating conditions were not used because this 
network would be used to classify only those patterns that the root network had 
detected as abnormal. 
This network training problem is slightly different from the conventional prob­
lems solved using neural networks. In most cases, a training set is given and is used 
to train a network. The recall set is not known beforehand, and the trained network 
is used to recall on unseen patterns. But in our case, the recall set is known from the 
simulations. We try to define the training set through the various trials so that it is a 
fairly accurate representation of the recall set. Consequently, good generalization is 
extremely important to keep the number of patterns in the training set to a minimum 
as well as to make the adviser fault and noise tolerant. 
The final architecture of the root network was 97 x 9 x 1 and the classifier network 
was 97 X 26 x 5. The advantages of the DNA algorithm can be appreciated here. 
Suppose a conventional fixed architecture scheme was used to solve this problem. In 
that case we need to guess a few architectures for the first trial, train all of them, and 
choose the architecture with the best performance for later trials. But the training set 
changes, in fact increases, with each trial. Consequently, there is no guarantee that 
the best architecture for a given trial will also be good enough for the following trials. 
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Thus a fixed node architecture scheme would have been extremely inconvenient for 
developing the nuclear power plant status diagnostic adviser. 
4. RESULTS 
.A. total of 43 different scenarios representing 27 distinct transients were used 
for this study. The fault diagnostic adviser was trained on pure non-noisy simulator 
data, and its performance was tested on both pure data and data corrupted by 3% 
Gaussian noise. The computer generated noisy data contained Gaussian noise at a 
3% standard deviation of the actual data. Table 1.6 gives a summary of the diagnostic 
performance of the adviser. The root network was able to detect all the transients 
irrespective of noise within 40 seconds. Table 1.6 shows that a vast majority of these 
were detected within 20 seconds. The root network needed only 192 patterns to 
be trained to this level of performance, which is less than 2.5% of the total of 7,8o4 
patterns. Similarly, the classifier network was able to identify all the transients within 
2 minutes of the initiating events. This network required 464 patterns, which is less 
than 6% of the total patterns. 
The results can be best understood by looking at certain examples from Table 
1.6. Transient scenario "fwr2cl" (transient number 6), assigned the output binary 
code 10110, is the failure of the feedwater regulator valve controller which leaves the 
valve stuck open. This caused the plant to undergo a safety trip 90 seconds after the 
initiating event. The root network was able to detect an abnormality in the plant 
status immediately after the initiating event. This ability was not hampered even 
when the input data was corrupted by noise. The classifier network diagnosed the 
transient after 104 seconds after its advent. Under noisy condition, successful 
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Table 1.6: The output binaries, time to safety trip, detection time (by the root 
network) and the classification time (by the classifier network) for each 
scenario. The diagnosis and classification times are since the initiation 
of the transient. Fourty-three scenarios representing twenty-seven tran­
sients were used to design the adviser. The performance results are for 
both pure and noisy data. 
Trans. 
Num. 
Scenario 
Code 
Output 
Binaries 
Safety 
Trip 
Time 
(sec) 
Root Diag- 1 Classifica- i 
nosis Time ! tion Time ; 
(sec) 1 (sec) 
Pure Noise Pure Noise i 
1 culO 1 1 0  0  0  n/s 5 5 i 62 . 62 i 
2 culOgpo 1 1 0  0  1  44 0 i 0 1 104 112 ! 
3 fw04a 1 1 1 0  1  n/s 25 1 27 1 40 52 1 
4 fwOQa 1 1 1 0  0  n/s 1 17 ! 16 1 53 55 
•5 fwl2c0 0  1 1 0  0  10 i 7 i 7 38 41 
6 j fwr2cl 10 10 0 90 i 0 ; 0 1 104 109 
7 i fw 17 a 0 10 0 1 1 i 0 1 1 i 74 86 : 
8 1 fwlSa 1 0 0 0 1 8 I 5 1 5 1 57 55 
fwl8a_2 24 1 8 1 12 1 58 62 ; 
i fwlSa.S n/s i 26 i 33 i 93 ' 101 ; 
9 hp05 0  1 1 0  1  n/s 1 14 i 14 1 67 i 63 ' 
j hp05-2 1 n/s 1 22 1 18 i 2 i 18 ; 
1 hp05-3 ! n/s 30 ! 32 ! 2 1 18 : 
10 i hp08 i 10 10 1 n/s 14 15 '^1 I i 
hp08-2 n/s 34 1 32 j 96 1 108 ; 
hp08_3 1 n/s 38 I 34 • 115 1 112 1 
11 ic20scr2 i 0 0 10 0 1 2 ; 5 1 93 93 
12 ic20scrm 0 10 0 0 1 2 i 2 j 116 i 118 , 
13 ic22scra 1 0 0 0 0 1 9 ! 12 1 49 1 51 
14 ic23scrml 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 2 ! 81 : 75 
1 15 ic24scrmj 10 0 10 1 i 10 1 8 ! 64 ! 62 
16 I ms02 0  1 1 1 1  3 4 4 j 46 i 46 
I ms02.2 3 4 4 56 1 59 
1 nis02.3 4 5 1 5 1 61 i 60 
17 ms03a 1 0  1 1 1  2 0 1 0 1 85 ! 101 
ms03a.2 1 0 j 0 j 38 i 38 
ms03a_31 2 1 2 1 2 i 71 1 73 
Table 1.6 (Continued) 
Trans. Scenario Output Safety Root Diag­ Classifica­
Num. Code Binaries Trip nosis Time tion Time 
t  Time (sec) (sec) j 
(sec) Pure Noise Pure Noise i 
18 nis04a 10 0 11 0 0 1 69 68 ; 
ms04a_2 2 0 1 68 68 i 
ms04a.3 2 0 3 69 68 -
19 msl9ab 1 0  1 1 0  17 20 26 76 91 
20 ms32 
o
 
o
 
o
 98 9 12 105 112 : 
21 rpOotcOl 
1 1 j 
0
 
1 
' 
o
 
o
 J 
20 5 5 63 62 
22 rp5actcl 0  0  1 1 0  n/s 5 5 •54 1 66 
23 rrlO 0 10 10 n/s 17 26 66 71 
24 rrl5a 1 1 0  1 0  1 0 2 23 26 
rrl5a.2 1 0 2 81 78 ' 
rrl5a.3 1 2 2 21 31 i  
25 rr30 1 1 0  1 1  18 7 9 101 96 : 
j rr30-2 i 30 21 24 83 88 : 
i rr3D.3 | 59 29 27 112 109 : 
26 r.KOl 1 1 1 1 0  n/s 11 18 18 23 1 
27 tc02 0  0  1 1 1  5 6 1 70 83 : 
n/s = no safety trip 
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diagnosis was achieved at 109 seconds. 
There are many transients that occur over a prolonged period of time and do 
not cause a safety trip. An example is transient "rxOl" (transient number 26). This 
transient is caused by a 5% failure of the fuel cladding, resulting in radioactive con­
tamination of the coolant system. The root network detects an abnormality 11 sec­
onds after the initiating event, and the classifier network diagnoses the transient at 18 
seconds. During this time the operators will be undertaking tasks mandated by the 
plant operating procedures. A definite diagnosis by the adviser in such a situation 
would help the shift technical adviser assess the situation and judge the validity and 
applicability of the procedures being performed. .Altough the procedures are quite 
extensive, it is conceivable that the plant might enter a situation not foreseen. If 
the shift technical adviser feels that information provided by the diagnostic adviser 
conflicts with the procedures being carried out, he may take appropriate action. 
Some of the transients analyzed here cause immediate safety trips of the reactor. 
For example transient "ms04a" (transient number 18) is caused by the rupture of the 
main steam line outside the primary containment. We analyzed three scenarios for 
this transient corresponding to 100% (ms04a), 60% (ms04a_2), and 30% (mso4a-3) 
severity of the rupture. All these transients were assigned the same binary output 
code 10011 since the adviser should classify the transient irrespective of severity. The 
plant underwent a safety trip within two seconds of the initiating event for each of 
the three severities. The root network was able to detect an anomaly in the plant 
status almost immediately. But the short time before the automatic safety trip will 
not give the operators a chance to take any action before the trip. In this case the 
diagnosis can later provide valuable clues during technical reviews of the transient. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The first conclusion from this work is the ability of neural networks to detect a 
very wide variety of operational transients at a boiling water reactor (BVV'R) nuclear 
power plant. An ANN-based adviser was successfully trained to detect and classify 
27 distinct transients and the four normal conditions. The adviser performed well 
even when the data was corrupted by noise. Two neural networks functioning in a 
hierarchical manner were used in this adviser. Further evolution of the hierarchical 
approach could produce advisers capable of drawing information from more plant 
instrumentation and diagnosing a wider range of transients. 
The second conclusion is the use of DNA allowed the speedy development of 
the adviser by eliminating a large amount of guesswork that would otherwise have 
been required to determine appropriate architectures. Use of a fixed architecture 
scheme would have been a major hurdle because the training set increased as the 
development of the adviser progressed. The DNA scheme is based on a derivative 
importance function and can arrive at a relative optimum network architecture for 
any problem. 
The third significant conclusion from this work is the feasibility of a modular 
approach to solving a problem using a collection of individual networks. This was 
demonstrated by the successful use of two networks to solve two parts of the diagnostic 
problem. The practical acceptance of this technology would depend largely on the 
ability to develop a modular design, making it possible to increase the diagnostic 
capability of the adviser using the existing system. It is conceivable that not all of 
the 97 variables are needed to identify each transient. A simplification of the system 
design incorporating a number of small ANNs will make it possible to identify the 
3 5  
important variables for the task of transient identification. 
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CHAPTER 2. A DYNAMIC INPUTS SELECTION SCHEME FOR 
ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORKS 
A paper submitted to IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks 
Anujit Basu and Eric B. Bartlett 
ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a dynamic input selection (DIS) scheme that enables an arti­
ficial neural network (ANN) to select appropriate input variables during the training 
process. The scheme also enables the ANN to add and subtract hidden nodes as 
required. DIS completely eliminates the need to pre-select network architectures 
including the number of inputs. .A statistical analysis of the training data patterns 
involving principal component analysis (PCA) and information theory (IT) is used to 
rank the input variables in order of their relative importance to the desired mapping. 
The network begins training with the higherst ranked input and one hidden node, 
and adds inputs and hidden nodes until the mapping is learned. .Any hidden or input 
nodes that are unnecessary once the network performs satisfactorily are subsequently 
removed from the ANN. In this work, DIS is demonstrated on two simple benchmark 
problems and a more complex temperature prediction problem. Results show DIS to 
be capable of developing viable .ANN models without needless trial and error with 
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respect to input selection. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Artificial neural networks (ASN'Ns) learn to map functions from example data, 
and hopefully generalize this information to novel data [19]. .An .ANN's ability to 
generalize is highly dependent on its architecture and input vector [20]. Although 
no one else, to our knowledge, has investigated input vector determination, many 
researchers have investigated methods to arrive at the optimum number of nodes 
in a hidden layer. Most of these approaches involve node or weight elimination 
[3. 4, 5, 6. 71. These methods train a network that is larger than optimal, thus wasting 
computing time training unnecessary nodes and weights. They then attempt to 
eliminate these same unnecessary elements from the trained .A.NN. Other researchers 
have approached the problem of hidden node architecture optimization by adding 
nodes during the training process [8. 35. lOi. These methods usually terminate when 
the problem is first learned, possibly leaving the network with e.xtra hidden nodes. 
In one such case, where node elimination is attempted after learning, the nodes 
are eliminated in the reverse order in which they are added [35]. Thought it makes 
intuitive sense, no quantitative evidence is presented to prove that the last added node 
has the least contribution to the ANN's performance. Still others use heuristic rules 
to preselect the optimal hidden architecture and do not vary the number of hidden 
nodes during training. However, mathematical justification for such rules are not 
completely rigorous [llj. Previous work by one of the authors [21] is the only instance 
to our knowledge where an attempt was made to have the network determine the size 
of the input layer during training. That work however had considerable difficulty 
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taking into account the information presented jointly by two or more input variables. 
The authors of the work described here have previously demonstrated a systematic 
method called dynamic node architecture (DNA) that arrives at the appropriate 
number of nodes in the hidden layer of a backpropagation network [1, 14]. The 
work-presented here improves oil the authors' previous DNA work'',and extends the 
DNA approach to the input layer. The method presented in this paper successfully 
accounts for joint information among input variables. 
Selecting the inputs for a well known problem is a simple exercise. However, for 
most real world applications, input selection can be extremely complicated. Most 
ANN users currently rely on their expertise for selecting the required input variables 
for specific problems. However, it is desirable to develop a general method that does 
not rely on user expertise. Such a general method would make ANNs more useful 
by reducing the complexity of their application. This is because neural network 
training is a non-polynomial time complete problem ;16, 17] and smaller networks 
are therefore much less difficult to train. Our dynamic input selection (DIS) scheme 
was developed to eliminate the guesswork associated with selecting appropriate ANN 
inputs. DIS proceeds systematically by building up the input and hidden layers 
during the training process, thus arriving at a viable model without any guesswork. 
There are many methods used by statisticians to estimate the number and ap­
propriateness of the variables that could be used to develop a model [23, 24. 25:. 
Testing the linear correlation of each input variable with respect to the output(s) 
over the available data would be an easy method for selecting input variables [26]. 
Unfortunately, such techniques account for only the linear relationship between the 
input and output variables [25, 27]. Measures of nonlinear correlation such as infor-
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Illation theory might also be used [28.  29.  30, .  But. as we will show in Section 3.1.  
an information theoretic interdependence" analysis (ITIA) of individual inputs x and 
y with respect to the output c might not provide an appropriate measure of the im­
portance of the inputs. For example, if ; = g{x,y) but r ^ h(x) and r ^ f(y)^ then 
ITIA on the individual variables ,r and y with respect to the output - would indicate 
that the two variables do not have much importance to determining the output. But 
we know that the two inputs together define the output, and this is not reflected 
in the interdependency analysis of individual inputs. The exclusive-or problem is a 
•simple example of such a dilema. It cannot be guaranteed that such situations will 
not occur in real world problems. This is where our previous work falls short 121; .  
Accounting for all such joint information using ITIA would lead to a combinatorial 
explosion of calculations as ITIA has to be performed for all possible combinations 
of input variables. Such an exhaustive analysis will be intractable for large models. 
Therefore, before an information theoretic analysis can be performed on the training 
data, it is important to assure that the variables being subjected to ITI.AL contain as 
little joint information as possible. 
TO solve this problem, we first perform a principal component analysis (PC'A) 
on the input data to transform the n-dimensioned input data vector into an n-
dimensioned vector of uncorrelated and mutually orthogonal principal components 
(PCs) i31, 32, 33]. We shall show in Section 3.1 that ITIA can be performed on 
the principal components without loss of accountability, and a measure of nonlinear 
correlation between the PCs and the outputs can be determined. Neural network 
researchers have been attracted to PC.A. for its ability to extract linear features from 
the data set [28]. Many researchers have implemented algorithms that perform PC.A 
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like operations :29. 30,. 31. 32]. However, for our analysis, the PC's are numerically 
computed by determining the eigenvalues and the corresponding eigenvectors of the 
data covariance matrix as described in Section 2.1. We have also developed and will 
describe a method of backtracking from the principal component space to the origi­
nal input space to arrive at a relative measure of the importance of each input with 
respect to the output vector. 
Once the input variables are ranked, the training process can begin with just the 
most important input and one hidden node. The DIS scheme will then add inputs and 
hidden nodes as needed until the ANN has learned the training data. Our experience 
has shown that ANNs typically require more hidden nodes to learn a problem than 
to recall it 'l, 14j. This same behavior can be exhibited in the input layer. Therefore, 
the DIS scheme attempts to prune out any input or hidden nodes from the trained 
network that are not required. It is possible that the trained .ANN disagrees with 
our original input variable ranking. This is because our original analysis is based on 
data and not on the characteristics of the .A.NN. The input variables are therefore 
pruned not on the basis of the original ranking of the variables, but on a new ranking 
involving the inputs and the outputs of the .4NN. 
In the next section we present the required concepts of principal component 
analysis and information theory applied to the DIS scheme. Section 3 presents the 
DIS scheme and its three constituent phases. Section 4 presents the results from 
various computer simulations which benchmark the scheme. Conclusion are presented 
in the final section. 
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2. STATISTICAL CONCEPTS 
2.1 Principal Component Analysis 
Principal component analysis has traditionally been used as a method of reducing 
the dimensionality of a data set that contains a large number of interrelated variables 
[31, 32, 33]. In the process, PC A preserves as much of the variation in the data set 
as possible. PCA has become an essential technique in data compression and linear 
feature extraction [30]. Our interest in PC.A., however, is limited to the transformation 
of input variables into principal components that are mutually orthogonal. 
Let X be an n-dimensioned input vector that has been transformed such that 
"T 
each variable has zero mean. The first PC is the linear combination a| x which has 
the maximum possible variance. Here, is a vector of n constants, 2. 0 
a| „ }. so that 
T " X  =  +  • • •  
j = l 
The second PC is the linear combination a.) x such that this second PC is uncorre-
lated to the first PC and has the maximum possible variance. Similarly we determine 
the remaining PCs such that they are all uncorrelated to the principal components 
before them and have the ma.Kimum possible variance. 
Let the data covariance matrix C be given by 
C = £[xx^j (2) 
where £[•] is the expectation value. Note that the covariance matrix is given by 
£'ixx'^i and not by Eixx^J — £''iX! because the data vector x had been modified to 
have a zero mean and therefore E\x\ = 0. 
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The vectors aj^, ao. ... . O-n that define the PC's are the n eigenvectors of the 
data covariance matrix C. These eigenvectors are the orthogonal unit vectors given 
by 
Ca[ = ^i'^i ! ^ (.3) 
where Ao. ... , An are the n eigenvalues of matrix C in descending order of 
T T' 
magnitude. Note that while x is called the first principal component, a/^x is 
called the first minor component. 
Statistically, PG.A. concentrates on variances, though it does not ignore covari-
ances and correlations [.31, 32i. The variance in the input variables is redistributed 
among the principal components such that the sum of the variances of the n input 
variables is equal to the sum of the variances of the n principal components. The 
traditional method of reducing dimensionality using PCA is to use only those PC's 
that account for a certain amount of the total variance in the original input data. 
Typically, the selected principal components account for 70% to 80% of the total 
variance [31;. 
2.2 Information Theory-
Let us assume for the moment that we are dealing with discrete data. Then, a 
v a r i a b l e  x  w o u l d  t a k e  o n  a n y  o n e  o f  N  d i s c r e t e  v a l u e s  X 2 .  P i  
defined as the probabilitj- of occurrence of any particular value .rj. 
p - = p { x  =  x i )  .  (4) 
This probability can be estimated for any x^ as the number of occurrences of the 
value x^ in a data set divided by the total number of patterns in the data set. The 
entropy, or information, presented by the variable ,c can be defined as [29, 30. 34j 
N' 
PiHPi) • (5) 
i = l  
Entropy is always a positive number since the probabilities are less than or equal to 
one, and therefore the logarithmic terms are negative or zero. The entropy of the 
variable .r is zero when .r takes only one value over the entire data set, in which case 
N — 1 and = 1. However, if x takes more than one value over a data set, then 
the entropy is maximized when the probability of occurrence of each of the N values 
is the same. In this case, PI = (1/A") for I — and H{.T) = -ln(l/:V). 
We can extend Equation 5 to define the information presented by two variables 
•r and y as 
H { . v . y )  =  -  ^  P I j  \ n i p i j )  ( 6 )  
'•i 
where the probability p^j is given by 
P i j  =  p i  y = y j )  •  ( ~ )  
The entropy of y  given x  is a measure the information in the variable y  when the 
value of X is known. Mathematically, 
H ( y \ x )  = - ^ P l j l n ^  (8 )  
ij 
where the subscripts i  and j  refer to the variables x  and y  respectively. It can also 
be shown that [34] 
H { y x )  =  H { x . y ) - H ( . v )  . (9) 
Based on the above, we can now define an asymmetric measure of association 
between two variables x and y. denoted by f^(2/|.r) [29]: 
r r /  .  X  H { y ) - H i y \ x )  
B t y )  •  <1°' 
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This measure explains the extent to which y's entropy H [ y )  is lost if x  is already 
k n o w n .  C " ( ^ | . r )  w i l l  a l w a y s  l i e  b e t w e e n  z e r o  a n d  o n e .  v a l u e  o f  0  i n d i c a t e s  H { y )  —  
H{y]x). which means that knowledge of x does not have any effect on the entropy of 
y. In that case. ,r and y have no functional relationship. On the other hand, a value 
of 1 indicates that H{y\x) = 0. which means that knowing .r eliminates the entropy 
of y. Thus y is completely predicted by x 1*28, 29, .34'. 
The above discussion assumed that the variables took discrete values, and thus it 
was possible to calculate the probabilities of each variable taking any particular value. 
But variables in real world are continuous rather than discrete. In such cases, the 
range of each variable can be broken into bins, and each data pattern can be converted 
such that the value of each variable is replaced by the bin number in which it falls 36;. 
Information theoretic interdependency analysis can then be accomplished, where 
refers to the probability of the value of .r falling in the j'th bin. 
3. DYNAMIC INPUT SELECTION 
The ANNs used in this work are three layered feed-forward neural networks 
trained using the backpropagation learning algorithm [20, 35. 36]. (See Figure 2.1.) 
The input layer nodes are inactive, their output being equal to their input. The 
hidden and output laj'ers, however, contain active nodes. The activation function 
used in this work is the familiar sigmoid function 120; given by 
The size of the output layer is fixed by the problem at hand since the output vector 
is usually well defined. The objective of the DIS scheme is to select the appropriate 
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input variables from a given set during training, thus determining the size of the input 
layer. Our training method also includes DNA from previous work which varies the 
number of hidden nodes to arrive at the optimum size for the hidden layer. This 
DN.\ is only coincidental to our discussion of DIS and the interested reader is refered 
to our earlier work [1, 14, 36j. Only one hidden layer is used in this work as it is 
adequate to solve virtually any mapping problem [37]. 
The DIS scheme can be divided into three phases. Phase I is the statistical 
ranking of the input variables. Phase II is the training of the network as it builds up 
from one input and one hidden node. In Phase III, DIS optimizes the input vector 
by pruning unnecessary input variables if they exist. 
3.1 Phase I: Input Variable Ranking 
Let us now focus the discussion on the input and output vectors. Let x be 
the r?-dimensioned input vector {,r , .r2..... .r;?}, and y be the n?-dimensioned output 
vector {yi.yo. -Assume that .V data patterns {x.y} have been collected. 
.A.lso assume that the input provides enough information to describe the output. .A.11 
the variables have been normalized to lie between zero and one. Let the ;V patterns 
of the input vector x form the matrix X. and the N patterns of the output vector y 
form the matrix Y. 
Our interest is to arrive at an appropriate measure of the importance of each of 
the input variables with respect to the output y. One might think that r(y,.r^-) 
would be an easy and useful measure. However, this measure will not work well in all 
cases. For example, let us take the data contingency table given in Table 2.1. This 
is the traditional exclusive-or problem with two additional spurious input variables. 
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One of these is a constant and the other is a random variable. It is well known that 
the variables .r][ and ,r2 are the most important with respect to the output y. How­
ever, ITIA on the four individual input variables gives us C'(yi.ci) = 0. f'(y|.r-)) = 0. 
f' (y 1-^.3) = 0? f'7yi'f4) = 0.1556. If these values were used as a measure of the 
importance of the input variables, .r^ would have a higher importance than either .r 
or .r2. In order to properly evaluate the importance of the input variables, we would 
have to look at the asymmetric association between the output vector y and all pos­
sible combinations of the input variables. In the present example, this would require 
us to look at all possible combinations U{y\.v^.vj). U(y\x^.vjxi^). and f'(yi,r^-,rj,r^.,r^). 
where i = j ^ k- ^ I. Such an analysis would reveal that the assymetric association 
between y and any combination of the inputs that involves both and x-y will be 
1.0. leading us to deduce that and xo are the most important variables. This 
deduction would be reinforced by the fact that the assymetric association between 
y and any combination of inputs that did not involve both and ,ro is less than 
1.0. Such an approach may be plausible for this example, but we will soon encounter 
a combinatorial explosion of computations as the number of input variables begins 
to increase. This approach will not be practical for large data sets or models with 
potentially large numbers of inputs. 
Principal component analysis allows us to transform the input data into a form 
where the variables are uncorrelated to each other. In order to perform PCA. let us 
convert the input data matrix X to the matrix X whose columns, corresponding to 
the input variables, have been centered to zero mean. The elements of X are given 
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where .fj is the mean of the /th variable in the original data matrix X. 
Let PCA convert the zero-centered input vector x into the principal component 
vector uj, which is also an n-dimensioned vector { }. The :V patterns 
of the principal component vector w form the matrix fi. Let a be the matrix of 
we igh t s  a  -  tha t  co n v e r t s  X  to  f i .  
f2 = oeX . (13) 
Thus, the ith principal component is given by 
n  
T cti2'^'2 ••• ~ • (1"^) 
i=i 
The values of the conversion matrix a are so chosen that Equation 13 is an orthonor-
mal linear transformation i31i. Each of the PCs are uncorrelated to each other, 
therefore, if a-'i and ujj are two principal components, then 
r = = •' = 0 (lo) 
where r is the correlation coefficient. The above equation implies .that 
E\yt;^uJj] = E\u! j^\E\ijJ j] (16) 
since the denominator in Equation 15 is bounded. Further, since the variables x; have 
been centered to zero mean and the principal components are linear combinations 
of the Xj's, each principal component also has a mean, or expectation value, of zero. 
Equation 16 can therefore be rewritten as 
E[^'la:j\ = E[u;i]E[,Mj\ = 0 . (17) 
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The above discussion tells us that the principal components are mutually uncorre-
lated. They are also orthogonal since E[u!iu.'j] = 0. A principal component derived 
i n  t h i s  w a y  c a n  b e  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a  p r o j e c t i o n  o f  a  d a t a  p o i n t  o n  a n  a x i s  i n  a n  n -
dimensioned hyperspace. The orientation of the axis is given by the coefficients 
that define the principal component. The n axes corresponding to the n principal 
components are mutually orthogonal. 
The original inputs have now been projected into the space spanned by the 
PCs. Each PC contains the information in the original data set along one direction. 
Since the direction represented by this PC is orthogonal to all the other directions 
represented by the other PCs, we are assured that the information in any particular 
PC is exclusive of the information in any other PC. Moreover, since each PC is a linear 
combination of all the input variables, each PC contains some aspects of information 
from each variable individually as well as some aspects of the information in all 
combinations of the variables. Together, all the PCs contain all the information 
present in the input vector. Virtually all of the joint information in the original 
inputs can be accounted for during ITIA of the individual PCs with respect to the 
outputs. 
The information theoretic measure of association can now be considered 
an appropriate measure of the importance of the /th PC with respect to y. If we are 
interested in the importance of the principal components with respect to the output 
vector, then a comparison of for all PCs, would be in order. However, 
since the PCs are abstractions and are not given to easy interpretation, we would like 
to determine the importance of the input variables since they represent the physical 
system in terms that are easy to understand. Our interest therefore lies not in the 
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PCs, but in the original input variables. Thus, we need to find some method to 
determine the inputs' contribution to the PCs. 
Statistically, the weight a— assigns a part of the variance of variable xj to the 
principal component Therefore, can be viewed as the contribution of xj to 
o;^-. Further, r^(y|u,'j) is the association of u.'i with the output vector y. We define 
the partial importance of the variable xj by way of the PC as 
The variable Xj contributes to all the principal components, and each principal com­
ponent has a certain measure of association with the output vector. We define the 
total importance of the variable Xj as 
n 
-f.ry =£>!_/fly - "2 jr(y|u.'2)-r ... ) = X! a-fiylu.^) . (19) 
i = L 
The term /,r • is a measure of relative importance as the absolute value of Ix • has J J 
little physical meaning. A higher value for /j • than for I.x- indicates that the jth J ^ 
input variable xj is more important to the input-output relationship than the ith 
input variable x^. 
3.2 Phase II; Network growth and training 
This phase of the DIS scheme starts by arranging the inputs in the order of their 
relative importance as defined in the previous section. Training is then initiated with 
one input node and one hidden node. This first input is the variable with the highest 
relative importance. As training progresses, the network soon reaches a learning 
plateau where the network error cannot be reduced below a certain value regardless 
of the number of successive iterations. At this stage, a node needs to be added to 
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the network. This node can be added to either the input or the hidden layer. The 
layer with the lower information theoretic association with the output of the network 
is chosen as the recipient of the additional node. If x is the input vector, h is the 
hidden laj'er vector, and y is the ANN output vector (Figure 2.1), then the condition 
f'(y|x) > r(yih) . (20) 
implies that the hidden layer is information deficient compared to the input layer. 
If the above condition is true, then the new node is added to the hidden layer, or 
else the new node is added to the input layer. Note that in the above condition, the 
dimension of the input vector x is determined by the number of inputs being used by 
the ANN at this stage of training. The dimension of the hidden layer vector h is also 
determined by the number of hidden nodes used by the .A lNN. The output vector y 
is the actual ANN output at the present stage and has a fixed dimension. 
The weights connecting the new node are assigned very small random values 
so that the addition of this node does not disrupt the network performance much. 
Training is resumed and the network soon reaches another plateau when another 
node is added to the layer with the lower information theoretic association with the 
ANN output. This process is continued until the network reaches a satisfactory level 
of performance as predetermined by the user. 
Experience has shown that ANNs typically require more hidden nodes to learn 
a mapping than to recall the same mapping ;14j. It is reasonable to assume that 
the ANN may also require more inputs to learn than to recall. Thus, it is quite 
possible that at this stage not all the hidden or input nodes may be necessary. To 
deal with this situation, we first look at the hidden nodes. The hidden node with 
the least importance is removed from the network. The importance of each of the 
56 
hidden nodes can be determined by a method very similar to the one used to rank 
the available inputs in Phase I of DIS. But such a calculation is fairly computation 
intensive since the importance of all the hidden nodes needs to be determined every 
time a hidden node is to be eliminated. This can significantly slow down the training 
process. Instead, the importance function used here for the hidden nodes is the 
derivative importance function used in the DN.A. scheme from the authors' previous 
work [1, 14j. The derivative importance measure works well and is computationally 
inexpensive. It assumes that if changes in the output of a hidden node are more 
influential in deciding the output of the network than a similar change in the output 
of another hidden node, then the former node is more important to the dynamic 
functioning of the network than the latter node. The importance of the «th hidden 
node with respect to the jth output node is given by 
I: .=E\&\]dh'P''-'' . (21) 
where E [ » \  is the expectation over the entire training set and is the ma.ximum 
change in the output of the /th hidden layer node over the entire training set. The 
above equation gives the partial importance of the /th hidden node with respect to the 
jth output node. The total importance of the ith hidden node is the sum of the partial 
importances of that node with respect to all the output nodes. Mathematically. 
m 
r  '  =  S "  I  •  ( - y i )  
i ^ i )  i h i W j )  
where m  in the number of output layer nodes. The derivatives in Equation 21 are 
readily calculable given the sigmoidal relationship between /) j and yj. and this results 
in very little computational overhead for this importance measure. 
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Following the elimination of a node, the ANN might require further training, 
depending on the deleted node's importance to the ANN function. Upon continued 
training, the smaller network might be able to learn the mapping. If it does, then, 
again the hidden node with the least importance is deleted. This process is continued 
until the network is too small to learn the problem. The smallest architecture capable 
of learning the problem is taken as the model from this phase of DIS. 
3.3 Phase III: Removal of unnecessary inputs 
Phase III deals with the possibility that the .4NN has used some input variables 
during the training phase that are not important. It is desirable to eliminate such 
inputs as it could provide a more compact model. For this purpose, we perform a 
Phase I style ranking of the variables actually being used by the network with respect 
to the actual output vector y. The ranking obtained might place the variables used by 
the network in a different order than the initial ranking in Phase I. This is a reflection 
of the mapping learned by the network. The input variable with the lowest relative 
importance is eliminated, and the resultant network is trained further if necessary. 
It is possible that this network is unable to reduce its error below the preselected 
target, in which case the network from the end of Phase II is retained as the final 
model. If however the .ANN is able to learn the mapping with one input less than in 
Phase II, we proceed to use the deriv'ative importance function on the hidden layer 
to determine if any of the hidden nodes can be eliminated. 
The input variables now remaining in the .\NN are re-ranked using PC.A. and 
ITIA with respect to the actual ANN output, and the least important variable is again 
eliminated. The whole process described in the previous paragraph is repeated, and 
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either a new model is achieved or the previous model is retained. The algorithm 
is stopped when a successful model is not found following the deletion of an input 
node. In the process of reducing the number of inputs, it is a good practice to test a 
model on a validation data set, and accept it only if its generalization performance 
exceeds that of the previous model. This is important as the elimination of an input 
variable is not guaranteed to provide better generalization. On the other hand we 
do not validate a model while removing only the hidden nodes as previous work 
has shown the capabilitj* of ANNs to generalize more effectively with lesser hidden 
nodes [.35, 14, .36]. Note that the final architecture arrived at by the DIS scheme is 
influenced by the selection of various training parameters such as the learning rate, 
the random weights used in the starting architecture, the pre-selected learning target 
and the number of iterations spent on a learning plateau before a node is added. 
4. COMPUTER SIMULATION RESULTS 
4.1 Exclusive-or problem 
For our first demonstration we return to the exclusive-or problem. The data 
given in Table 2.1 is used for training. The problem is defined by input 1. input 2 
and the output as shown in the table. Input 3 and input 4 are spuriously generated 
data unimportant to the output value. Input 3 is a constant and input 4 is a random 
variable. 
Phase I of the DIS scheme is the statistical ranking of the variables, and the 
results of this analysis can be seen in Table 2.2. The input variable ranking analysis 
shows that input 2 has the highest relative importance followed closely by input 1. 
Ideally, input 1 and input 2 should have equal importance, but the slight difference 
seen in Table 2.2 is due to machine round off error during the numerical computations. 
Input 4 (random values) ranks third with a lower relative importance. Also, the table 
shows that input 3 (constant value) has no importance to determining the output. 
In Phase II, an ANN is trained on the data. The preset training target for the 
.ANN was an RMS error of 0.01 over the training data. The training history of this 
.ANN can be seen in Table 2.3. The network starts with one input (input 2) and 
one hidden node. This is not sufficient to provide the desired mapping, so the ANN 
reaches a learning plateau and another node needs to be added. .\n information 
theoretic interdependency analysis shows that the input layer is better associated 
than the hidden layer with the output layer. Thus, a second node is added to the 
information deficient hidden layer. The addition of this node disrupts the network and 
increases the RMS error slightly. Continued training of this one input, two hidden, 
one output (1x2x1) network does not decrease the RMS error significantly, and a 
node is added to the input layer on the basis of ITIA of the hidden and input layers. 
The new input is input 1 since it is the second most important variable (see Table 2.2). 
The ANN is now able to significantly reduce its RMS error before reaching another 
plateau. A hidden node is added, and the 2 x 3 x 1 network reaches a plateau short 
of the target RMS error. Analysis of this network suggests the addition of another 
hidden node. Upon continued training, the 2 x 4 x 1 network is able to reach an RMS 
error below the preset target of 0.01. The derivative importance of each of the four 
hidden nodes is now calculated as given by Equations 21 and 22. The node with the 
lowest importance is deleted, and the resultant 2x3x1 network is trained until it 
can learn the function. Again, the hidden node with the least derivative importance 
is deleted from the network, and the 2 x 2 .x 1 network is further trained. This 
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network is also able to learn the functional mapping and another node is removed. 
The 2x1x1 network is incapable of learning this function and a second node is 
added. The process of adding and deleting nodes is continued until it is apparent 
that 2 X 2 X 1 is the optimum architecture at the end of this phase of DIS. Phase 
III, wherein any unnecessary inputs are removed, is not attempted with this model 
as we know that the two inputs used by the present model are the appropriate ones 
and eliminating any of them is an exercise in futility. 
4.2 Continuous function mapping 
The function selected for this demonstration is the two dimensioned (2-D) sine 
function given by the equation 
z  =  s i n { ~ x ) s i n ( - y )  (23) 
where x  and y  lie in the range i O,lj. There were 600 patterns in the training data set. 
each pattern corresponding to a randomly selected point on the x-y square. Table 
2.4 shows ten sample patterns. The first two input variables are .r and y. The next 
two variables are derived from x and y as shown in the table. The fifth variable is 
randomly generated. The output is given by equation 23. 
The Phase I ranking of the input variables (see Table 2.5) shows that input 1 and 
input 2 are the most important in determining the functional relationship between 
the inputs and the output. Input o. input 4 and input 3 follow in that order. The 
Phase II training history of an .A.NN on this data can be seen in Table 2.6. The target 
RMS error for this example is 0.0-5. The training followed a pattern very similar to 
the exclusive-or problem. The network with the architecture 2 x 8 x 1 and RMS error 
0.0487 is selected as the model from this phase. The two inputs used by this model 
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are known to be the appropriate variables for this problem. Therefore, Phase III is 
not implemented in this example. 
It is possible that the choice of random numbers for input 1, input 2, and input o 
are such that a ranking of the variables gives us a different order of relative importance 
than in the previous case. Such a ranking analysis with a new data set for the 2-D 
sine function can be seen in Table 2.7. The random variable input 5 is ranked higher 
than the p variable input 2. The phase II training history for this data is shown 
in Table 2.8. At the end of this phase, a model is obtained with the architecture 
I 
3 X 13 .X 1 and training RMS errC^r of 0.0489. The three input variables used by 
ft 
this model are statistically re-ranked in Phase III. The output vector used for this 
ranking is the actual output of the ANN model. The results of this new ranking can 
be seen in Table 2.9. On the basis of this ranking, input 5 is deleted from the model 
and the resultant network is trained further. The training progress in Phase III DIS 
can be seen in Table 2.10,. The final model has an architecture of 2 x 8 x 1, the same 
as in the previous case, and an RMS error of 0.0479. This example shows that an 
inappropriate ranking in Phase I can be corrected in Phase III based on the ANN 
learning in Phase II. 
4.3 Temperature prediction problem 
We have seen the DIS scheme applied to two known benchmark problems. In 
this section we will apply the scheme to a real world problem, the solution to which 
is not known. This problem involves the prediction of noon-time temperatures at the 
Chicago lake-front area based on historical data [381. The historical variables that we 
expect to use for the prediction of noon temperatures are shown in Table 2.11. Data 
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for the months of June, July and August of 1991 and 1992 were used for training, 
and data for those same months in 1993 were used to test the model. Table 2.11 also 
shows the Phase I relative importance and ranking of each of the variables. 
In Phase II, an ANN was trained using the DIS scheme. The target RMS error 
of 0.01 was achieved with an architecture of 23 x 32 x 1. The 23 variables used by 
this model are indicated with an asterisk in Table 2.11. This .A.NN model was tested 
to predict the noon temperatures in June, July and August of 1993. The model had 
an average error of 3.8°F for 1993. In Phase III, the 23 variables were re-ranked. 
This new ranking can be seen in Table 2.12. The variable "wind chill 4 days ago" 
was ranked 22nd in Phase I but is now ranked 23rd. This variable is eliminated and 
the resultant network trained further. The number of hidden nodes is varied and the 
network learns the mapping with an architecture of 22 x 34 x 1. But this network 
had slightly worse performance on the recall of the 1993 test data than the network 
with the 23 inputs. Thus, the earlier network obtained at the end of Phase II is taken 
as the model. The performance of this model on the 1993 data can be seen in Figure 
2.2. The average error of 3.8°F is comparable to the 3°F average error obtained by 
meteorologists in predicting temperatures with a 24 hour lead time [391. The square 
of the linear correlation between the actual temperature and the ANN prediction 
is 0.80. Taking into account that the summer of 1993 was an abnormally rainy 
summer, causing extensive floods in the American Midwest, this degree of accuracy 
in prediction is remarkable. .AL careful examination of Table 2.11 reveals that most 
of the variables used by the ANN were historical data of precipitation, wind speed, 
relative humidity and sky cover. In fact, historical data regarding temperature, heat 
index and wind chill were almost totally neglected. This input variable selection 
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was based solely on the data corresponding to the years 1991 and 1992. The model 
built on this analysis looked at precisely those variables that would indicate the rainy 
conditions prevailing in 1993. This possibly explains the resilience of the AiNTN model. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The DIS scheme presented in this paper is a very powerful technique that com­
pletely eliminates the need to preselect network architectures. The scheme automat­
ically selects the input variables needed for the model by analyzing the given data. 
It also selects the number of hidden nodes needed for the training process, and sub­
sequently eliminates the hidden nodes and input variables not necessary for recalling 
the learned functional mapping. The computer simulations show that DIS works 
effectively in learning both discrete and continuous mapping functions. Furthermore, 
the results in the temperature prediction problem demonstrate the usefulness of DIS 
with respect to real world applications. Using the DIS scheme, the ANN completely-
ignored the intuitive variables such as temperature one day ago. and built an ex­
tremely resilient model based on wind speeds, sky cover and humidity. The DIS 
scheme can be used to model almost any real world system provided there is ade­
quate representative data. The user needs to only make a broad decision as to which 
variables might be needed to model the system, and the DIS scheme will determine 
the appropriate variables from this set. Such a degree of automation will allow .A.NN 
models to be developed without guesswork and will lead to substantial reductions in 
developmental time. This will significantly increase .A.NN applicability and use. 
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Figure 2.1: A three-layered feed-forward backpropagation neural network. 
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Table 2.1: Exclusive-or training data 
Pattern Inputl Input2 Inputs Input4 Output 
(switch) (switch) (constant) (random) 
1 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.3.38 0.0 
2 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.417 1.0 
3 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.793 1.0 
4 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.981 0.0 
0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.144 0.0 
6 0.0 1.0 0.5 0..583 1.0 
7 1.0 0.0 0.5 0.891 1.0 
8 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.510 0.0 
Table 2.2: Phase I ranking analysis of ex­
clusive-or training data 
Rank Relative Variable 
Importance Number 
1 0.319 2 
2 0.318 1 
3 0.117 4 
4 0.000 3 
Table 2.3: Phase II training history for e.xclusive-or problem 
.•\rchitecture RMS Architecture RMS i 
Input Hidden Output Error Input Hidden Output Error 
Start: [nput2 1 hidden node Delete hidden node 
1 1 1 0.5842 2 2 1 0.0417 i 
1 1 .1 0.4919 2 2 1 0.0092 i 
.\dcl hidden node Delete hidden node i 
1 2 1 0.5528 2 1 1 0.3718 1 
1 2 1 0.4692 2 1 1 0.3373 j 
.A.dd Input 1 .\dd hidden node | 
2 2 1 0.4921 2 2 1 0.3136 j 
2 2 1 0.1822 2 2 1 0.0181 i 1 
.\dd hidden node Add hidden node 
2 3 1 0.2011 2 3 1 0.0201 1 
2 3 0.0813 2 3 1 0.0098 1 
.A.dd hidden node Delete hidden node j 
2 4 1 0.0886 2 2 0.0318 ! 
2 4 1 0.0097 2 2 1 0.0096; 
Delete hidden node Delete hidden node 
2 3 1 0.0366 2 1 1 0.4181 1 
2 3 1 0.0098 2 1 1 ! 0.3117 i 
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Table 2.4: 2-D sine continuous function sample training data 
Input1 Input2 Inputs Input4 Input5 Output 
X y (x-^y)/2 xy random sin(-x)sin(7ry) 
0..3490 0.6115 0.4802 0.21.34 0.6883 0.8357 
0.7.3.35 0.8809 0.8072 0.6461 0.3155 0.2716 
0.4137 0.2395 0.3266 0.0991 0.4524 0.6585 
0.8166 0.86.50 0.8408 0.7063 0.6887 0.2243 
0.8.356 0.8996 0.8676 0.7517 0.1402 0.15.32 
0.5348 0.3394 0.4371 0.1815 0.0091 0.8702 
0.3167 0.7625 0.5396 0.2415 0.8803 0.5693 
0.40.34 0.8048 0.6041 0..3247 0.0911 0..5492 
0.0888 0.7212 0.4050 0.0641 0.4517 0.2116 
0.8448 0.8104 0.8276 0.6847 0.6096 0.2628 
Table 2.5: Phase I 
2-D sine 
mapping 
ranking analysis of 
continuous function 
problem (case 1). 
Rank Relative Variable 
Importance Number 
1 0.086 2 
2 0.080 1 
3 0.071 5 
4 0.047 4 
5 0.042 3 
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Table 2.6: Phase II training history for 2-D sine continuous function 
mapping (case 1). 
Architecture RMS .4rchitecture RMS 
Input Hidden Output Error Input Hidden i  Output Error 
Start: [nput2 1 hidden node Delete hidden node 
1 1 1 0.4421 2 9 ! 1 0.0966 
1 1 1 0.3615 2 9 i  1 0.0614 
Add hidden node Delete hidden node 
1 2 1 0.4049 9  10 j 1 0.0819 
1 2 1 0.3384 2 10 1  1 0.0492 i  
Add hidden node .A.dd hidden node 
1 3 1 0.3968 2 9 ; 1 0.1184 1 
1 3 1 0.3137 2 9 i 1 0.0498 i  
Add Input 1 .\dd hidden node 
-
3 0.4161 2 8 1 1 0.0922 i 
2 3 0.2718 2 8 i  1 0.0487 1 
Add hidden node Delete hidden node i  
2 4 1 0.3193 2 7 ! 1 0.1637 i 
2 4 1 0.2066 2 7 1 1 0.0833 
Delete hidden node Delete hidden node 
2 5 1 0.2828 2 8 i  1 0.0982 
2 5 0.1196 2 8 1 0.0702 
Delete hidden node Delete hidden node 
2 6 I 0,1311 2 9 1 0.1281 
2 6 1 0:0992 2 9 1  1 0.0499 
Delete hidden node Delete hidden node 
j 2 7 1  1 0.1362 2 8 : 1  0.0896 
2 7 1  1 0.0986 2 8 i  1 0.0496 
Delete hidden node Delete hidden node 
2 8  1  1 0.146.5 2 1  7 ' 1 0.1662 
2 8 ! 1 0.0752 1 2 1 1 0.0822 
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Table 2.7: Phase I ranking analysis of 
2-D sine continuous function 
mapping problem (case 2). 
Rank Relative Variable 
Importance Number 
~L 066 2 
2 0.062 5 
3 0.061 1 
4 0.039 3 
5 0.036 4 
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Table 2.8: Phase II training history for 2-D sine continuous function 
mapping (case 2). 
Architecture ! RMS Architecture RMS 1 
Input Hidden Output Error Input Hidden Output Error j 
Start: Input2 k 1 hidden node Delete hidden node j 
1 1 1 0.3988 3 9 1 0.0966 
1 1 1 0.2432 3 9 0.0614 
Add hidden node j Add hidden node 
1 2 I 0.2817 3 10 1 0.1202 
1 •7 1 0.2300 3 10 1 ! 0.0731 
Add Input.5 Add hidden node 
2 2 1 0.3121 3 1 i 0.1182 
2 2 1 0.1422 i 3 11 1 0.0642 
Add hidden node Add hidden node 1 
2 3 1 0.17.57 1 3 12 1 0.0961 j 
2 3 1 0.1392 1 3 12 1 0.0641 i 
Add hidden node Add hidden node 
2 4 1 0.1801 3 13 1 0.0993 
2 4 L 1 0.13-58 3 13 1 0.0518 
Add hidden node •Add hidden node 
2 .5 1 0.1842 3 14 1 0.0839 
1 2 5 1 0.1355 3 14 1 0.0492 
i Add hidden node Delete hidden node 
2 i 6 1 0.1907 3 13 1 0.1166 
i 2 ! 6 1 0.1270 3 13 1 0.0497 
.Add Input 1 Delete hidden node 
1 3 1 6 1 0.1.362 3 12 1 0.1.386 
! 3 i 6 1 0.0986 3 12 1 0.0772 
Add hidden node •Add hidden node 
3 i "i* 1 0.1287 3 13 1 0.0983 
3 i  ^ 1 0.07.52 3 13 1 0.0489 
Add hidden noc e Delete hidden node 
3 i 8 1 0.1118 3 12 1 j 0.1226 
! 3 i 8 1 0.0711 3 12 1 ! 0.0819 
Table 2.9: Phase III ranking analysis of 
the three variables used in the 
Phase II model for the 2-D 
sine continuous function map­
ping problem (case 2). 
Rank Relative Variable 
Importance N umber 
1 0.064 2 
2 0.061 1 
3 0.058 .5 
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Table 2.10: Phase III training history for 2-D sine continuous function 
mapping (case 2) after deletion of an input. 
Architecture RMS Architecture RMS i 
Input Hidden Output Error Input Hidden Output Error : 
Delete Inputo Delete hidden node 
2 13 1 0.0912 2 1 0.2210; 
2 13 1 0.0490 2 
" 
1 0.0767 ; 
Delete hidden node Add hidden node 1 
2 12 1 0.1803 2 8 1 0.1478 ; 
2 12 • 1 0.0496 2 8 1 0.0591 ^ 
Delete hidden node .^dd hidden node 
2 11 1 0.1383 2 9 1 0.1272 i 
2 11 1 0.0492 2 9 1 0.0475 1 
Delete hidden node Delete hidden node ! 
2 10 1 0.1774 2 8 0.0919 1 
2 10 1 0.0559 2 8 1 0.0496 i 
Add hidden node Delete hidden node 
2 11 1 0.1903 0 7 0.1103 ; 
2 11 1 0.0488 2 7 1 0.0816 i 
Delete hidden node .•\dd hidden node | 
2 10 1 0.1019 2 8 1 0.1229 i 
2 10 1 0.0499 2 8 1 0.0479 i 
Delete hidden node Delete hidden node ' 
2 9 1 0.2016 2 7 1 0.1857 i 
2 9 1 0.0497 2 1 ! 0.0721 i 
Delete hidden node Add hidden node | 
3 8 1 0.1296 2 8 1 0.1692 i 
.3 8 1 0.0492 2 8 ! 0.0494 1 
Table 2.11: The variables available for the temperature prediction problem, the 
Phase I relative importance of the variables, and their ranking. All 
values are at the noon hour. 
Var. Variable Rel. Var. { Var. Variable Rel. Var. ! 
IT Description Imp. Rank j Description Imp. Rank j 
Temperature 1 Wind speed 
t 
i - 1 year ago 0.026 48 i 25 - 1 year ago"* 0.196 11 ! 
2 - 1 day ago 0.0.33 39 26 - 1 day ago" 0.200 9 1 
.3 - 2 days ago 0.0.32 44 27 - 2 days ago"" 0.206 7 1 
4 - 3 days ago 0.032 45 28 - 3 days ago* 0.196 12 i 
5 - 4 days ago 0.030 47 29 - 4 days ago* 0.203 8 i 
6 - 5 days ago 0.033 41 30 - 5 days ago* 0.198 10 I 
Heat index Sky cover 1 
7 - 1 year ago 0.031 46 31 - 1 year ago* 0.062 19 : 
8 - 1 day ago 0.032 43 32 - 1 day ago* 0.057 20 i 
9 - 2 days ago 0.0.34 37 33 - 2 days ago* 0.055 23 ; 
10 - 3 days ago 0.035 36 34 - 3 days ago* 0.056 21 ' 
11 - 4 days ago 0.0.35 35 35 - 4 days ago 0.048 29 
12 - 5 days ago 0.0.39 31 36 - 5 days ago 0.050 28 ! 
Wind chill Precipitation I 
13 - 1 year ago 0.048 30 37 - 1 year ago* 0.252 6 
14 - 1 day ago 0.051 27 38 - 1 day ago* 0.267 2 ! 
15 - 2 days ago 0.054 24 39 - 2 days ago* 0.253 5 1 
16 - 3 days ago 0.052 26 40 - 3 days ago* 0.260 3 ! 
17 - 4 days ago* 0.056 22 41 - 4 days ago* 0.270 1 1 
18 - 5 days ago 0.053 25 42 - 5 days ago* 0.257 4 1 
Wind direction Relative humidity i 
19 - 1 year ago 0.0.33 42 43 - 1 year ago* 0.106 14 i 
20 - 1 day ago 0.033 40 44 - 1 day ago* 0.095 18 i 
21 - 2 days ago 0.034 38 45 - 2 days ago* 0.105 15 i 
22 - 3 days ago 0.039 32 46 - 3 days ago* 0.103 17 1 
23 - 4 days ago 0.037 33 47 - 4 days ago* 0.104 16 
24 - 5 days ago 0.0.36 34 48 - 5 days ago* 0.110 13 1 
Variables used in the Phase II ANN model. 
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Table 2.12: The Phase III re-ranking of the variables based on the 
output of the ANN from Phase II. 
ANN Variable Description New- New 
Var. Importance Rank 
1 Precipitation 4 days ago 0.189 2 
2 Precipitation 1 day ago 0.198 1 
3 Precipitation 3 days ago 0.160 5 
4 Precipitation 5 days ago 0.157 6 
5 Precipitation 2 days ago 0.176 4 
6 Precipitation 1 year ago 0.185 3 
T Wind speed 2 days ago 0.135 11 
8 Wind speed 4 days ago 0.154 7 
9 Wind speed 1 day ago 0.136 9 
10 Wind speed 5 days ago 0.1.36 10 
11 Wind speed 1 year ago 0.140 8 
12 Wind speed 3 days ago 0.125 12 
13 Relative humidity 5 days ago 0.070 17 
14 Relative humidity 1 year ago 0.065 18 
15 Relative humidity 2 days ago 0.073 15 
16 Relative humidity 4 days ago 0.077 13 
17 Relative humidity 3 days ago 0.074 14 
18 Relative humidity 1 day ago 0.071 16 
19 Sky cover 1 year ago 0.042 19 
20 Sky cover 1 day ago 0.040 20 
21 Sky cover 3 days ago 0.037 22 
22 Wind chill 4 days ago 0.0.36 23 
23 Sky cover 2 days ago 0.038 21 
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CHAPTER 3. A MULTIPLE NEURAL NETWORK SYSTEM FOR 
DETECTING FAULTS IN A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
A paper submitted to IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science 
Anujit Basu and Eric B. Bartlett 
ABSTRACT 
This paper describes a modular design approach for an artificial neural network-
(ANN-) based diagnostic adviser capable of identifying the operating status of a 
nuclear power plant. The diagnostic capabilities of an adviser based on this modular 
design can be expanded without having to start afresh. The adviser consists of two 
components, the root network and the classifier group of networks. The root network 
monitors the operating condition of a nuclear power plant on a continuous basis, and 
triggers the classifier group of networks upon detecting an abnormality. The networks 
in the classifier group subsequently try to classify the abnormal plant status as one of 
the transients they are trained to recognize. Each network in the classifier group has 
the capability to differentiate one particular transient from all the other transients 
used in the development of the adviser. A dynamic input selection (DIS) scheme is 
used to select the appropriate input variables and optimize the hidden layer for each 
network. The networks are developed using simulated plant behavior during both 
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normal and abnormal conditions. Data from the nuclear generating station training 
simulator at lES Utility's Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) is used in this work. 
An adviser is initially developed to detect and classify 30 distinct transients based 
on 47 simulations at various severities. This adviser is later expanded to detect and 
classify 36 distinct transients using data from -58 transient simulations. In both cases, 
the noise tolerance capabilities of the adviser is demonstrated. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has witnessed a steady increase in the emphasis on safety and 
reliability of nuclear power plant operations. Artificial intelligence techniciues are 
being investigated to further sustain such efforts. .Artificial neural network- (ANN-) 
based models are presently being developed for a wide variety of applications in the 
nuclear power plant environment. Such applications include fault diagnostics il, 2. 
3, 4. 5. 6. 7:. component monitoring [8, 9, 10], sensor validation ill;, and parameter 
estimation •12. 13, I4|. Previous work by the authors has effectively demonstrated 
the feasibility of using .ANNs for a broad based fault diagnostic adviser (refered to 
hereafter as Adviser 1) for a nuclear power plant [1]. Faults in the various systems 
and components of nuclear power plants cause distinct behavioral transients. These 
transients are identified by the adviser and the particular faults that cause them are 
thus detected. This paper explains the development of an ANN based nuclear power 
plant adviser with an extent of design flexibility and performance unmatched by any 
previous attempts to develop such diagnostic systems. 
One of the shortcomings with the previously developed advisers '1, 2, 3, 15; was 
their inability to adapt to changing requirements such as detecting an increasing 
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number of transients. Most of these advisers depended on one ANN to detect and 
classify a transient. Such networks formed extremely complex decision boundaries 
to accomplish their respective diagnostic tasks. This made it difficult to change 
the existing model in the event of plant modifications. Moreover, once a network 
was trained, the chances of expanding the number of transients were limited by 
the number of output nodes used in the network. One of the advisers (Adviser 1) 
[ij attempted to separate the problem by using a hierarchy of two networks. The 
"root" network detected 'the onset of a transient by classifying the plant status as 
"abnormal." The classifier network subsequently attempted to classify the abnormal 
condition as one of 27 distinct transient conditions. In spite of separating the problem 
into the two tasks of detecting and classifying the transients, the classifier network 
had to perform a fairly complex classification task. This network needed five output 
nodes to differentiate between 27 classes. The maximum number of output classes 
that can be formed by this network is 2'^, assuming binary outputs. Thus, any 
subsec[uent attempt to further train this network to classify additional transients 
would be limited to a total of 32 transients. 
The fault diagnostic adviser design described in this paper takes the hierarchical 
approach further by utilizing numerous ANNs with a corresponding decrease in the 
complexity of the task performed by each network. The new design utilizes a root 
network that continuously monitors the status of the power plant. Its classification 
task is very simple, to decide if the plant is in a normal or abnormal condition. In this 
respect, the root network is similar to the root network in Adviser 1 jl]. Once the root 
network decides that the plant is in an abnormal condition, numerous networks in the 
classifier group try to classify the transient in progress. Each network in the classifier 
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group is trained to recognize one transient to the exclusion of all the other transients 
used to develop the adviser. Thus, the classifier group consists of the same number 
of ANNs as the number of transients that the adviser is required to classify. The task 
of transient classification has now been distributed between numerous ANNs. Since 
each ANN is required to differentiate its assigned transient from all other transients, 
its task is much simpler than a single classifier network that tries to classify all the 
different transients. 
The classifier network in .Adviser 1 used all the 97 available instrumentation data 
variables as inputs to perform its task. Given the complexity of its task, most of these 
variables would likely have been necessary. In fact, these 97 variables were selected 
with this precise scenario in mind, wherein one network would try to classify all the 
transients of interest. On the other hand, .A.NNs in the classifier group of the present 
design solve a much simpler problem, and it is entirely possible that many of them 
can perform their task by using only a small subset of the 97 variables. Reducing the 
number of input variables by selecting an appropriate subset of the available variables 
and reducing the number of output variables by simplifying the classification task 
would lead to a significant decrease in the training effort. The non-polynomial-time 
completeness of neural network learning [16; implies that as the number of variables 
n increases, the complexity of obtaining a solution increases faster than a polynomial 
of order n [17]. The Dynamic Input Selection (DIS) [ISj scheme developed by the 
authors makes it possible to realize this advantage of reduced learning complexity. 
DIS is an advancement on the Dynamic Node Architecture (DNA) scheme used to 
develop .\dviser 1. While DNA attempted to optimize the hidden layer of a network 
during training. DIS attempts to optimize both the input and hidden layers. 
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The next section outlines the working of DIS, and illustrates the algorithm using 
a benchmark problem. Section 3 gives a description of the design and development of 
the nuclear power plant fault diagnostic adviser. This section also demonstrates the 
ease with which the diagnostic capability of this adviser can be increased to classify 
a larger number of transients. Section 4 details the performance of the adv'iser as 
initially developed, and after the expansion of its capabilities. Both pure simulator 
data and data corrupted by 3% uniform noise are used to test the adviser. Conclusions 
are presented in Section o. 
2. ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORK ARCHITECTURES 
The artificial neural networks used in this work are two-layered feed-forward 
networks trained with the backpropagation training algorithm. Such .A.NNs learn to 
map functions from example data, and hopefully generalize this information to novel 
data il9). .A.n .A.NN's ability to generalize is highly dependent on its architecture and 
input vector !20l. If the hidden layer is too large, the ANN will memorize the example 
data and will have poor generalization. On the other hand, too small a hidden layer 
will increase the training time, and might even be unable to learn the example data. 
Similarly, too big an input vector will increase the training complexity, and too small 
an input vector will lack adequate information to solve the problem. -Although no one 
else [18. 21], to our knowledge, has investigated input vector determination, many 
researchers have investigated methods to arrive at the optimum number of nodes in a 
hidden layer. Our DNA scheme [1, 22] is a systematic method that adds and deletes 
hidden nodes during training to arrive at the optimum number of nodes for a given 
training problem. DN.\ was improved and extended to the input layer to arrive at 
the dynamic input selection scheme. 
2.1 Dynamic input selection 
Selecting the inputs for a well known problem is a simple exercise. However, 
for most real world applications such as the development of a power plant status 
diagnostic adviser, input selection can be extremely complicated. Most ANN users 
currently rely on their expertise for selecting the required input variables for specific 
problems. DIS is a general method that does not rely on user expertise, proceeding 
systematically by building up the input and hidden layers during the training process. 
The scheme thus arrives at a viable model without any guesswork. 
Dynamic input selection consists of three distinct phases. In Phase I. the avail­
able input variables ranked according to their importance to the problem. Phase II 
is the training phase. The network starts training with the most important input 
and one hidden node, and adds input variables and hidden nodes as required until 
the problem is learned. .\ny input variables that are added during Phase II training 
but are subsequently deemed unnecessary for recall are eliminated from the network 
in Phase III. Although a complete description of DIS can be found in reference [18 , 
a brief review is presented below. 
Phase 1: Input Variable Ranking The object of this phase of DIS is to arrive 
at an appropriate measure of the importance of each input variable with respect 
to the output vector y. There are many methods used by statisticians to estimate 
the number and appropriateness of the variables that could be used to develop a 
model [2.3, 24. 25]. Testing the linear correlation of each input variable with respect 
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to the output(s) over the available data would be an easy method for selecting input 
variables [26!. Unfortunately, such techniques account only for the linear relationship 
between the input and output variables [25, 27] and will be incorrect in the context 
of ANNs. Measures of nonlinear correlation such as information theory might also 
be used [28. 29. .30!. But an information theoretic interdependency analysis (ITI.\) 
of individual inputs x and y with respect to the output r would not provide an 
a p p r o p r i a t e  m e a s u r e  o f  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t h e  i n p u t s  i f  r  =  g ( x , y )  b u t  c  l i { x )  
and r == f(y)- The e.xclusive-or problem is a simple example of this. It cannot be 
guaranteed that such a situation will not occur in real world problems, .\ccounting 
for all such joint information using ITI.4 would lead to a combinatorial explosion of 
calculations and will be intractable for large models. Therefore, before an information 
theoretic analysis can be performed on the training data, it is important to assure that 
the variables being subjected to ITIA contain as little joint information as possible. 
Principal component analysis (PC.A.) [.31, 32. 33] is a statistical method that 
transforms an input vector into a set of mutually uncorrected and orthogonal prin­
cipal components (PCs). Each PC is a linear combination of the original input 
variables. In order to perform PCA, we first convert the input data matrix X to the 
matrix X whose columns, corresponding to the input variables, have been centered 
to zero mean. The elements of X are given by 
.fj = .c^-- .fj : i (1) 
where £[ is the mean of the ith variable in the original data matrix X. In the above 
equation, n is the number of input variables. PCA converts the zero-centered input 
vector X into the principal component vector which is also an n-dimensioned 
vector. If the total number of observations, or patterns, is X, the collection of the 
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N  patterns of the principal component vector u) form the matrix fi. Let a be the 
matrix of weights a^j that converts X to f2. 
f2 = aX 
Thus, the ith principal component is given by 
n 
''i ~ = H a.jXj = + a-.2.T2 + ... + . (.3) 
The values of the conversion matrix a are so chosen that Equation 2 is an orthonormal 
linear transformation [31]. Each of the PCs are uncorrelated to each other. They 
are also mutually orthogonal. 
An n-dimensioned data point converted into an ?i-dimensioned PC vector can be 
interpreted as a projection of the data point on n mutually perpendicular axes in an 
^-dimensioned hyperspace. This set of axes is unique in the sense that it preserves 
all the information present in the original data point. But that information has been 
spread among the PCs such that there is very little joint information between the 
PCs. All the PCs are as distinct from each other as possible. .Any attempt to move 
two particular PCs further apart will result in them getting closer to other PCs. 
With each PC now containing the information in the original data set along one 
direction, we proceed to perform an ITIA on the individual PCs with respect to the 
output vector. The measure ) defined as 
H ( y )  -  H { y \ u ; i )  
=  g ( y )  < • "  
can be considered a fair measure of the importance of the /th PC with respect to 
the output vector. In Equation 4. the term H{y) is known as the entropy of y and 
H { y \u; j ^ )  is the entropy of y given Entropy of a \-ariable x  is defined as 
H ( - v )  =  -  ^  P i l n i p i )  (5) 
where the variable .r takes .V distinct values, and is the probability of occurrence 
of any of these values. Conditional entropy H[y\x) is defined as 
• •  • '  P i  I.J 
where the subscripts i  and j  refer to the variables . v  and y  respectively. It can also 
be shown that [.341 
H { y \ . v )  =  H { . v , y )  -  H ( J : )  .  (7) 
We have now ranked the PCs in the order of their importance with respect to 
the output vector. But PCs are abstractions not given to easy interpretation and we 
would like to determine the importance of the input variables since they represent the 
physical system in terms that are easy to understand. Our interest therefore lies not 
in the PCs, but in the original input variables. Thus, we need to find some method 
to determine the inputs' contribution to the PCs. Statistically, the weight a^j (in 
Equation -3) assigns a part of the variance of variable xj to the principal component 
Therefore, a ^ j  can be viewed as the contribution of x j  to Further, 
is the association of with the output vector y. We define the partial importance 
of the variable xj by way of the PC as 
J  ^  
The variable x j  contributes to all the principal components, and each principal com­
ponent has a certain measure of association with the output vector. We define the 
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total importance of the variable x j  as 
n  
I.vj = aijU(y\uJi) + a 2 j U { y \ u J 2 )  - ...  ^  ^a i j U ( y \ ^ i )  . (!•)) 
2 = 1 
The term Ixj is a measure of relative importance; the absolute value of has little 
physical meaning. A higher value for Ix • than for Ix - indicates that the jth input J ' 
variable .rj is more important to the input-output relationship than the /th input 
variable 
Phase II: Network Growth and Training This phase of the DIS scheme 
starts by arranging the inputs in the order of their relative importance as arrived at in 
Phase I. Training is then initiated with one input node and one hidden node. This first 
input is the variable with the highest relative importance. .As training progresses, the 
network soon reaches a learning plateau where the network error cannot be reduced 
below a certain value regardless of the number of successive iterations. At this stage, 
a node needs to be added to the network. This node can be added to either the input 
or the hidden layer. The layer with the lower information theoretic association with 
the output of the network is chosen as the recipient of the additional node. If x is 
the input vector, h is the hidden layer vector, and y is the ANN output vector, then 
the condition 
U ( y \ ± )  >  U { y \ h )  .  (10)  
implies that the hidden layer is information deficient compared to the input layer. 
If the above condition is true, then the new node is added to the hidden layer, or 
else the new node is added to the input layer. Note that in the above condition, the 
dimension of the input vector x is determined by the number of inputs being used by 
the ANN at this stage of training. The dimension of the hidden layer vector h is also 
determined by the number of hidden nodes used by the ANN. The output vector y 
is the actual ANN output at the present stage and has a fixed dimension. 
The weights connecting the new node are assigned very small random values 
so that the addition of this node does not disrupt the network performance much. 
Training is resumed and the network soon reaches another plateau when another 
node is added to the layer with the lower information theoretic association with the 
.•\NN output. This process is continued until the network reaches a satisfactory level 
of performance as predetermined by the user. 
Experience has shown that .\NNs typically require more hidden nodes to learn 
a mapping than to recall the same mapping 122;. It is reasonable to assume that 
the ANN may also require more inputs to learn than to recall. Thus, it is quite 
possible that at this stage not all the hidden or input nodes may be necessary. To 
deal with this situation,.we first look at the hidden nodes. The hidden node with 
the least importance is removed from the network. The importance of each of the 
hidden nodes can be determined by a method very similar to the one used to rank 
the available inputs in Phase I of DIS. But such a calculation is fairly computation 
intensive since the importance of all the hidden nodes needs to be determined every 
time a hidden node is to be eliminated. This can significantly slow down the training 
process. Instead, the importance function used here for the hidden nodes is the 
derivative importance function used in the DN.\ scheme from the authors" previous 
work [1, 22). The derivative importance measure works well and is computationally 
inexpensive. It assumes that if changes in the output of a hidden node are more 
influential in deciding the output of the network than a similar change in the output 
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of another hidden node, then the former node is more important to the dynamic 
functioning of the network than the latter node. The hidden node with the least 
importance, as defined by the derivative importance function, is eliminated from the 
network. 
Following the elimination of a node, the ANN might require further training, 
depending on the deleted node's importance to the ANN function. Upon continued 
training, the smaller network might be able to learn the mapping. If it does, then 
again the hidden node with the least importance is deleted. This process is continued 
until the network is too small to learn the problem. The smallest architecture capable 
of learning the problem is taken as the model from this phase of DIS. 
Phase III : Removal of Unnecessary Inputs Phase III deals with the 
possibility that the .A.NN has used some input variables during the training phase 
that are not important. It is desirable to eliminate such inputs as it could provide 
a more compact model. For this purpose, we perform a Phase I style ranking of the 
variables actually being used by the network with respect to the actual ANN output 
vector y. The ranking obtained might place the variables used by the network in a 
different order than the initial ranking in Phase I. This is a reflection of the mapping 
learned by the network. The input variable with the lowest relative importance is 
eliminated, and the resultant network is trained further if necessary. It is possible 
that this network is unable to reduce its error below the preselected target, in which 
case the network from the end of Phase II is retained as the final model. If however 
the ANN is able to learn the mapping with one input less than in Phase II, we proceed 
to use the derivative importance function on the hidden layer to determine if any of 
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the hidden nodes can be eliminated. 
The input variables now remaining in the ANN are re-ranked using PCA and 
ITIA with respect to the actual ANN output, and the least important variable is again 
eliminated. The whole process described in the previous paragraph is repeated, and 
either a new model is achieved or the previous model is retained. The algorithm 
is stopped when a successful model is not found following the deletion of an input 
node. In the process of reducing the number of inputs, it is a good practice to test a 
model on a validation data set, and accept it only if its generalization performance 
exceeds that of the previous model. This is important as the elimination of an input 
variable is not guaranteed to provide better generalization. On the other hand we 
do not validate a model while removing only the hidden nodes as previous work 
has shown the capability of .^NNs to generalize more effectively with lesser hidden 
nodes [22, 35. 36j. Note that the final architecture arrived at by the DIS scheme is 
influenced by the selection of various training parameters such as the learning rate, 
the random weights used in the starting architecture, the pre-selected learning target 
and the number of iterations spent on a learning plateau before a node is added, 
2.2 DIS Training: An Example 
For a demonstration of the DIS scheme, we use the exclusive-or problem. The 
data given in Table 3.1 is used for training. The problem is defined by input 1. 
input 2 and the output as shown in the table. Input 3 and input 4 are spuriously 
generated data unimportant to the output value. Input 3 is a constant and input 4 
is a random variable. This example is significant as a direct information theoretic 
interdependency analysis on the individual inputs would assign zero importance to 
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input 1 and input 2 while assigning a greater importance to the random variable, 
input 4. Clearly, such a ranking is inappropriate. 
Phase I of the DIS scheme is the statistical ranking of the variables using PCA 
and ITIA. The results of this analysis can be seen in Table 3.2. The input variable 
ranking analysis shows that input 2 has the highest relative importance followed 
closely by input 1. Ideally, input 1 and input 2 should have equal importance, but 
the slight difference seen in Table 3.2 is due to machine round off error during the 
numerical computations. Input 4 ,which is a random variable, ranks third with a 
lower relative importance. Also, the table shows that input 3. a constant, has no 
importance to determining the output. Based on our knowledge of the problem, we 
see that the results of the ranking analysis are appropriate. 
In Phase II, an ANN is trained on the data. The preset training target for the 
.A.NN was an RMS error of O.OI over the training data. The training history of this 
ANN can be seen in Table 3.3. The network starts with one input (input 2) and 
one hidden node. This is not sufficient to provide the desired mapping, so the ANN 
reaches a learning plateau and another node needs to be added. .A.n information 
theoretic interdependency analysis shows that the input layer is better associated 
than the hidden layer with the output layer. Thus, a second node is added to the 
information deficient hidden layer. The addition of this node disrupts the network and 
increases the RM.S error slightly. Continued training of this one input, two hidden, 
one output (1x2x1) network does not decrease the RMS error significantly, and a 
node is added to the input layer on the basis of ITIA of the hidden and input layers. 
The new input is input 1 since it is the second most important variable (see Table 3.2). 
The ANN is now able to significantly reduce its RMS error before reaching another 
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plateau. A hidden node is added, and the 2x3x1 network reaches a plateau short 
of the target RMS error. Analysis of this network suggests the addition of another 
hidden node. Upon continued training, the 2x4x1 network is able to reach an RM.S 
error below the preset target of 0.01. The derivative importance of each of the four 
hidden nodes is now calculated. The node with the lowest importance is deleted, and 
the resultant 2 x 3 x 1 network is trained until it can learn the function. Again, the 
hidden node with the least derivative importance is deleted from the network, and the 
2x2x1 network is further trained. This network is also able to learn the functional 
mapping and another node is removed. The 2x1x1 network is incapable of learning 
the function and a second node is added. The process of adding and deleting nodes 
is continued until it is apparent that 2 x 2 x 1 is the optimum architecture at the 
end of this phase of DIS. Phase III, wherein any unnecessary inputs are removed, is 
not attempted with this model as we know that the two inputs used by the present 
model are the appropriate ones and eliminating any of them will render the network 
incapable of solving the problem. 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER PLANT ADVISER 
This section describes the development of the .A.NN-based nuclear power plant 
fault diagnostic adviser. In order to be useful, any adviser should be capable of 
detecting and classifying a large variety of transients and therefore needs to draw 
information from many plant variables. The choice of transients and variables is 
therefore very important. Two documents were consulted for the purpose: the Up­
dated Final Safety Analysis Report [37] and the Malfunction Cause and Effects Report 
[•38], both pertaining to the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC). These documents 
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describe many power plant transients. Discussions between personnel at DAEC and 
fellow researchers at Iowa State University (ISU) [39] resulted in a preliminary list 
of transients to be simulated on the operator training simulator and plant variables 
to be monitored [26]. Thirty of these transients, some of which can occur at varying 
severities, were selected for the development of the initial adviser. This adviser shall 
be referred to as Adviser 2a. The simulation of some transients at different severities 
enabled the adviser to detect a transient irrespective of its intensity. The training 
data for .4dviser 2a therefore consisted of 47 scenarios representing the 30 distinct 
transients. This adviser was later expanded to detect six more transients and we 
shall refer to this expanded adviser as Adviser 2b. The training data for .Adviser 2b 
consisted of 58 scenarios representing 36 distinct transients. 
3.1 Data Collection and Pi-ocessing 
The raw data were obtained from the DAEC operators" training simulator. This 
data consisted of the numerical values of 97 plant variables at intervals of one sec­
ond. The data also included a Yes/No binary switch that indicated the onset of 
the transient. The variables were selected from the complete list of 2,369 variables 
available on the simulator. These 97 variables were judged to be sufficient for an op­
erator to diagnose the transients being investigated [39] and were therefore selected 
as the inputs for the proposed adviser. These variables covered a wide variety of 
plant instrumentation such as pressures and temperatures in the various systems of 
the plant, radiation monitors, and flow meters. Table 3.4 contains a complete list of 
the variable used in this work. Raw data obtained from D.AEC were reformatted and 
normalized in the range zero to one. Normalization was based on the maximum and 
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minimum possible values of the variables. 
3.2 Structure of the Adviser 
The largest adviser developed in our earlier work (Adviser 1) [ij utilized a hi­
erarchy of two networks. The structure of that adviser can be seen in Figure 3.1. 
The root network determined if the plant was in a normal condition or not, and the 
classifier network identified the particular transient in progress. The values of the 97 
chosen variables at any single instant of time was assumed to contain enough infor­
mation to diagnose the plant status. Both the networks used all the 97 variables as 
inputs. This information proved to be adequate to solve the problem. 
The adviser(s) developed in this work are a step further in the evolution of the 
hierarchical concept initially demonstrated during the development of Adviser 1. The 
structure common to both Adviser 2a and Adviser 2b can be seen in Figure -3.2. The 
root network in this design has the same function as in Adviser 1. namely to detect an 
abnormal condition in the plant. The classification task is distributed among different 
.\NNs that form the classifier group. Each .\NN in the classifier group recognizes one 
transient. Therefore, Adviser 2a has 30 networks in the classifier group to identify 
the 30 transients it is expected to identify. Similarly, Adviser 2b has 36 ANNs in the 
classifier group. Since the DIS scheme is used to train the networks in these advisers, 
each network uses a subset of the 97 available variables. Thus the number of input 
variables vary among the networks, but each network has only one output node. 
listing of the transients and scenarios used in this work can be found in Table 3.5. 
Transients 1 through 30 were used to develop Adviser 2a and transients 31 through 
36 were added to develop Adviser 2b. 
3.3 Development of Adviser 2a 
The first phase in DIS training requires us to rank all the available inputs using 
a combination of PCA and ITIA. In this particular case, we need to perform this 
analysis for each of the individual networks. The simulation of the 47 scenarios used 
for developing Adviser 2a had a total of 11,792 data patterns, each containing the 
values of 97 instrumentation readings. We assigned an output to each of the networks 
according to the task of the network. For the root network, all abnormal patterns 
were assigned an output of 1 and all normal patterns were assigned an output of 
0. A phase I analysis using all the 11,792 data patterns gave us a ranking for the 
97 variables. Of the 11,792 data patterns, .376 corresponded to normal operating 
conditions, and were not relevant in the context of the ANNs in the classifier group. 
These .\NNs would be used to recall only those patterns that have been identified 
as abnormal by the root network. The data set for the ANNs in the classifier group 
thus consisted of 11,416 patterns. For each of the classifier ANNs, these patterns were 
assigned an output of 0 or 1 depending on the particular transient that the given .ANN 
had to recognize. Patterns corresponding to those scenarios were assigned an output 
of 1, and the patterns corresponding to all the other simulations were assigned an 
output of 0. A Phase I ranking analysis was performed for each of the network using 
the 11,416 patterns and a ranking obtained in each case. 
The training data for all the networks were chosen in an iterative manner. For 
the first trial of the root network, one pattern at the beginning and one at the end of 
each of the 47 simulations were taken to form the training set. The initial training set 
therefore contained 94 patterns. Training was initiated with one hidden node and the 
highest ranked input. The target RMS error was 0.10. As the training progressed. 
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the DIS scheme added more inputs and hidden nodes and gave a final architecture 
of 8 X 16 X I. This network was used to recall all the patterns over the entire length 
of the 47 simulations. The network, as expected, did not do a very good job of 
classifying all the patterns. The patterns with the worst recall errors were added to 
the training set and the network from the previous trial was trained further. This 
process of adding patterns to the training set was continued until the network could 
detect the onset of all the transients within a reasonable amount of time. The final 
architecture of the root network was 16 x 21 x 1. 
A similar approach was taken to train all the networks in the classifier group. In 
this case, the networks were tested on only the patterns corresponding to abnormal 
plant conditions. Thus, each network had only one pattern from the end of each 
simulation during its first training attempt. Each network grew in size and improved 
its performance over successive training cycles. The networks ended up with different 
subsets of the available 97 variables as inputs. The input layer size ranged from 3 
to 40. All the networks were trained to perform their individual classification task 
within 100 seconds of initiation of the transients. 
All the networks were put together to form the diagnostic system. When the root 
network diagnosed a data pattern to be normal, nothing further happened. But as 
soon as the root network detected an abnormal pattern, it triggered on the networks 
in the classifier group. .\ll of these networks attempted to classify the abnormal 
condition. The classification ability of the adviser is dependent on the outputs of all 
the .30 networks in the classifier layer. A definite classification is made when one of the 
networks gives an output of 1 and all the others give an output of 0. Thus, the speed 
of classification is controlled by the worst performing network in the classifier group. 
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But all the ANNs had been trained to perform their tasks within 100 seconds since 
the initiation of the transient. The adviser as a whole can thus arrive at the correct 
diagnosis within 100 seconds. Instead of having the adviser react to the output of 
the .30 networks at every one second interval, the adviser was designed to report only 
those trends that lasted for at least five seconds. Thus, the adviser would change an 
existing diagnosis only if it observes the new diagnosis consistently over five seconds, 
thus preventing it from making rapid changes in its diagnosis. This measure also 
adds robustness to the design of the adviser. 
3.4 Expansion of Adviser 2a to Adviser 2b 
We now decided to increase the capabilities to the adviser by modifying it to 
detect and classify six additional transients, using data from 11 simulations. The 
first step in this expansion is to account for the additional data represented by the 
11 new simulations. The cumulative data now stood at 14.176 patterns, of which 460 
patterns corresponded to normal operating conditions. The input variable ranking 
performed earlier did not take into account this new data, and is thus not valid any 
more. However, the existing networks are already trained using the previous ranking, 
and it is necessary to preserve these networks. So, we perform input variable ranking 
for each existing network using the complete set of data, and preserve the ranking of 
all the variables not already used by the network. We will also need to add six new 
networks to the classifier group, and we perform the input variable ranking for these 
networks. 
The new ANNs in the classifier group are trained in a process similar to the 
training of the classifier group networks during the development of Adviser 2a. But 
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instead of 47 scenarios, these networks are tested on the new set of 58 scenarios. 
These networks are repeatedly trained until they can perform their task within the 
target of 100 seconds since the initiation of the transients. 
.A.t this stage, we shift our attention to the ANNs which constituted the original 
.\dviser 2a. We test these networks on all the 58 simulations. Obviously, these 
networks will perform satisfactorily on the 47 scenarios that were originalh* used 
to develop .Adviser 2a. Their performance on the 11 new scenarios might not be 
adequate, and they need to be further trained. Once these networks are trained on 
additional data, they need to be tested on all the 58 scenarios to make sure that 
their performance on the previous 47 scenarios did not deteriorate. This process is 
continued until the networks from .Aidviser 2a have learn their additional task. In 
the present work, none of the pre-existing networks needed any additional inputs 
to adapt to their expanded task. In fact, the root network was the only network 
that needed any significant retraining. The modified root network, the .30 networks 
retained and modified from the previous adviser, and the six new classifier networks 
are put together to form .Adviser 2b. 
4. RESULTS 
The performance of Adviser 2a and Adviser 2b are tabulated in Table 3.6. The 
pure simulator data was corrupted by .3% uniform noise, and the advisers were tested 
on this noisy data. Results from these can also be seen in Table 3.6. It is evident 
from the table that the diagnostic capability of the advisers did not undergo any 
significant degradation under noisy conditions. This can be directly attributed to 
the "five-second observation" feature incorporated in the adviser. 
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The performance of Adviser 2b is comparaljle to that of Adviser 2a. The advan­
tage of the modular design can be best appreciated b\- reflecting on the expansion 
of the adviser if it were based on the design that produced Adviser L [Ij. The 30 
transients would have been trained using a network with five output nodes. But this 
network would be unable to accommodate the six new networks. So. the existing 
classifier network would have to be discarded and a whole new classifier network 
trained. However, the root network could have been modified exactly in the same 
way as with the modular design. 
Figures .3..3 and 3.4 graphically represent the performance of Adviser 2a on a 
selected transient. The transient in this case is Spurious Group 7 Isolation (ms32). 
The top half of Figure 3.3 displays the performance of the root network on pure 
simulator data, while the top half of Figure 3.4 shows the performance of this same 
network when it is tested on the pure data corrupted by 3% uniform noise. The 
bottom half of the two figures show the classification performed by the ANNs in the 
classifier group. "Normal" means that all the networks are showing an output of 
0. which "Uncertain" means that ether some of the networks have an output in the 
intermediate range of 0.3 to 0.7 or more than one network has an output of 1. A 
"Wrong Diagnosis" means that only one network has an output of 1 and this network 
is not the ANN corresponding to the transient in progress. This kind of incorrect 
diagnosis would require the network corresponding to the transient in progress to 
have an output of 0. and one of the other networks to have an output of 1, while 
the remaining networks output 0. And this situation should be maintained for a 
minimum of five seconds. In this adviser structure, when the .A.NN corresponding 
to the transient in progress is giving an output of 0 instead of 1. the remaining 
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networks are usually all stable with outputs of 0 ("Normal") or in a very unstable 
state, their outputs changing every second. Thus the adviser rarely settles into a 
"Wrong Diagnosis." Such incorrect classification were detected in four instances over 
the duration of the fifty-eight transient scenarios. Finally, a "Correct Diagnosis" is 
obviously when the only network showing an output of 1 is the ANN corresponding 
to the transient in progress. 
The utility of the advisers developed here can be best understood by looking 
at certain examples from Table 3.6. Transient scenario "ms32" (transient number 
24) is the spurious group 7 isolation in the plant. This transient caused the plant 
to undergo a safety trip 98 seconds after the initiating event. The root network (in 
.Adviser 2a) was able to detect an abnormality in the plant status 11 seconds after 
the initiating event. This ability was not hampered even when the input data was 
corrupted by noise. The classifier networks diagnosed the transient 74 seconds after 
its advent. Under noisy condition, successful diagnosis was achieved at 80 seconds. 
Table 3.6 also shows that Adviser 2b had a similar performance for this transient. 
The diagnosis might be able to indicate to the operators the cause of the transient, 
and that a safety trip was imminent. The operators could then take measures to shut 
down the plant, thus sparing the plant from an abrupt and stressful safety trip. .A. 
controlled shutdown has a much lower impact on the plant components. 
There are many transients that occur over a prolonged period of time and do 
not cause a safety trip. .A.n example is transient "rxOl"' (transient number 30). This 
transient is caused by a failure of the fuel cladding, resulting in radioactive con­
tamination of the coolant system. The root network detects an abnormality within 10 
seconds after the initiating event, and the classifier network diagnoses the transient 
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arouad the 32 seconds mark. During this time the operators will be undertaking 
tasks mandated by the plant operating procedures. A definite diagnosis by the ad­
viser in such a situation would help the shift technical adviser assess the situation 
and judge the validity and applicability of the procedures being performed. Although 
the procedures are quite extensive, it is conceivable that the plant might enter a sit­
uation not foreseen. If the shift technical adviser feels that information provided by 
the diagnostic adviser conflicts with the procedures being carried out, he may take 
appropriate action. 
The use of DIS significantly decreased training time, and allowed the networks 
to use only those variables that they deemed necessary to perform their task. Table 
3.7 shows the architecture of the 37 networks that form Adviser 2b. and the input 
variables used by the networks. The separation of the classification problem into 
the modular components allowed the various networks to be trained on different 
computers, thus quickening the process of developing the adviser. However, one 
possible drawback of this approach is the need to test the performance of all the 
networks on all the simulations during each training cycle, and adding new data 
patterns to the training data set. This can be overwhelming while developing many 
networks simultaneously, but this inconvenience is more than compensated by the fact 
that these networks can be retained in future upgradations of the adviser. Thus, the 
process of adding a few transients to the diagnostic capability of the existing adviser 
is a much more manageable task than it would have been without the modular design. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
The first conclusion from this work is the ability to detect a very wide variety of 
operational transients at a boiling water reactor (BWR) nuclear power plant using 
multiple neural networks. An ANN-based adviser was successfully designed and 
trained to detect and classify 30 distinct transients and the five normal conditions. 
This adviser consisted of a total of 31 networks working in a hierarchical manner. The 
adviser performed well even when the data was corrupted by noise. The diagnosis 
of the adviser was a result of the outputs of all the individual .^NNs. Even though 
the .ANNs based their outputs on the data at one second intervals, the adviser made 
its decisions based on trends in the output of the ANNs. The adviser changed its 
diagnosis only when a new diagnosis was detected consistently for five seconds. This 
provided a measure of stability to the adviser, and was responsible for its admirable 
performance under noisy conditions. 
The second conclusion from this work is the ability of the modular design to 
accommodate an increase in the diagnostics capabilities of an existing adviser. The 
adviser capable of detecting and classifying 30 transients was expanded to diagnose six 
more transients. The expansion process involved the training of six new networks, 
and minor retraining of the 31 existing networks. This expansion was performed 
without sacrificing the performance of the existing networks. 
The third conclusion is the use of DIS allowed the speedy development of the 
adviser by automating the architecture selection process for all the networks. The 
dynamic growth of the input and hidden layers allowed the networks to be developed 
without any guesswork. The dimensionality reduction derived by the process helped 
in decreasing the training time required for all the networks. Successful application 
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of DIS in this problem ciemonstrated the advantages of the scheme in developing 
ANN-based solutions for large real world problems. 
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Figure 3.3: Performance of Adviser 2a during spurious group 7 isolation without 
any noise. 
Transient nis32; No noise 
114 
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Figure 3.4; Performance of Adviser 2a during spurious group 7 isolation with 3% 
uniform noise. 
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Table 3.1: Exclusive-or training data 
Pattern Inputl Input2 Inputs Input4 Output j 
(switch) (switch) (constant) (random) j j 
1 0.0 0.0 0..5 0.338 0.0 1 
2 0.0 1.0 0..5 0.417 1.0 i 
3 1.0 0.0 0..5 0.793 1.0 1 
4 1.0 1.0 0.-5 0.981 0.0 1 
.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.144 0.0 i 
6 0.0 1.0 0..5 0.583 1.0 j 
7 1.0 0.0 0..5 0.891 1.0 i 
8 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.510 0.0 ! 
Table 3.2: Phase I ranking analysis of 
exclusive-or training data 
Rank Relative Variable 
i 
Importance N umber 
i 1 0.319 2 
! 2 0.318 1 
! 3 0.117 4 
i -i 0.000 3 
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Table 3.3; Phase [I training history for exclusive-or problem 
Architecture RMS .A.rchitecture RMS 1 
Input Hidden Output Error Input i  Hidden Output Error 
Start: Input2 1 hidden node Delete hidden node 
1 1 1 0..5842 2 i  2 1 0.0417 
1 1 1 0.4919 2 1 2 1 0.0092 
.\dcl hidden node Delete hidden node 
1 2 0.5528 2 : 1 1 0.3718 
1 2 1 0.4692 2 i  1 1 0.3373 • 
.4dd Input 1 Add hidden node 
2 9 1 0.4921 2 i  2 1 0.3136 
2 2 0.1822 2 i  2 1 0.0181 
Add hidden node Add hidden node 
2 3 1 0.2011 2 i  3 1 1 0.0201 
2 3 0.0813 2 j  3 1 i 0.0098 
Add hidden node Delete hidden node 
2 4 0.0886 0 i 9  1 0.0318 
2 4 0.0097 2 i  2 1 i  0.0096 
Delete hidden node Delete hidden node 
2 3 1 0.0366 2 i  1 1 i  0.4181 
2 
> 
3 1 0.0098 2 1 1 1 1 0.3117 
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Table 3.4: Plant variables available for training the ANN adviser. 
Var. 
Num. 
Variable 
Desig. Description 
Min. 
Value 
Max. Var. | 
Value Unit j 
1 A041 Local power range monitor 
16-25 flux level B 
0.0 125.0 i % power 
i ; 1 1 
0 
.\091 Source range monitor channel B 0.0 100.0 i % 1 
3 BOOO .Average power range monitor .A 
Flux level 
0.0 125.0 1 % power i 
t 1 1 ! 
4 1 BO 12 j Reactor total core flow 0.0 60.0 1 Mlb/hr i 
0 BO 13 j Reactor core pressure-differential 0.0 30.0 ; psid 
6 BOH Control rod drive system flow 0.0 0.025 j Mlb/hr j 
" 
B015 Reactor feedwater loop .4 flow- 0.0 4.0 ; Mlb/hr 1 
8 1 BO 16 ] Reactor feedwater loop B flow 0.0 4.0 i Mlb/hr ; 
9 B017 j Cleanup system flow 0.0 i 0.07691 ' Mlb/hr I 
10 B022 Total steam flow 0.0 8.0 ; Mlb/hr ; 
11 B023 1 Cleanup system inlet temperature 0.0 755.0 i "F ! 
12 ' B024 1 Cleanup system outlet temperature 0.0 1 600.0 i ''F i 
13 B026 1 Recirculation loop .A.1 drive flow 0.0 j 15.1 j Mlb/hr | 
14 1 B028 1 Recirculation loop Bl drive flow 0.0 15.1 1 Mlb/hr 1 
15 B030 Reactor feedwater channel .A.1 
I temperature 
280.0 430.0 i -'F 1 
16 B032 i Reactor feedwater channel Bl 
! temperature 
280.0 430.0 j °F 1 
1 
17 ! B034 i Recirculation loop .Al inlet 1 j } temperature 
260.0 580.0 ; ''F ! 
! i 
18 B036 j Recirculation loop Bl inlet 
j temperature 
260.0 580.0 I ^F i 
! i 
1 i 
; 19 B038 1 Recirculation A wide range 
1 temperature 
50.4 789.6 1 ^F j 
i ! 
1 20 B039 1 Recirculation B wide range 
! temperature 
50.4 1 789.6 ! "T ! 
I 21 B061 Reactor coolant total jet pumps 
1-8 flow B 
0.0 1 36.7 : Mlb/hr j 
! ! i 
22 B062 Reactor coolant total jet pumps 
9-16 flow A 
0.0 i 36.7 i Mlb/hr ! 
i ' 1 1 1 1 
j 23 B063 Reactor coolant total outlet 
steam flow A 
0.0 2.0 j Mlb/hr 1 
I 1 i 1 
118 
Table 3.4 (Continued) 
Var. j Variable j i Min. 
Num.! Desig. j Description j Value 
Max. i Var. j 
Value 1 Unit | 
24 j B064 j Reactor coolant total outlet | 0.0 
i j steam flow B | 
2.0 i Mlb/hr j 
i 1 
25 j B065 Reactor coolant total outlet | 0.0 
1 ! steam flow C i 1 ' 1 
2.0 1 Mlb/hr 
1 
26 B066 Reactor coolant total outlet steam 
flow D 
0.0 2.0 Mlb/hr 
27 B079 Reactor recirculation pump A 
motor vibration 
0.0 10.0 MILS 
! 
28 { B080 
1 
Reactor recirculation pump B 
motor vibration 
0.0 10.0 MILS i 
1 
29 B083 ! Control rod drive cooling-water j 0.0 
; differential pressure | 
500.0 j dpsi j 
1 1 1 
30 1 B084 i Control rod drive cooling-water ! t ^ 
1 i differential pressure 
0.0 60.0 1 dpsi ' 
i i i 
31 B085 i Torus air temperature 0.0 j 500.0 ! °F 1 
32 B086 i Torus air temperature ^2 0.0 i 500.0 I i 
33 j B087 j Torus air temperature #3 0.0 500.0 °F i 
34 i B088 Torus air temperature ^=4 0.0 | 500.0 ! 
35 B089 i Drywell temperature azmuth 0 | 0.0 j 500.0 
; elevation 750 | | 1 
' 
36 j B090 1 Drywell temperature azmuth 245 
j elevation 750 
0.0 500.0 op : 
37 1 B091 i Drywell temperature azmuth 90 
j 1 elevation 765 
0.0 500.0 op 1 j 
i 
38 B092 Drywell temperature azmuth 270 0.0 
elevation 765 | 
500.0 op ! 
39 B093 j Drywell temperature azmuth 270 j 0.0 
elevation 765 j 
500.0 op 
40 B094 Drywell temperature azmuth 180 j 0.0 
j elevation 780 i 
500.0 op 
1 
41 B095 ! Drywell temperature azmuth 270 
i elevation 830 
! 0.0 
1 
500.0 1 
j 
42 B096 1 Drywell temperature center 
i elevation 750 
0.0 1 500.0 i °F 
i 1 
43 B098 j Torus water temperature 0.0 752.0 1 °F 
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
Var. Variable Min. Max. Var. 1 
Num. Desig. Description Value Value Unit i 
44 B099 Torus water temperature 0.0 752.0 1 
45 B103 Drywell pressure 0.0 100.0 psia i 
46 B104 Torus pressure 0.0 100.0 psia ! 
47 B105 Torus water level -10.0 10.0 in. 1 
48 B120 Torus radiation monitor A -1.0 100.0 % 1 
49 B121 Torus radiation monitor B -1.0 100.0 % i 
50 B122 Reactor water level 158.0 218.0 in. 1 
51 B124 Reactor water level 158.0 218.0 in. 1 
52 B1257 Fuel zone level indication -153.0 218.0 in. i 
53 B126 Reactor water level 158.0 458.0 in. 
54 B127 Reactor vessel pressure 0.0 
0
 
0
 
0
 Psig i 
55 B128 Reactor vessel pressure 0.0 1200.0 psig ! 
56 B129 Reactor vessel pressure 0.0 1500.0 psig ! 
57 B1.30 Reactor vessel pressure 0.0 1500.0 psig ! 
58 B137 Torus water level 1.5 16.0 ft ; 
59 B1.38 Torus water level 1.5 16.0 ft 
60 B150 Core spray A flow -1767.8 .5000.0 gpm 1 
61 B151 Core spray B flow -1767.8 5000.0 gpm ! 
62 B160 Reactor core isolation cooling flow -62.5 500.0 gP"i i 
63 B161 High-pressure core injection flow -437.5 .3500.0 gpm ; 
64 B162 Residual heat removal A flow -75.0 15000.0 gpm 1 
65 B163 Residual heat removal B flow -75.0 150.0 gpni ! 
66 B164 Drywell radiation monitor A -1.0 100.0 % ! 
67 B165 Dry well radiation monitor B 0.0 100.0 % ! 
68 B166 Post-treat activity 0.0 100.0 % ! 
69 B168 Pretreat activity 1 0.0 100.0 % 
70 ! B171 Analyzer A — O2 concentration 1 -1.25 10.0 % 
'1 i B172 Analyzer A — Ho concentration i -1.25 : 10.0 % 
72 B173 •Analyzer B — O2 concentration -1.25 10.0 % 
73 1 B174 Analyzer B — Ho concentration 1 -1.25 10.0 % 
74 1 B180 Clean-up system flow j 0.0 200.0 gpm 
75 1 B196 Reactor water level-fuel zone A i -153.0 1 218.0 in. 
76 ! B197 Reactor water level-fuel zone B 1 -153.0 i 218.0 in. 
! 1 B247 Turbine steam bypass i 0.0 I 500.0 
op 
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Table 3.4 (Continued) 
Var. 1 Variable Min. 1 Max. Var. 
Num.! Desig. Description Value i Value Unit 
T8 j B248 Turbine steam bypass 0.0 ! 500.0 Op i  
79 1 EOOO 4160 V switch gear bus lAl A-B 0.0 I 5.25 KV ; 
80 : F004 Condensate pump A^cB discharge 
pressure 
0.0 i 
i  
1 
600.0 psig 
81 1 
i 
F005 Low-pressure condenser circulating 
water inlet temperature A 
0.0 i j 200.0 OF i 
82 j 
t 
I 
FOlO High-pressure condenser circulating 
water outlet temperature A 
0.0 200.0 "F i 
83 j 
] 
Foi l  Low-pressure condenser circulating 
water pressure differential A 
0.0 i 10.0 dpsi 
84 1 F015 Circulating water pump A<L-B 
discharge pressure 
0.0 ; 
1 
100.0 psig 1 
85 i F0i8 C'ooling tower A discharge water 
temperature 
0.0 1 
i  
752.0 '^F 
86 i 
i 
F019 Cooling tower B discharge water 
temperature 
0.0 ; 
; 1 
752.0 -F : 
87 i 
1 
F040 IP-lA reactor feed pump suction 
pressure 
0.0 ; 600.0 psig i 
88 j 
1 
F041 IP-IB reactor feed pump suction 
pressure 
0.0 : 
1 
600.0 psig 
: 
89 1  
i  1 
F042 1P-1.\ reactor feed pump discharge 
pressure 
0.0 1  
i 
2000.0 psig ^ 
90 j F043 IP-IB reactor feed pump discharge 0.0 1  2000.C psig 
91 ! F044 Condensate total flow- 0.0 1  8.0 Mlb/hr 
92 1  F045 Condensate makeup flow -10.0 1  100.0 Klb/H 
93 ! F046 Corvdensate rejection flow 0.0 ! 50.0 Klb/H 
94 1 F094 Feedwater final pressure 0.0 i 2000.0 psig 
95 GOOl Generator gross watts 0.0: 720.0 MWE 
96 T039 Low-pressure condenser pressure 0.0 j 30.0 in.-Hg 
97 T040 High-pressure condenser pressure 0.01 30.0 in.-Hg 
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Table 3.5: The thirt\--six transients, and the fifty-eight scenarios used to design 
Adviser 2a and Adviser 2b. 
No. j Scenario Description | 
1 culO Reactor water clean-up coolant leakage | 
2 culOgpo Reactor water clean-up coolant leakage with failure of Group o j 
isolation valves. I 
3 j fw02a 1 Condensate pump trip 
4 f\v04a Condensate filter demineralizer resin injection 1 
•5 
fw08-6 
fw08-6.2 
fw08-6-3 
Feedwater tube leak inside heaters 6A 6B ! 
- 100% severity j 
- 60% severity j 
- 30% severity 
6 ! fw09a 
• 
Reactor feedwater pump trip 
7 fwl2c0 Feedwater regulator valve controller stuck closed 
8 fwl2cl Feedwater regulator valve controller stuck open I 
9 i 
i f\v 17a 
! f\vl7a.2 
fwl7a-3 
Main feedwater line break inside primary containment 1 
- 100% severity 
- 60%. severity ; 
- 30%. severity i 
10 
i 
hpO.5-2 
hp0.5J3 
High-pressure core injection (HPCI) steam supply line | 
break in HPCI room 
- 60% severity 
- 30% severity 
11 
hp08-2 
hp08-3 
High-pressure core injection steam supply line break j 
in torus room 
- 60% severity 
- 30%. severity 
12 1 
1 iaOl 
iaOl-2 
Complete loss of instrumentation air 1 
- 100% severity 
- 60% severity 
13 j icl4scra 
! i 
Spurious scram with no operator action. Initial condition IC14 : 
100% power, Beginning of Cycle 
14 j ic20scr2 Spurious scram with effective operator action to avoid feedwater 
pump trip. Initial condition IC20 : 100%> power. 
End of Cycle 
Lo I ic20scrm ! Spurious scram with no operator action. Initial condition IC20 ; i 
I I 100% power, End of Cycle. | 
Table 3.5 (Continued) 
No. i Scenario 
i 
L6 j ic22scra 
Description 
Spurious scram. Initial condition IC22: 25% power, 
Beginning of Cycle 
17 ic23scrm 
! 
i 
Spurious scram. Initial condition IC23 : 75% power, 
Beginning of Cycle 
18 ic24scrm Spurious scram. Initial condition IC24 : 100%. power. 
Middle of Cycle 
19 
mc04 
mc04.2 
mc04.3 
Main condenser air inleakage 
- 100% severity 
- 60%i severity 
- 30%. severity 
20 i j Steam leak inside primary containment 
; ms02 i  - 100% severity 
1 ms02.2 i - 60% severity 
ms02J3 1 - SC/c severity 
21 1 
i ms03a 
ms03a_2 
1 ms03a_3 
Main steam line rupture inside primary containment 
- 100%. severity 
- 60% severity 
- 30%. severity 
22 1 msl4-6 | Loss of feedwater heating to feedwater heaters 6A 6B 
23 ! msl9ab I Spurious group 1 isolation 
24 • ms32 1 Spurious group 7 isolation 
25 1 rp05tc01 | Reactor protection system SCRAM circuit failure (ATWS) with 
i i alternate rod injection 
26 i rp5actcl 
1 
Reactor protection system SCRAM circuit failure (ATWS) with 
failure of alternate rod injection 
27 I rrlO Recirculation pump speed feedback signal failure 
1 -8 1 
! 1 ; ! 
! rrloa 
1 rrl5a_2 
! rrl5a.3 
Recirculation loop rupture (design basis Loss of Coolant 
.Occident) 
- 100% severity 
- 60% severity 
- 30% severity 
i 29 
! 
i Coolant leakage inside primary containment 
rr30 ; - 100% severity 
rr30-2 j - 60% severity 
rr30-3 | - 30% severity 
Table 3.5 (Continued) 
No. Scenario Description 
30 rxOl Fuel cladding (5%) failure 
31 ad05 Inadvertent initiation of Automatic Depressurization 
System (ADS) 
32 
fwlSa 
fwl8a-2 
fwl8a_3 
Main feedwater line break outside primary containment 
- 100% severity 
- 60% severity 
- 30% severity 
33 mcOla Main circulation water pump "A" trip 
34 
ms04a 
ms04a.2 
ms04aJ3 
Main steam line rupture outside primary containment j 
- 100% severity 
- 60% severity ; 
- 30%' severity 
35 
1 
rdl3 
rdl3-2 
Loss of air pressure to control rod drive (CRD) hydraulic 
control units (HCUs) 
- 100% severity 
- 60% severity 
1 36 tc02 Electrical hydraulic control (EHC) system hydraulic pump 
failure 
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Table 3.6: Performance of Adviser 2a and Adviser 2b on pure and noisy data. All 
times are in seconds since the initiation of the transients. 
i  
1 
Adviser 2a Adviser 2b j  
Scenario .Scram Pure data Noisy data Pure data Noisy data | j  
Time Root Class. Root Class. Root Class. Root Class, i  
culO n/s 0 87 22 87 0 88 10 ! 88 ! i  
culOgp-5 44 i  95 19 96 1 95 6 1 94 i i  
fw02a 498 1 0 76 8 78 1 76 9 88 1  
f\v04a n/s ! 1 30 13 31 1 32 12 1  32 i  
fw08-6 22 i  0 60 5 72 2 60 8 • 62 i  
fw08-6-2 n/s 0 86 1 88 0 82 6 91 ! 
fw08-6-3 n/s i  1 94 9 92 0 89 9 94 : 
f\v09a n/s 1  0 96 6 102 0 96 2 112 :| 
fwr2c0 • 10 1  1 63 10 66 0 64 18 64 i i  
fwl2cl 90 i  I  99 12 96 0 96 14 99 
fwlTa 1 ; 0 81 2 80 2 81 5 107 i i  
f\vl7a-2 4 i  1 83 9 86 2 83 9 84 Ii 
f\vl7a.3 8 i 1 6.5 12 72 65 L  6 72 i i  
hpO.5-2 n/s i 85 6 80 1 80 3 87 i! 
hpO.5-3 n/s i  1 84 4 90 1 86 4 85 ; i  
hp08-2 /  1 n/s , 1 99 1 99 1 102 3 118 i i  
hp08-3 n/s ! 1 34 72 1 42 3 66 : i  
iaOl n/s 0 23 1 24 0 23 12 23 ! 
iaOl.2 n/s 1 0 58 3 58 0 52 7 52 I j  
icl4scra 1 ; 2 93 17 92 1 92 9 101 :l 
ic20scr2 1 1 1 85 12 99 1 85 22 112 
ic20scrm 1 ! 1 79 4 82 1 79 4 80 i' 
j  ic22scra 1 i  18 85 16 102 12 85 13 89 11 
ic23scrm 1 ' 1 85 10 91 0 86 6 99 1 
ic24scrm 1 2 81 12 80 2 80 7 82: 
1 mc04a 3.5 0 72 26 77 1 72 22 72 ! 
mc04a_2 47 0 82 24 95 4 80 18 79 1 
mc04a_3 .58 26 92 39 107 22 87 26 91 ! 
ms02 3 0 77 0 68 0 81 4 102 1  
ms02 -2 3 0 85 j  9 88 0 93 3 98 
ms02-3 4 0 95 j 12 103 0 92 6 106 ! 
Table 3.6 (Continued) 
! Adviser 2a i  Adviser 2b 1  
Scenario Scram j  Pure data Noisy data Pure data Nois's • data 1  
Time | Root Class. Root Class. Root Class. Root Class. I 
ms03a 2 1 92 7 92 II 2 87 18 87 1  
ms03a.2 1 1  0 67 3 82 1  0 62 9 
ms03a.3 2; 0 82 3 89 1  0 89 12 89 I  
msl4-6 n/s 1 87 7 85 1  2 87 3 85 1  
msl9ab 17 17 79 32 80 1 20 78 24 78 1  
ins32 98 ! 11 73 12 
" i  16 18 78 1  
rpOotcOl 20 i 1 69 12 66 i 1 71 8 71 1  
rpoactcl n/s i  1 64 18 52 1 60 14 60 i  
rrlO n/s 11 91 29 109 12 91 18 111 1  
rrl5a • 1 ! 0  95 4 92 1  0 95 1 95 i| 
rrl5a-2 1 i 2 91 12 99 ! 2 91 6 92 j :  
rrl5aJ3 1 1  •> 78 9 92 1  2 78 5 78 
rr30 18 i  19 89 21 91 i  14 88 36 98 I I  
O
 
( 30 I 2 84 22 78 1  0  93 1' 93 || 
1  rr30_3 59 ! 13 94 18 81; 12 94 14 109 : 
1  rxOI n/s ! 8 32 10 33 ! 7 32 11 32 i  
ad 05 3 : -
-  1  4 68 14 68 1  OO 
8 i - - -
- 1 8 61 24 66 1 
f\vl8a-2 24 ! 
" 
- " i 12 73 18 91 j 
fAvlSaJ? n/s ; 
-
-
-
" : 12 68 15 
mcOla 275 i - "  1  - ' 4 92 11 92 i 
ms04a 2 i - - . 1 92 6 92 
ms04a-2 2 - -
• 
- 1 0 88 17 87 
ms04a_3 2 
" 
-
-
-
2 96 12 104 
rdl3 1 j - . - 1' 1 I I  ^  1 72 3 81 i 
! rdl3-2 4 1  1  _ 1  I 1 1  4 102 i  
tc02 5 Ij - 1  - ' i  0  i  63 9 64 i 
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Table 3.7: Architecture of the artificial neural networks used in Adviser 2b. and the 
input variables used by the networks. 
Network •Associated 
Transient 
Architecture Input Variables (Numbers in this column ; 
correspond to the order in which the | 
variables are listed in Table 3.4.) 
Root 1  -
i  
1  
16 X 22 x 1 3, 5, 7. 8, 9, 10, 13. 14, 23, 24. 25, 26, 
52, 74, 91, 95 : 
Class. 1 culO 17 X  26 X  1 3, 5, 7, 8. 9. 10. 13. 14, 23, 24, 25, 26, 
50, 52, 74. 91, 95 
Class. 2 culOgp.5 
1  
17 X  6 X  1 3, 5, 7. 8, 9. 10, 13, 14, 23. 24. 25. 26. 
50. 52. 74, 91. 95 
Class. 3 fw02a 14 X  18 X  1 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 23, 24. 25. 26, -52. 74. 
91, 95 
Class. 4 fw04a 40 X  13 X  1 3, 4. 5, 7, 8. 9, 10, 13, 14. 15. 16. 17, 
21, 22. 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30. .50. 51. -52. 
53, -54, 55. .56, 57, 60. 62. 63. 74. 87, 88. 
89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95 
Class. .5 fw08-6 13 x 8 x 1 j  o,  7, 8, 9, 10, 23, 24. 2-5. 26. -52. 74. 91. 9.5 
Class. 6 i  fw09a j  5 K 3x 1 7, 8, 9, 25, 52 
Class. 7 ! fwl2c0 19x5x1 | 5. 8, 15, 24, 26, 52, 74, 91, 94 
Class. 8 i  fwl2cl 12 x 19 x 1 5, 7. 8, 15, 24. 25, 26. 52, 55, 74. 91, 94 
Class. 9 I  fwi.a i  26 x 21 x 1 
i  1  i  
1  I  
1  •  !  
!  i  !  
3, 4, 8. 9, 10, 13, 14, 15. 17, 21, 22, 23. 
24, 25, 26, .50. 51, .52. .54, 55. 74, 90. 91, 
92, 93, 95 
] Class. 10 hp05 j  3 x 6 x 1 9, 25, .52 
Class. 11 hp08 1 7x4x1 7, 8, 9, 23, 24. 25, .52 
Class. 12 
1  
iaOl 16 X  10 X  1 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13. 14, 23. 24. 25, 26. .52. 
74, 91, 95 
Class. 13 icl4scr 18 X  25 X  1 3, 5. 7, 8. 9, 10, 13. 14. 19, 23. 24, 25, 26, 
.52, 74, 75, 91, 95 
i  Class. 14 ic20scr2 12 X  8 X  1 5, 7. 15, 17. 24, 25. 26, 52, 55. 74. 91. 94 
Class. 15 i  ic20scrm 6 x 5 x 1  8, 9, 24, 25, 26. 52 
Class. 16 1  ic22scra 7 x 6 x 1  8, 9, 23, 24, 25, 26, 52 
Class. 17 ; ic2.3scrm 
j 
t 
!  
! 
24 X  14 X  1 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, .50, 51, 52. .54, .55, 74, 90, 91. 92, 93, 
95 
] Class. 18 1 ic24scrm } 20 x 15 x 1 
i  I  i  
3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26, 
.50. .52. .54. .55. 74. 90. 91. 92 
Table 3.7 (Continued) 
Network .ALSSociatecl 
Transient 
.Architecture Input Variables (Numbers in this column | 
j correspond to the order in which the ' 
1 variables are listed in Table 3.4.) | 
Class. 19 j mc04a 12 X 9 X 1 1 5. 7, 8. 10. 13, 14, 23, 24, 26, 50, 74. 91 i 
Class. 20 ms02 32 X 17 X 1 i 3, 4, 5. 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22. 23, | 
i 24, 25, 26, 29, 50, 51, 52, 53. 54, 63. 74. i 
87, 88, 89. 90. 91, 92. 93, 95 
Class. 21 ! ms03a 1 
i 1 
1 
25 X 18 X 1 3. 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 21. 22. 23, i 
24, 25. 26. 50. 51, 52, 54, 74, 91, 92. 93. • 
95 ' 
Class. 22 ! msl4-6 7 x 7 x 1  7, 8, 9, 23, 24, 25, 52 
Class. 23 I msl9ab i 1 
' t 
16 X 15 X 1 3. 5. 7, 8, 9, 10. 13, 14, 23, 24, 25, 26. 1 
52. 74, 91, 95 
Class. 24 j nis32 
i 
i 
30 X 27 X 1 ! 3. 4. 5, 7, 8, 9, 13. 14. 15, 16. 17, 22. 23. ; 
24, 25, 29. 50, 51. 52, 53. 54. 63, 74. 87. i 
j 88, 89, 90. 92. 93. 95 
' Class. 25 1 rpQ.^tcOL 1 22 x 8x1 i 5. 7. 8, 9, 13, 15, 16, 22. 23. 25. 26. 50. : 
1 1 51, 54. 55, 74. 89, 90, 91. 92. 93, 95 
i Class. 26 1 rp5actcl 17 x 11 x 1 3,5.7,8,9,10.13.14,23,24,25.26, i 
i 50. 52. 74. 91, 95 ! 
i Class. 27 : rrlO 5 x 8 x 1 1 7. 8, 9. 25. 52 1 
; Class. 28 i rrl5a 
i 1 
25 X 58 X 1 i 3. 4. 5, 7, 8, 9, 10. 13, 14. 17. 21, 22, 23, i 
24. 25, 26. 50. 51. 52. 54, 74. 91, 92. 93. ! 
1 95 
Class. 29 rr30 
! j 
28 X 17 X 1 I 4. 9. 15. 17, 21. 22. 25. 52. 50, 51. 54, i 
55. 90, 92. 93 ! 
' Class. .30 rxOl 5 X 10 X 1 j 7, 9. 25. 48, 52 
1 Class. 31 ad05 12 X 8 X 1 1 4. 5, 8, 10. 13, 14. 23, 24. 50. 51, 74, 91 
i Class. 32 [ fwl8a 20 X 18 X 1 3. 4, 8, 9. 10. 14, 15. 17, 21, 22, 24, 25. 
26. 50, 51. 52, 54, 90, 91, 95 
! Class. 33 ! incOla 7 X 12 X 1 7. 23, 24. 82. 83. 84. 95 
; Class. .34 ms04a 19 X 17 X 1 3. 4, 5, 7, 10. 13, 14, 17, 21, 22. 23, 24. 
25, 26, 74. 91, 92, 93. 95 
Class. 35 i rdl3 5 X 4 X 1 6. 23. 24, 25, 29 
1 Class. 36 tc02 28 X 32 1 4, 8. 9, 13, 14, 15. 16, 17, 21, 22, 23. 24. 
25, 26, 29. 30, 51, 52, 55, 56. 57, 60. 62. 
63. 74. 87. 91. 95 
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GENERAL SUMMARY 
In this study, a viable architecture selection technique has been presented. The 
dynamic input selection (DIS) scheme allows an ANN model to be generated without 
any guesswork regarding the selection of inputs and the size of the hidden layer. This 
scheme was used to develop a fault diagnostic adviser for a nuclear power plant. The 
adviser was designed such that it could be expanded easily to detect a greater number 
of transients. The diagnostic problem was broken into subtasks. and each of these 
was solved by an individual neural network. The adviser was initially developed to 
detect thirty distinct transients irrespective of the severity. This was achieved by 
a root networks that detected the onset of abnormal plant conditions, and thirty 
classifier networks that detected the particular transient in progress. The modular 
design of the adviser enabled the expansion of this adviser to detect and classify six 
more transients; the existing ANNs were slightly modified and six new ANNs were 
added to the adviser. The DIS scheme was instrumental in the speedy development 
of the adviser without any guesswork regarding the input variables and hidden nodes 
used in each of the component ANNs. Though the backpropagation scheme was used 
in this work, DIS can be applied to any learning scheme. 
Some salient DIS features 
In. this section, some of the features, assumptions, and concerns about the DIS 
scheme are presented and discussed. These are issues that were not addressed in the 
three papers that form the body of this dissertation. 
Correlation coefRcient vs. information theory 
Correlation coefficient r between two variables x and y, commonly given in statis­
tics as 
_ E[.vy] - E\/\E[y] 
sjE[x^ - E-[,v\y'E[y~\ - E-[y] 
measures the extent of linear correlation between x and y. If the relationship is 
totally linear, then the correlation coefficient will be 1. On the other extreme, if we 
have a function such as 
y  =  s i n { x ]  . 0 < ,r < ~, (12) 
then the correlation coefRcient between x and y will be equal to zero. This indicates 
that there is no linearity in the relationship between x and y. 
We are interested in using a measure of association between x and y that tells 
us how important x is for the determination of y. In the linear case, the correlation 
coefRcient is a very good measure. However, in the extreme non-linear case, we 
have seen that the correlation coefRcient indicates that x is not important for the 
determination of y. We know that x and y are related by a sine function, so knowledge 
of X should be significant and sufficient to determine y. In such cases, the correlation 
coefRcient would be an inappropriate measure of the importance of x to determine y. 
On the other hand, the information theoretic measure of association f'(^|.r) would 
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hav'e a very high value (almost 1), indicating a strong functional relationship between 
X and y. The non-linear nature of the information correlation enables it to identify 
the non-linearity in the relationship between x and y. Since most of problems suitable 
for a neural network based solution represent non-linear systems, it is desirable to 
use information correlation over linear correlation coefficient. 
Relative ranking of random variables 
The input variable ranking capabilities of DIS for a continuous function mapping 
problem is demonstrated in section 4.2 of Chapter 2. The output r is given by 
z  —  s i n ( ~ x ) s i n { ~ y )  ( 1 3 )  
where x and y are the two input variables required to solve the problem. In the 
ranking analysis, there are three other inputs; (.r -r y),2. xy. and a random number 
(see Table 2.4). The analysis and the subsequent training demonstrated that the 
DIS scheme could select the variables .r and y to solve the problem. It is however 
of some concern that the random variable (Input -5 in Table 2.4) is ranked higher 
than (.r -r y)/2 and xy (see Table 2.5). Moreover, in Case 2 (Table 2.7), the random 
variable is ranked above x. This might indicate a problem with the ranking method, 
especially because 600 data patterns were used. 
I had originally used a bin size of 0.05 (20 bins) for the information theoretic 
analysis of the data. Upon decreasing the bin size to 0.02 (50 bins) I noticed a 
change in the ranking of the variables. For Case 1, at a bin size of 0.01, the random 
variable had fallen to fourth place in the ranking analysis. For Case 2, the random 
variable was now ranked last. Further analysis with new sets of data indicated that 
the random number tended to be ranked third with a bin size of 0.05, and second on 
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rare occasions. But reduction in the bin size to 0.01 invariably relegated the random 
variable to the fourth or fifth spot. 
The above experiment indicates that the selection of the bin size is important for 
the proper ranking of the variables. This might provide us with a means to determine 
the appropriate bin size. If we introduce a random variable to the data set. then we 
may select the bin size such that the random variable is ranked very low. 
Validation of the DIS models 
The effectiveness of the dynamic input selection scheme was demonstrated on 
benchmark problems where the scheme was able to select the correct input variables 
to arrive at a solution to the problem. This scheme was later used to develop models 
to solve real world problems, such as the temperature prediction problem in Paper II 
(page 79). The effectiveness of this model was illustrated by predicting the noon-time 
temperatures for 1993, while the model was based on data for 1991 and 1992. The 
result of this prediction can be seen in Figure 11.2 (page 84). This model was accepted 
because it achieved the target RMS error over the training set and performed well 
over the novel data using a subset of the available input variables. However, we can 
perform a few tests to gauge the acceptability of the model. The first test is a test for 
white noise in the prediction error of the model. The second test is based on Mallows 
Cp* criterion that measures the DIS model versus a competing model that uses all 
the available input variables. 
Test for white noise 
The data for the temperature prediction problem happens to be a time series. 
Thus the prediction error of the model is also a time series. The SPECTRA procedure 
of the time series module in the SAS statistical package has a WHITETEST option that 
evaluates the whiteness of a time series. The test prints out the value of Bartlett's 
Kohnogorov-Smirnov Statistic [8. 5i which is the maximum absolute difference of 
the standardized partial sums of the periodogram of the time series data and the 
cumulative density function (CDF) of a uniform (0,1) random variable. The test 
statistic for the error data over the recall patterns was 0.0745, indicating that the 
error series is very close to a white noise distribution. This shows that the model 
derived by the DIS scheme does not consistently miss any particular feature during 
prediction using novel data. 
Mallow^s C'p* criterion test 
The criterion developed by Mallows 3] is used to compare a regression model 
using p'' parameters to the regression model that uses all the T available parameters 
[2. 4, 6i. The Cp* statistic is defined as 
55T . 
^> = 175^-'-"'-"' 
where p* is the number of parameters included in a particular model with p input 
variables, SSE^^ is the error sum of squares for the regression model with p'^ pa­
rameters, T is the total number of parameters available for use in a regression model. 
MSEj is the mean square error of a regression model containing all T parameters, 
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and n  is the sample size. Equation 14 can also be expressed as [ l -
;—^2 (V-») (15) 
X 
where and are the coefficients of multiple determination for the regression 
models with and T parameters respectively. In the above equation, it is extremely 
important to have the values of and RL to very high precision. A regression 
P 
model is considered adequate if is equal to or very close to p". 
We can modify the above definition of in the context of regression models in 
order to apply it to neural network models. The number of trainable parameters in 
a given ANN model can be taken as the equivalent of the number of parameters in a 
regression model. In the case of the ANNs used in this work, the weights are the only 
trainable parameters. Thus the number of parameters p* in a model given by the DIS 
scheme is the number of weights in the neural network. We now need a value for T. 
the number of parameters in a model that uses all the available input variables. We 
use the dynamic node architecture (DNA) scheme to develop an ANN model with all 
the available inputs and the optimum hidden layer. The number of weights in this 
ANN is the value for T. For the two models, the squares of the correlation coefficients 
between the expected and predicted values over a set of novel test patterns gives us 
the values for R^^ and R\ I. We can now calculate the C' * criterion for the model p i  p 
provided by the DIS scheme. 
As with the test for white noise, we take the temperature prediction problem 
for purposes of demonstration. The test set consisted of 92 patterns. Thus, n = 92. 
The DIS model had an architecture of 23 x 32 x 1 with 768 interconnecting weights. 
Thus, p* = 768. The square of the correlation coefficient between the expected and 
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predicted output values for the 92 test patterns gives the value of = 0.802095. 
We now develop an ANN model for the same problem using all the 48 available input 
variables. The DNA scheme is used to develop this model, and the final architecture 
was 48 X 44 x 1. We thus get T - 2156, the number of weights in this model. From 
this model we also get — 0.818452. 
We now have all the values rec[uired to calculate for the DIS model. Upon 
substitution of the values into Equation 15, we get 
(1 - 0.802095)( 21.56-92) 
'p' = (1-0.81845-2) (16) 
= 805.96 
C * 
= 1.04942 . (17) 
P 
. ^ . This value of —^ is sufficientlv close to 1. and thus the model is acceptable. It is 
P 
unlikely that any models with fewer input variables would be able to have a lower 
value for the ratio —Though it is theoretically possible for (T'^x to be less than 
P P 
p*.  it is extremely rare to realize such a model. 
Future work with DIS 
The DIS scheme presented here uses a combination of principal component anal­
ysis (PC.A.) and information theoretic interdependency analysis (ITIA) to rank the 
available input variables. ITIA was not performed directly on the input variables be­
cause of the possibility that some input variables might be individually uncorrelated 
to the output, but together they might define the output to a very large extent. In the 
information theoretic notation, f'iyl-r]^) == 0 and {'(yLro) = 0 but f'(yj.r]^,.r2) == 1. 
In such a case, ITIA on the input variables would assign low importance to the input 
variables ,C]^ and X2. and some other input variable with higher information theo­
retic correlation to the output would be assigned a higher importance. This variable 
.rg. though ranked higher than and .ro, might be unable to predict the output 
without the presence of both .rj and .ro in the model. But since .rj and x-y together 
define the output to a great extent, .rg might not be needed for predicting the output. 
Principal component analysis was used to work around the problem described 
above. PC.A. transforms the input data into a set of mutually uncorrelated and 
orthogonal principal components (PCs). The PC's are projections of the original 
data points along mutually perpendicular axes. Each PC is a linear combination of 
the input variables. By converting the input data into PCs. we have preserved all the 
information in the input data while performing a transformation. Each PC contains 
the information in the original data set along one particular direction. Thus, each PC 
not only contains the information in each of the input variables along one direction, 
but it also contains the joint information in any combination of the input variables 
along that direction. 
In its most desirable form, the information in the original input variables should 
have been distributed among the PCs such that knowledge of two PCs together 
is no more valuable to determining the output than knowledge of those two PCs 
individually. It is not possible to guarantee such a condition by transformation of the 
input data irrespective of its relationship with the output. PC.A., however, performs 
transformation of the input data alone, and does not deal with the outputs. Practical 
experience has shown that for most problems, including the ones used in Paper II, 
the value of U{Y\'J;I.UJ2 ) nearly equal to the value of U(Y ) — f)• This 
has enabled the use of the information theoretic correlation between any particular 
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PC and the output vector as a measure of the importance of that PC. Since the 
importance measure used in DIS is not exact, the scheme has an ability to correct 
any possible mistakes. Dynamic addition of inputs allows network growth. Once a 
problem is learned, an attempt is made to rerank the input variables actuallj- used 
by the ANN, and delete any unnecessary inputs. The ability to detect and delete any 
unnecessary input variables from the trained .\NN has been demonstrated in Paper 
II. 
PCA is basically an analysis of the variance in the input data. The PCs are 
derived using the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the data covariance matrix. It might 
be possible to take the matrix of the information theoretic correlation between the 
input variables instead of the covariance matrix, and construct a set of components 
based on the eigenvectors of this matrix. The information theoretic properties of 
these components might provide a better transformation than PCA. Other methods 
can also be investigated that take into account the correlation between the input 
variables and the output. 
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APPENDIX. DESCRIPTION OF TRANSIENT SCINARIOS 
MALFUNCTION ADOS 
Spurious automatic depressurization system (ADS) actuation 
A. Logic A 
B. Logic B 
Generic. Logic Failure. 100/^ power. 
This malfunction will cause the selected ADS channel to actuate spuriously from a 
channel logic failure. The effected valves will not respond to any other actuation 
signals, open or close, auto, or manual. 
The failed valves will cause the steam flow to increase and the reactor pressure will 
decrease. The reactor vessel water level will decrease, causing reactor scram on low 
level at 170 inches. The suppression pool parameters will respond to the increased 
temperature, pressure and level will react to the steam regulating valve (SRV) 
discharge. The emergency core cooling system (ECCS) will activate automatically 
and provide the system with cooling as the plant condition degrades. 
The rate of depressurization and level decrease will be consistent with the mass and 
energy balances on the vessel. 
Malfunction removal will restore the effected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafiles: 
ad05.dat: Transient is inadvertant initiation of ADS (AD05A). IC24, 100% power, 
middle of cycle. This is for the first trend file. 
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MALFUNCTION CUlO 
Coolant leakage outside the primary containment. Severity is variable: 0 - 100% = 
0 - 4" diameter pipe (single-ended shear). Reactor Water Cleanup System (RVVCS) 
expansion joint failure at 100% power. 
This malfunction will cause a leak to occur at the cleanup system inlet expansion 
joint. The leak rate will be determined by the specified severity. 
A low-severity leak will cause the ambient temperature to increase and will actuate 
the leak detection system isolation and annunciation at setpoint. .\s severity 
increases the leak detection system will be actuated by area temp/temp 
differentials. Prior to isolation, a brief decrease in pressure and flow will indicate 
mass loss on the inlet to the RWCS pumps. The pump discharge pressure will 
decrease proportional to leak severity and the cleanup system return temperature 
will decrease. When the reactor water cleanup system leak detection system 
activates, motor valves (MO-2700. 2701, 2740) will close, and the RWCU pumps 
will trip. The motor valve position indicating lights will indicate the valves are 
closed, and the RWCU pump motor breaker will indicate the breaker is open. The 
RWCU leak will cause the system pressure to decrease to atmospheric pressure. 
The system flow will decrease resulting in appropriate annunciation. The cleanup 
holding pumps will start automatically from the system low flow. System 
temperature will slowly decay to ambient, and the heat load on Reactor Building 
Closed Coolant Water (RBCCW) will decrease rapidly. 
iVIalfunction removal will restore the effected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafiles: 
culO.dat: Accident is reactor water cleanup line break outside primary 
containment 100% break. 1C24, 100% power. Middle of Cycle (MOC). Malfunction 
is YP:MCU10 at 100%. Decay heat is normal. No operator action. 
culOgpS-dat: Accident is reactor water cleanup line break outside primary 
containment 100% break. IC24, 100% power. Middle of Cycle (MOC). Malfunction 
is YP;MCU10 at 100%. Decay heat is normal. No operator action. Automatic 
group 5 isolation is overridden. Valves M02700, 2701, 2740 do not close feedwater 
pumps run out trip on delayed overload. 
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MALFUNCTION FW02 
iMalfiinction is condensate pump trip. 
A) Pump A B) Pump B 
Generic, breaker overcurrent device (50) failure, 100% power. 
This malfunction will cause the selected main condensate pump breaker to trip 
from a faulty overcurrent device (50). The condensate pump breaker will indicate 
open, motor current will decrease, and annunciation from the trip will occur. 
When the condensate pump motor breaker trips, the pump will stop, and pump 
discharge pressure and flow will decrease. The corresponding reactor feedwater 
pump will trip and the recirculation system will run back low water level of 186 
inches to 457c speed. Condensate header pressure will decrease, and flow will 
increase as the remaining condensate pump capacity is exceeded. 
If both condensate pumps are tripped, the reactor feedwater pumps will trip. The 
recirculation pumps will start to run back at 186 inches Reactor Pressure Vessel 
(RPV) water level to 45% speed. 
The reactor will scram when level reaches 170 inches. 
j\lalfunction removal will restore the effected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Data files: 
fw02a.dat: .Accident is trip of condensate pump A. No loss of power. When a 
condensate pump trips, the associated feedwater pump trips automatically. Reactor 
trips on low level. The turbine then trips on reverse power. IC24. 100% power, 
Middle of Cycle (MOC). Malfunction is YP:MFW02(A) the runback of recirculation 
pumps delays the reactor scram. 
MALFUNCTION FW04 
iVIalfunction is condensate filter demineralization resin injection. 
.A) Filter A B) Filter B 
C) Filter C D) Filter D 
E) Filter E 
Generic, variable, I - 100% = 1 - 5% resin release, resin retention element failure, 
100% power. 
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This malfunction will cause the release of resin from the selected demineralizer filter 
to the severity selected. Any release of resin into the condensate system will cause a 
buildup in the reactor vessel. Irradiation and carryover into the main steam system 
will cause the radiation monitoring system to respond to increased radiation levels 
and annunciation. High temperature and radiation cause a large increase in reactor 
vessel conductivity and a decrease in water pH. 
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafiles: 
fw04a.dat; Condensate filter demin resin injection causes increase in vessel 
conductivity and steam line radiation IC24, 100% power. Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
MALFUNCTION FW08 
Feedwater heater tube leak. 
A) Heater lA B) Heater IB C) Heater 2A D) Heater 2B 
E) Heater .3.A. F) Heater 3B G) Heater 4A H) Heater 4B 
Generic, variable. 0 - 100% = 0-4 inch diameter (equivalent to rupture of appro.x: 
.30 tubes) tube failure 100% power. 
This malfunction will cause a tube failure in the selected feedwater heater at a rate 
specified by the severity. 
the leak severity increases for the selected feedwater heater, water from the 
condensate system, for heaters ^1 - ^5, and water from the feedpump discharge, 
for heaters will be induced into the shell side of the heater. The addition of 
mass will cause the mass within the heater to increase and the level control system 
will respond and modulate the drain and dump valves open. The cascading effect of 
the excess mass will impact the downline low pressure feedwater heaters and the 
level control systems. 
A maximum severity or multiple leaks in the #6 heater could cause insufficient 
feedwater flow to the reactor vessel and result in a reactor scram on low water level. 
A maximum severity or multiple leaks in the #1 - #5 heaters could result in a low-
suction pressure trip of the reactor feedpumps. A. less severe leak will result in 
decreased feedwater heating and decrease in condenser vacuum. 
If the heater inleakage exceeds the normal drain and dump capacity the level will 
increase and actuate the high and hi-hi level annunciators. The level could backup 
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into the turbine resulting in a turbine trip from high vibration, reactor scram and 
recirculation RPT breakers to open. The hi and hi-hi level alarms are bypassed if 
HS1393 in bypass and there is a turbine trip or a reactor scram. 
Malfunction removal will restore the effected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafiles: 
Feedwater tube leak inside heaters 6.A Sc 6B. IC24. 100% power, middle of cycle. 
The following three simulations are for the first trend file: 
fw08-6.dat: 100% severity corresponding to -30 tubes breaking 
fw08-6_2.dat: 60%. severity corresponding to 18 tubes breaking 
fw08-6_3.dat: 30%c severity corresponding to 9 tubes breaking 
MALFUNCTION FW09 
Malfunction is reactor feedwater pump trip. 
A) Pump .A. B) Pump B 
Generic, spurious trip signal. 100% power. 
This malfunction will cause the selected main feedwater pump to trip instantly 
from a spurious trip signal. The pump motor breaker will trip open and 
annunciation will activate. The pump pressure and flow will decrease and the 
recirculation valve will close, if open. 
The main feedwater pump trip will cause a partial loss of feedwater to the reactor, 
the level will decrease, and speed is runback to 45% at the recirculation pump. 
Reactor and turbine power are reduced accordingly. The feedwater control valves 
will modulate and maintain reactor water level in the control band at the reduced 
power level. The plant will stabilize at a new lower power. It is possible for low 
water level scram because of too high a power level or load line. 
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafiles: 
fw09a.dat: .Accident is reactor feedwater pump 'A' trip. IC24, 100%) power, 
Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
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MALFUNCTION FW12 
Feedwater regulator valve controller (FWRV) failure (auto). 
A) FWRV A B) FWRV B C) Master controller 
Generic, variable. 0 - 100% = 0 - 100% of valve position. Auto output signal 
failure. 100%. power. 
This malfunction will cause the selected feedwater regulator valve controller output 
to fail to the specified severity. The output will cause the regulator valve to 
modulate normally to the new position independent of the automatic control input 
signal. Placing the affected controller in the manual control mode will allow 
operator control. 
If the regulator valve position is decreased, the flow provided will decrease, if the 
uneffected feedwater regulator valve capacity permits, it will open and compensate 
for the failed valve control. If the failed valve closes or closes sufficiently to decrease 
the total system capacity the reactor water level will decrease. A reactor scram may 
result. 
If the output signal on the effected controller drops below 6 milliamps. The 
feedwater control valve lockout relav will actuate. .A.n amber alarm light and 
• O 
annunciation will respond. 
If the regulator valve position is increased, the flow provided will increase and the 
unaffected feedwater regulator valve will close to compensate for the failed control 
valve. The plant will remain stable in this condition. As flow is increased for either 
reactor feedwater pump to a value exceeding the design capacity, the motor current 
developed may exceed the overcurrent rating and the unit will trip on overcurrent. 
The master controller failure will cause the feedwater regulator valve controllers in 
auto to respond in unison, the overall effect will be similar to the above failures. 
Exessive flow will increase reactor water level and decreased flow will lower reactor 
water level. A reactor high water level of 211 inches will result in a trip of both 
feedwater pumps and the main turbine. 
Malfunction removal will restore the effected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Dataflles: 
Master feedwater controller failure. Fails both feedwater regulator valves. 100% 
power, IC24. middle of cycle. The following two simulations are for the first trend 
file: 
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fwl2c0.dat: Feedwater regulator valves fail fully closed 
fwl2cl.dat: Feedwater regulator valves fail fully opened 
MALFUNCTION FW17 
Malfunction is main feedwater line break inside primary containment. 
A. Feed line A 
B. Feed line B 
Generic, variable, 0-100% = 0-16" diameter double-ended shear weld failure on 
outlet of check valve, 100% power. This malfunction will cause the selected feed line 
inside the primary containment to shear at the outlet of the check valve to the size 
specified by severity. This malfunction is unisolable from the reactor vessel through 
the selected feedwater line. 
At 100% severity, the rupture will cause a rapid depressurization of the reactor 
vessel and feedwater line. The reactor water level will initially increase resulting in 
a high-level trip of the main turbine, reactor feed pumps, High Pressure C'oolant 
Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC). Low-Pressure 
Coolant Injection (LPCI) and Core Spray (CS) will initiate on the resulting 
containment pressure of 2 psig and inject into the reactor vessel when reactor 
pressure decreases below the shutoff head of the pumps. (Inject valves for LPCI and 
CS will not open until reactor pressure decreases below 400 PSIGJ). 
Drywell pressure and temperature will increase rapidly, and at 2 PSI group 
isolations 2.3.4.8.9 and reactor scram will occur. Suppression pool temperature and 
level will increase in response to the rupture severity. The reactor water level will 
decrease rapidly actuating reactor trip, and turbine reactor water 
low,low-low,low-low-low isolation signals for groups 1,2.3,4,.5,7,8, seal purge. 
The core spray, HPCI and LPCI systems will actuate and begin to flood the reactor 
with water. The unisoltated rupture will continue to cause mass loss from the 
reactor to the drywell and suppression pool. HPCI and RCIC will receive initiation 
signals on lo-lo reactor water level. If the reactor pressure is greater than 100 PSIG. 
these systems will initiate. 
Depending on which feedwater line is broken, HPCI or RCIC will inject to the 
reactor vessel. ("A' feedwater line break, RCIC injects to vessel, portion of HPCI 
bay inject and rest through break, and the opposite is true of 'B" feedwater line 
breaks). 
The reactor will cooldown in response to the Emergency Core Cooling System 
(ECCS).and the event will eventually stabilize. Reactor pressure and drywell 
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pressure will equalize on large break in very short period of time. 
This malfunction is unrecoverable, and the simulator will have to be reinitialized for 
malfunction removal. 
Datafiles: 
fwl7a.dat: Accident is main feed water line break. lOO'^c single-ended shear loop .A. 
IC24. 100% power, MOC. 
fwI7a_2.dat: Accident is main feed water line break. 60% single-ended shear loop 
A IC24. 100% power, MOC. 
fwl7a_3.clat: Accident is main feed water line break. .30% single-ended shear - loop 
A IC24. 100% power. MOC. 
MALFUNCTION FW18 
Malfunction is main feedwater line break outside primary containment. 
A. Feed line X 
B. Feed line B 
Generic, variable, 0-100% = 0-16" diameter double-ended shear weld failure on 
outlet of feed reg valve 100% power. This malfunction will cause the selected feed 
line outside the primary containment to shear at the outlet of the feedwater 
regulator valve to the size specified by severity. 
.A.t 100% severity, the rupture will cause the feedwater header pressure to decrease 
rapidly to less than reactor pressure. Header flow will increase rapidly to maximum, 
and the feedwater pumps capacity will be exceeded and trip on low suction pressure 
of 250 PSIG. Initially the feedwater regulator valves will modulate open from 
steam/feedwater mismatch, then open when the decreasing reactor water level 
overrides control. 
A reactor scram will occur when reactor water level decreases from lack of 
feedwater. the low water level causes High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), and 
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) actuation and begin to flood the reactor 
with water and eventually recover the level. Group isolations will occur at the 
respective setpoints. 
The reactor will cool down in response to the Emergency Core Coolant System 
(ECCS), and the event will eventually stabilize. This malfunction is unrecoverable, 
and the simulator will have to be reinitialized for malfunction removal. 
Datafiles; 
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fwl8a.dat: Accident is main feedwater line break outside primary containment 
1009c break. 
fwl8a_2.dat: Accident is main feedwater line break outside primary containment 
60% break. 
fwl8a_3.dat: Accident is main feedwater line break outside primary containment 
.30% break. 
MALFUNCTION HP05 
Malfunction is High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam supply line break 
(HPCI room). Variable, exponential. 0.J-.J100% = O.J-.IIO" diameter single-ended 
shear weld failure on HPCI steam supply line any. HPCI in operation. This 
malfunction will cause the HPCI turbine steam supply line to break at the drain 
pot inlet. The break size will be specified by severity. 
A low severity steam line break will cause the HPCI turbine speed to decrease. The 
turbine speed controller will cause the throttle valve to open and return the speed 
to set point. 
.A .S severity increases, the steam flow will increase and the turbine speed/pumping 
capacity will decrease. The emergency area cooler will detect a high differential 
temperature, high room temperature or high steam flow (.300%) caused by the 
steam line break and actuate an auto-isolation signal, closing the steam isolation 
valves MO-2238. MO-2'2.39, torus suction valves close, and tripping the turbine. The 
room fire suppression system may activate at high severities. 
The HPCI turbine steam inlet valve HV-2201 will close, the turbine speed will 
decrease, and exhaust pressure will go to minimum. The HPCI pump discharge 
pressure and flow will decrease as pump capacity is lost. Reactor water level will 
not increase from the HPCI system. Without a manual reset the turbine will not 
attempt a restart at 119.-5". 
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Data files: 
hp05_2.dat: Accident is High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line break 
in HPCI room. 60% single-ended shear IC20, 100%c power, End of Cycle (EOC). 
hp05.3.dat; Accident is High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line break 
in HPCI room. 30% single-ended shear IC20. 100%i power. End of Cycle (EOC). 
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MALFUNCTION HP08 
Malfunction is High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam supply line break 
(torus room), variable, 0-100% = 0-10" diameter single-ended shear, weld failure on 
HPCI supply line at MO-2298 any, HPCI in operation. This malfunction will cause 
the HPCI turbine steam supply line to break in the torus room at the outlet of 
MO-2298. The break size will be specified by severity. A low-severity steam line 
break will cause the HPCI turbine speed to decrease, and the turbine speed 
controller will cause the throttle valve to open and return the speed to setpoint. 
HPCI isolation can result if the torus area temperature increases to the high 
setpoint or has a high D/T for greater than lo minutes. 
.•\s severity increases, the steam flow will increase, and the turbine speed/pumping 
capacity will decrease. The excessive steam flow will cause a high steam line D/P 
isolation signal to be generated, closing the steam isolation valves MO-2238. 
MO-2239, torus suction valves close and tripping the turbine. 
The HPCI turbine steam inlet valve MO-2202 will close, the turbine speed will 
decrease, and exhaust pressure will go to minimum. The HPCI pump discharge 
pressure and flow will decrease as pump capacity is lost. Reactor water level will 
not increase from the HPCI system. Without a manual reset the turbine will not 
attempt a restart at 119.5". 
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafiles: 
hp08_2.dat: Accident is High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line break 
in torus room. 60% single-ended shear IC20, 100% power. End of Cycle (EOC). 
hp08_3.dat: .Accident is High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line break 
in torus room. .30%. single-ended shear IC20. 100% power. End of Cycle (EOC). 
MALFUNCTION lAOl 
Loss of instrument air 
Variable 0 - 100% = 0 - 200% of capacity (CFM). 100% capacity = 3000 CFM. .Air 
reciever leak 100% power 
This malfunction will cause the instrument air system to leak from the air reciever 
at a rate specified by severity. 
.\t severities less than 100% the pressure will decrease to the auto start setpoint of 
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the standby compressors which will start and recharge the system. 
.\t severities greater than 100% the system pressure will decrease with all three 
compressors running, severity w^ill determine the rate of decrease. The following 
automatic functions will occur at setpoint: 
1. 87 PSIG - service air low press ann. 
2. 82 PSIG - CY3032 isolates service air hdr. 
•3. 85 PSIG - inst air dryer disch press low ann. 
4. 80 PSIG - CV3034. CV3035, GV3039 isolate appropriate I..A., hdrs 
5. 60 PSIG - breathing air low press ann. 
Each isolated air header pressure will decrease dependent on header air usage and 
individual components will go to thier fail position or mode. 
The plant is expected to trip and will stablize in a post shutdown condition. 
Malfunction removal will restore the effected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafiles: 
iaOl.dat: Transient is complete loss of instrumentation air (LA.01). 100% severity. 
IC24. 100% power, MOC. This is for the first trend file. 
ia01_2.dat: Transient is complete loss of instrumentation air (I.\01). 60% severity. 
IC24. 100% power. MOC. This is for the first trend file. 
MALFUNCTION MCOl 
Malfunction is main circulating water pump trip. 
A. Pump LP4A 
B. Pump B, LP4B 
Generic, upper motor bearing failure, 100% power. This malfunction will cause the 
selected main circulating water-pump motor upper bearing to fail, resulting in a 
motor breaker trip on overcurrent. 
The circulating water-pump upper motor bearing will fail causing the motor speed 
or current to fluctuate. .After approximately one minute the motor bearing will 
seize and cause a very high current to be drawn by the motor, and the supply 
breaker will trip on overcurrent. As the circulating water pump discharges pressure, 
flow will decrease, and the pump discharge valve will close. The cooling tower basin 
level will increase slightly then return to normal as the system mass rebalances. 
With a circulating water pump tripped the circulating water temperatures will 
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increase across the condensers. Condenser vacuum will decrease, and annunciation 
and a turbine trip will result, causing a reactor scram and Reactor Pump Trip 
(RPT). The plant protection system will respond appropriately to the turbine trip, 
and the plant will stabilize in a post trip condition with Electro-hydraulic Control 
(EHC) maintaining reactor pressure with the bypass valves. 
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafile: 
mcOla.dat: Accident is main circulation water pump "a" trip. No loss of power 
IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC). Malfunction is YP:MMC01(A). 
MALFUNCTION MC04 
Main condenser air inleakage. 
A) High pressure condenser B) Low pressure condenser 
Generic, variable. 0 - 100*^ = 0 - 1000 SCFiVI at 29 in. Hg. Condenser boot seal 
failure. 100% power. 
This malfunction will cause the selected condenser to have air inleakage at a CFIVl 
rate specified by severity. 
At low severites the air ejector system will compensate for the air inleakage, however 
as severity is increased the selected condenser will lead a total vacuum decrease by 
both condensers. .As the condenser pressure decreases the following functions occur: 
1) 5.0" HgAbs - Condenser low vacuum annunciation 
2) -5.0" HgAbs - Turbine IB/lC low vacuum annunciation 
3) 7.5" Hg.\bs - Turbine trip actuates 
4) 19" HgAbs - Group 1 isolation signal 
5) 22" HgAbs - Bypass valves are closed 
The ofFgas system will be affected by this malfunction. The pressure and flow will 
increase and as severity increases, the loop seals will isolate on high pressure. The 
flow will alarm. The recombiner temperatures will decrease depending on the 
malfunction. Offgas should stabilize after a short period of time. 
Malfunction removal will restore the effected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Dataflles: 
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Main condenser air inleakage. IC24. 100'^ power, middle of cycle. 
mc04a.dat: 100% severity 
mc04a_2.dat: 60% severity 
inc04a.3.dat: -30% severity 
MALFUNCTION MS02 
Steam leak inside the primary containment. Variable 0 - 100%. = 0-4" diameter 
single ended shear. Caused by RCIC steam line weld failure at elbow instrument 
tap (unisolable). 100%. power. This malfunction will cause a main steam leak at 
RC'IC line elbow instrument tap at a rate specified by severity. Very small severities 
will cause local heating inside the drywell. a very slight pressure increase, and an 
increase in leakage to the drywell floor drain system. 
The main steam flow will increase and rx pressure will decrease. The turbine 
Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system will detect the pressure decrease and 
respond to maintain pressure. With the decreased steam flow the feed flow will 
decrease causing the reactor vessel water level to decrease until the level dominates 
and stablizes the level. 
The drywell pressure and temp will respond quickly to the leak and the high 
drywell pressure trip at 2 psig. The HPCI. LPCI, CS and DG's will sta?t. grcJup 2, 
3. 4. 5 isolations will activate. If the rx pressure decreases to 850 psig. group 1 
isolation will occur and isolate the turbine bypass system. The rx will continue to 
blow down and the rx pressure and level will decrease consistant with the severity. 
Reactor pressure and temperature will decrease rapidly. The torus level and 
temperature will increase in response to the rupture. 
Malfunction removal will restore the effected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafile: 
ms02.dat: RCIC line break inside primary containment. The simulation was a 
100% single ended shear in a 4" dia pipe. Initial condition is IC24, 100%. power. 
Middle of Cycle (MOC). 100%. severity. 
ms02_2.dat: RCIC line break inside primary containment. The simulation was a 
60% single ended shear in a 4" dia pipe. Initial condition is IC24. 100% power. 
Middle of Cycle (MOC). 60% severity. 
nis02_3.dat: RCIC line break inside primary containment. The simulation was a 
30% single ended shear in a 4" dia pipe. Initial condition is IC24, 100% power. 
Middle of Cycle (MOC). 30% severity. 
MALFUNCTION MS03 
Malfunction is Main Steam Line (MSL) rupture inside primary containment. 
A. Steam line 
B. Steam line B 
C. Steam line C" 
D. Steam line D 
Generic, variable. 0- 100% = 0 - 20" diameter double-ended shear piping on flow 
restricter at the high pressure instrument tap that feed CRM steam flow 
instrumentation, 100% power. This malfunction will cause the selected main steam 
line to rupture at the flow restricter inlet at a rate specified by severity. 
At very low severities, local drywell temperatures will increase. Drywell pressure 
increase will be small. The drywell floor drain sump will fill up faster, and the 
drywell cooling system will indicate temperature increases. At lower severities, the 
main steam flow will increase, measured flow will decrease, and reactor pressure will 
decrease. The turbine bypass and control valves will modulate close, if open, in an 
attempt to increase steam pressure. 
The feedwater control system will increase feedflow to control the increased 
demand. The hotwell level control system will begin to makeup from the 
condensate storage tank to maintain the hotwell level in the normal control band, 
compensating for the system mass loss. The drywell temperature/pressure will 
increase at an appropriate level consistent with severity. 
At higher severities, the excessive main steam pressure decrease will cause the main 
turbine control valves to close, attempting to maintain steam pressure. VV'henever 
the steam line pressure decreases to 8-50 PSIG, the main steam isolation signal and 
group I isolation will activate and the Main Steam isolation Valve (MSIV) will 
close, the reactor will scram, and the turbine bypass system will isolate. The 
reactor will continue to blow down, and the reactor pressure and level will decrease 
consistent with the severity. The drywell temperature/pressure increase will cause 
the ECCS to activate at 2 PSIG. and group isolation 11,111 IV will occur. Reactor 
pressure and temperature will decrease rapidly. 
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafile: 
ms03a.dat; Accident is main steam line header double ended shear, 100% . (20" 
line). IC'24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
ms03a_2.dat: Accident is main steam line header double ended shear, 60'?^. (20" 
line). IC24, 100% power. Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
ms03a_3.dat: Accident is main steam line header double ended shear, .30%. (20" 
line). IC24, 100% power. Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
MALFUNCTION MS04 
Malfunction is Main Steam Line (MSL) rupture outside primary containment. 
A. Steam line A 
B. Steam line B 
C. Steam line C 
D. Steam line D 
Generic, variable, 0 - 100% = 0 - 20" diameter double-ended shear, piping failure at 
ms common header, 100%' power. This malfunction will cause the selected main 
steam line to rupture outside the containment at the turbine inlet header at a rate 
specified by severity. At lower severities, the main steam flow will increase, and 
reactor pressure will decrease. The turbine bypass and control valves will modulate 
close, if open, in an attempt to increase steam pressure to control the increased 
demand. The hotwell level control system will begin to makeup from the 
condensate storage tank to maintain the hotwell level in the normal control band, 
compensating for the system mass loss. A Primary Containment Isolation System 
(PCIS) group I isolation is possible on steam line high temp (200 DEG F). and 
probability increases with severity. 
At 100%' severity, the PCIS group I isolation will be initiated on steam line 
low-pressure (850 PSIG in the run mode) with the steam line flow (140%) as a 
backup. The reactor will scram on MSIV closure. Because of the rapid steaming 
rate, the reactor water level will rapidlj' increase causing the main turbine and both 
reactor feed pumps. HPCI and RCIC, to trip. As the MSIVs close, steam flow 
through the break will cease, voids will collapse, and reactor water level will stabilize 
at some new lower level. Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) will respond to 
maintain adequate core cooling. The pressure rise in the turbine building will cause 
the blowout panels to function, releasing the steam cloud to the environment. 
Alalfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Dataflle: 
ms04a.dat: Accident is main steam line header double ended shear, 100%. (20" 
line). Outside primary containment. IC24, 100% power. Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
ms04a-2.dat: Accident is main steam line header double ended shear, 60%. (20" 
line). Outside primary containment. IC24, 100% power. Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
ms04a_3.dat: .Occident is main steam line header double ended shear, 30%. (20" 
line). Outside primary containment. IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
MALFUNCTION MS14 
Loss of extraction steam to feedwater heater 
.\) Heater 1A B) Heater 2A C) Heater 3.A D) Heater 4A 
E) Heater oA F) Heater 6A G) Heater IB H) Heater 2B 
I) Heater 3B .J) Heater 4B K) Heater .5B L) Heater 6B 
Generic, extraction line restriction, 100% power. 
This malfunction will cause the selected feedwater heater to lose extraction steam. 
The loss of extraction steam will cause the selected heater level to decrease and the 
associated heat gain across the heater will be lost. The resultant decrease in 
feedwater temperature will cause a power increase for the resultant load. The 
extent of power increase will be based on the heater selected, and/or the number of 
heaters selected. Worst case would produce a reactor scram on high flux. Less 
severe failures will produce possible long term effects for fuel failure considerations 
and administrative requirements. 
The reduced drain flow to the next heater in the drain line will cause its level to 
decrease and the heater level controller will modulate to compensate and maintain 
the setpoint level. The reduced flow will cause a cascading effect for the remaining 
heaters down line. Once the mass transient is over, the drain heaters individual 
level control system will compensate for the loss of extraction steam and stabilize 
transient condition. 
Malfunction removal will restore the effected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafiles: 
msl4-6.dat: Loss of feedwater heating to both feedwater heaters 6A Sz 6B. IC24. 
100%' power, middle of cycle. No associated severity. 
MALFUNCTION MS19 
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Malfunction is spurious group I isolation. 
A. Logic 'A' 
B. Logic "B' 
Generic, relay tailure, 100% power. This malfunction will cause the selected group I 
isolation relay to fail and cause the isolation signal to be generated. 
The failure of logic 'A' will cause the group I isolation annunciator to actuate 
without valve response. 
The failure of logic 'B' will cause the group I isolation annunciator to actuate 
without valve response. 
The tailure of both logic "A" and "B* will cause the below listed inboard/outboard 
isolation valves to trip closed. The valve positions will be displayed at the 
hand-switches and 1C03. The valves are listed below: 
lVIO-4423 MO-4424 CV-4639 CV-4640 CV-4412 CV-4415 
CV-4418 CV-4420 C'V-4413 CV-44i6 CV-4419 CV-4421 
The closing of the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) inboard or outboard will 
result in a reactor scram, turbine trip, and plant shutdown. Reactor high pressure 
will activate the Low Low Set (LLS). and reactor pressure will be controlled at 
about 900 to 1020 PSIG. 
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator 
action may be reciuired to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafile: 
nisl9ab.dat: .\ccident is feedwater relay failures A. and B logic causing a group I 
isolation. IG24, 100% power. Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
MALFUNCTION MS32 
Spurious group 7 isolation. Discrete. Short circuit causes relay CR4841 to energize. 
100% power. 
This malfunction will cause the selected group 7 isolation relay to fail and cause the 
isolation signal to be generated. 
The failure of relay CR4841 will cause the group 7 isolation valves to trip closed. 
The valve positions will be displayed at the handswitches and 1C03. The isolation 
valves are listed below: 
M04841A M04841B 
.M04841A/B closure will cause the respective recirculation pumps to loose cooling, 
overheat and fail. 
CVol 18A CV5718B CV5704A CV5704B 
CV5718A/B and CV.5704A/B closure will cause the drywell to loose cooling, 
drywell temperature and pressure will increase. .\t 2 PSIG the reactor will scram, 
emergency core cooling system (ECCS) will be initiated and PCIS group 2..3,4. and 
0 isolations will be initiated. 
Malfunction removal will restore the effected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafiles: 
ms32.dat: Spurious group 7 isolation. Isolates well water cooling to the drywell. 
IC24. 100% power, middle of cycle. 
MALFUNCTION RD13 
Loss of air pressure to control rod drive (CRD) hydraulic control units (HCUs). 
Variable 0 - 100% = 0 - 1.5 inch diameter pipe break. Air header piping failure. 
100% power. 
This malfunction will cause the loss of air pressure to the CRD HCU'S at a rate 
consistant with the piping failure specified by severity. 
Loss of air pressure will cause the flow control valves to fail closed eliminating the 
supply from the CRD pumps to the drive, exhaust and cooling water headers. The 
scram discharge volume will be isolated when CVS 1867.\/B and 1859.\/B fail 
closed. Manipulation of the rod control system will not be available, however the 
charging header will remain pressurized. The drive/exhaust valves. CV 1849,1850 
are fail open valves. If they loose air pressure the charging header pressure will 
insert the control rods. 
Malfunction removal will restore the effected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafiles: 
rdl3.dat: Transient is loss of air to HCU (RDl.3). 100% severity. IC24. 100% 
power, MOC. This is for the first trend file. 
rdl3_2.dat: Transient is loss of air to HCU (RD13). 60% severity. IC24, 100%^ 
power. MOC. 
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MALFUNCTION RP05 
Malfunction RPS scram circuit failure (ATWS). 
A. Auto-scram failure 
B. Manual-scram failure 
C. ARI failure 
D. RPS fuse removal failure 
E. All individual rod-scram switches fail 
F. H\'draulic lock-scram discharge volume 
Discrete, RPS scram circuit internal short circuit in wiring (A.B.C.D.E) scram 
discharge volume blockage (F), 100% power. This malfunction will cause the 
selected RPS scram circuit to fail to cause a reactor scram when actuated. 
(A.BiC'.D.E) selection of the hydraulic lock malfunction will reduce the scram 
discharge volume to simulate flow blockage. 
If the auto-scram is selected for failure, the plant will respond to the effects of the 
condition that generated the scram signal. The annunciators and indications will 
respond to auto-scram inputs as they are generated. However, the plant will remain 
operating until a protection feature or injection of sodium pentaborate causes the 
plant to shutdown. The reactor has the manual-scram capability functional, and 
the operator can utilize this mode as desired. 
With an active auto-scram, the plant will scram as required by logic whenever the 
appropriate condition exists. 
A failure of ARI to cause a scram will also cause a failure of the RPT breakers to 
trip on lo-lo reactor water level, high reactor pressure, or manual initiation of ARI. 
The effects of the manual-scram feature failures would be the response failure of the 
function to respond when activated manually. 
RPS fuse removal failure simulates a failure of the RPS fuse removal to work. 
Failure of the rod-scram switches simulates a failure of all 89 scram switches to 
work. 
The hydraulic lock malfunction reduces the volume and will allow the rods to 
partially insert, with each scram signal/reset applied. 
Insertion of all (6) generic failures will result in a "ATWS" condition. 
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafiles: 
157 
rp05tc0l.dat: Accident is trip of main turbine together with failure to scram 
(ATWS). No operator action. IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
Malfunction is YP:MTC01 (turbine trip) followed by YP;MRP05(A) (failure to 
automatically scram). Scram will be delayed and slow. .Scram is from alternate rod 
insert (ARI). Recirculation pumps also trip on ARI. ARI is triggered at 119'' vessel 
level or 1140 PSIG vessel pressure. Recirculation pump trips at turbine control 
valves fast closure or stop valves less than 90% open. 
rp5actcl.dat; Accident is trip of main turbine together with failure to scram 
(ATWS). and Alternate Rod Insert (ARI). No operator action. IC24. 100%. power. 
Middle of Cycle (MOC). Malfunction is YP:MTC0l (turbine trip) followed by 
YP;MRP05(.A) (failure to automatically scram) and YP:MRP05(C) (failure of 
•ARI). Recirculation pump trips on turbine control valves fast closure or stop valves 
less than 90%. open. 
MALFUNCTION RRIQ 
Malfunction recirculation pump speed feedback signal failure. 
A. Pump .A 
B. Pump B 
Generic, variable, 0 - 100% = 0 - 100%. of feedback signal, speed control circuit 
failure, 50% power. This malfunction will cause the selected recirculation pump 
speed-control feedback circuit to fail to the specified severity. The pump speed 
indicator will fail to the specified severity. With the tacho-generator signal failing 
below the speed demand/manual pot position signal, the recirculation pump actual 
speed will increase, and the scoop tube will increase to maximum or auto lock if 
auto-lock conditions are met. With the tacho-generator signal failing above the 
speed demand/manual pot position signal, the recirculation actual speed will 
decrease to minimum. 
The resulting effect on the plant will be the increase in power for an increased 
recirculation flow and a decrease in power for a decreased recirculation flow. 
Turbine generator power and control valve positions will respond as appropriate. 
Annunciator response to flow limits and control failures will actuate at setpoint. 
Reactor water level will respond to the opposite of the recirculation speed initially 
until feedflow and steam flow can get matched at the proper water level. 
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafile: 
rrlO.dat: Accident is recirculation pump speed feedback signal failure caused by 
speed circuit control failure IC24. 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
MALFUNCTION RR15 
Malfunction is recirculation loop rupture (design basis Loss of Coolant Accident 
(LOCA) at 100%). 
A. Loop A 
B. Loop B 
Generic, variable. 0 - 100% = 0 - 22" diameter double-ended shear piping failure at 
recirc pump suction, 100% power. This malfunction will cause the selected 
recirculation loop, inside the primary containment, to shear at the recirculation 
pump suction to the size specified by severity. 
At 100%' severity, the rupture will cause the recirculation loop and reactor pressure 
to decrease rapidly. The affected loop recirculation pump will cavitate and flow will 
be lost. Reactor water level will decrease rapidly as the reactor blows down through 
the rupture into the containment. The reactor water level decrease will actuate 
reactor scram, and reactor water level low, low-low. low-low-low isolation signals for 
groups 1. 2. 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, seal purge. The Core Spray (CS), High-Pressure Coolant 
Injection (HPCI). Low-Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCl), DG. and ADS systems 
will actuate and begin to flood the reactor with water. The RR pump discharge 
valves will close on the non-broken loop on the LPCT loop select signal. Reactor 
feed pumps will trip on overcurrent. 
At 100% severity, the HPCI and RCIC will receive initiation signals. However, the 
reactor pressure will decrease so fast that they will trip and isolate on low pressure 
before they will have any noticeable effect. Drywell pressure and temperature will 
increase rapidly and at 2 PSI group isolations 2,.3.4.8,9 will occur. Suppression pool 
temperature and level will increase in response to the rupture severity. The reactor 
will cooldown in response to the Emergency Core Coolant System (ECCS), and the 
event will eventually stabilize. 
This malfunction is unrecoverable, and the simulator will have to be reinitialized for 
malfunction removal. 
Datafiles: 
rrl5a.dat: Accident is recirculation loop rupture. 100% double-ended shear - loop 
a IC24, 100% power. Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
rrl5a_2.dat: Accident is recirculation loop rupture. 60% double-ended shear - loop 
a IC24, 100% power. Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
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rrl5a_3.dat: Accident is recirculation loop rupture. 30% double-ended shear - loop 
a IC24, 100% power. Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
MALFUNCTION RR30 
Malfunction is coolant leakage inside primary containment. Variable (exponential). 
0 - 100% = 0 -.12" diameter pipe (double-ended shear) reactor vessel bottom drain 
weld failure, 100% power. This malfunction will cause reactor coolant to leak from 
the reactor vessel bottom drain failed weld at a rate specified by severity. .As 
severity increases the mass loss from the reactor will easily be made up for by the 
hot well level control system. In fact, at 100% severity the effects on reactor 
level/hotwell level will be very small. The most effective display of mass loss will be 
at hot standby. 
At 100% severity, drywell pressure, temperature, and activity will increase. .At 2 
PSI, group isolations 2,.3.4,5,8 will occur. Suppression pool temperature and level 
will increase in response to the rupture severity. The reactor scram will result from 
the 2 PSIG drywell pressure, and a turbine trip will result from reserve power. 
The shutdown plant will cooldown in response to the Emergency Core Cooling 
(ECC) and will stabilize. The longterm effect of the leak will be the transfer of the 
Condensate Storage Tanks (CST) mass to the suppression pool via the leak in the 
reactor vessel. 
At small severities where the drywell pressure remains below 2 PSIG. the floor drain 
equipment system will see a high leak (in excess of the 5 GPM tech spec limit). The 
drywell cooler heat load will increase as seen on the cooler temperatures on 1C25. 
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafile: 
rr30.dat: Accident is reactor bottom head drain 100% single-ended shear (2" line). 
IC24, 100% power, Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
rr30_2.dat; .Accident is reactor bottom head drain 60% single-ended shear (2" 
line). IC24. 100% power. Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
rr30_3.dat: Accident is reactor bottom head drain 30%. single-ended shear (2" 
line). IC24, 100%o power. Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
MALFUNCTION RXOl 
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Malfunction is fuel cladding failure. Variable, exponential, 0 -100% = 0 - 30% fuel 
clad damage, fuel cladding degradation. 100%. power. This malfunction will cause 
the fuel cladding to fail to a value specified by severity. 
.\s the fuel failure increases, the amount of activity in the reactor recirculation and 
main steam system will increase. This activity will propagate throughout the plant 
and the radiation monitoring system will detect, indicate, and alarm as the activity 
increases. .\t low severities, offgas post-treat radiation monitors will cause ofFgas to 
isolate (without a group isolation) resulting in a loss of condenser vacuum, main 
turbine trips, and reactor scram. .A.s the severity increases, the main steam line 
radiation monitors will cause main steam line isolation and reactor scram at 
setpoint. As the normal power dependent background radiation levels decrease, the 
additional radiation levels will be more evident on area and process monitors. .A.t 
high severities the before mentioned will occur faster with more dramatic increases. 
Various system trips and isolations will occur, protecting the environment from 
excessive discharges. 
The sequence of the fuel failure indication will be as follows; 
1. OfFgas pretreat and post-treat radiation monitors increase 
2. OfFgas stack release will start to increase 
•3. OfFgas system isolates on post-treat hi-hi radiation level 
-I. Main steam line radiation monitors respond; 
a. MSL high radiation alarm 
b. Group I isolation 
c. Reactor scram 
5. Drywell monitors increase 
6. Torus radiation monitors increase from relief valve discharge or HPCT and/or 
RCIC exhaust. 
7. Reactor building area radiation increases from Emergency Core Cooling 
System (ECCS) system operation. (HPC'I, RCIC. LPCI, CS). 
NOTE; Malfunction severity will cause some of the above items to be "passed over" 
or will result in a delayed response. 
Datafile: 
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rxOl.dat: Accident is 30% Fuel clad failure. Causes high radiation alanu to go off 
IC24. 100% power, Middle ot" Cycle (MOC). 
MALFUNCTION TC02 
Malfunction is EHC hydraulic pump trip. 
A. Pump A 
B. Pump B 
Generic, motor failure. 100% power. This malfunction will cause the selected EHC 
pump motor to fail and trip on overload. The starter will open, and an annunciator 
will actuate. 
The unaffected EHC pump will start when the low pressure annunciator actuates at 
1300 PSIG EHC system pressure. 
If the unaffected EHC pump is unavailable or both EHC pumps are failed, the 
turbine will trip at 1100 PSIG EHC system pressure. When the turljine trip is 
initiated, the turbine stop valves, control valves, and combined intermediate valves 
will rapidly close. The reactor/main steam pressure increases rapidly activating the 
turbine bypass system. The turbine bypass system will modulate as necessary to 
control the steam pressure by dumping steam to the main condenser. reactor 
scram will occur as a result of the turbine trip. Recirculation pumps will trip when 
the RPT breakers open from a turbine trip. 
4KV bus close-circuit transfer is initiated. The main generator 286/B lockout relay 
will actuate from the anti-motoring trip protection. The main generator output 
breakers 3.52-H and or 352-1 will trip open and lockout. The generator e.xciter field 
breaker will open. Generator indication of current, voltage, megawatts, megavars. 
etc. will decrease to zero. .Appropriate annunciators for generator trip will actuate. 
The plant will stabilize in a post shutdown condition. 
Malfunction removal will restore the affected components to normal. Operator 
action may be required to restore the plant to normal. 
Datafile: 
tc02.dat: .Accident is EHC hydraulic pump trip causes pump motors to fail and 
trip on overload. IC24. 100% power. Middle of Cycle (MOC). 
SOME SELECTED INITIAL CONDITIONS (IC) DESCRIPTIONS 
IC-14 FULL POWER OPERATIONS (ANSI PARAMETERS) 
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A) Moderator temperature = saturated conditions 
B) Reactor pressure = power dependent 
C) Reactor power level = 100% power 
D) Reactivity = critical 
E) Xenon condition = li - I'yc equilibrium 
F) C'ore life = beginning of life 
This IC is set up to meet the ANSI criteria for 100% power. 
IC-20 FULL POWER OPERATION/MAX DECAY HEAT (EOL) 
A) Moderator temperature = saturated conditions 
B) Reactor pressure = power dependent 
C) Reactor power level = 100%i power 
D) Reactivity = critical 
E) Xenon condition = 100% equilibrium 
F) Core life = end of life 
This IC is similar to IC-15 except it has 20% more decay heat than normal. 
Note: Effective Jan 27, 1993. some changes in IC-nomenclature were made. 
The above initial conditions - the older "IC-20" - is now "IC-26" except that 
it has 20%' more decay heat than normal (see below). The new initial 
conditions •TC-20" is similar to IC-14 except that all cooling tower fans are on. 
IC-22 2.5% POWER (ANSI PARAMETERS) 
k) Moderator temperature = saturated conditions 
B) Reactor pressure power dependent 
C) Reactor power level = 2-5% power 
D) Reactivity = critical 
E) Xenon condition = equilibrium for 25% power 
F) Core life = beginning of life 
This IC is set up to meet the ANSI criteria for 25% power. 
IC-23 75% POWER (ANSI PARAxMETERS) 
This IC is similar to IC-22, e.xcept at 75%' power. 
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IC-24 FULL POWER OPERATIONS (MOL) 
This IC is similar to IC-14. except the core is at middle of life (MOL). 
IC-26 100% POWER (EOL) 
This IC is similar to IC-20 (i.e., the older version given above), except that it 
has 20% more decay heat than normal. 
Datafiles: 
icl4scra.dat: Accident is spurious scram. No operator action. IC14. 100% power, 
BOC. Malfunction is YP:MRP03. 
ic20scr2.clat: .Accident is spurious scram with operator action. IC20, 100%. power, 
EOC. Malfunction is YP:MRP03. Decay heat is 10% of full power. Operator action 
is according to Integrated Plant Operating Instruction (IPOI) NO. 5 - reactor 
scram. .Actions include; mode switch to shutdown position, feedwater level 
controller to 175 inches,, use reactor water cleanup to maintain RPV level, trip '.A" 
feed and condensate pumps, manually control feed regulator valves, insert all SRM 
and IRM detectors. Level was manually controlled to prevent the trip of feed 
pumps and turbine. 
ic20scrm.dat: .Accident is spurious scram. No operator action. IC20, 100% power, 
EOC. Malfunction is YP;MRP03. 
ic22scrm.dat: .Accident is spurious scram. No operator action. IC22. 2-5% power. 
BOC. Malfunction is YP:MRP03. 
ic23scrm.dat: .Accident is spurious scram. No operator action. IC23. 75% power. 
BOC. Malfunction is YP;MRP03. 
ic24scrm.dat: .Accident is spurious scram. No operator action. IC24, 100% power. 
MOC. Malfunction is YP:MRP03. 
